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 English Summary 
How do people make quantitative estimations, such as estimating a car’s selling price? 
Often people rely on cues, information that is probabilistically related to the quantity they 
are estimating. For instance, to estimate the selling price of a car they could use information, 
such as the car’s manufacturer, age, mileage, or general condition. Traditionally, linear 
regression type models have been employed to capture the estimation process. These models 
assume that people weight and integrate all information available to estimate a criterion. In 
my dissertation, I propose an alternative cognitive theory for quantitative estimation: The 
mapping model, inspired by the work of Brown and Siegler (1993) on metrics and mappings, 
offers a heuristic approach to decision making. In the first part of my dissertation, I laid the 
theoretical foundation for the mapping model, and tested this against established alternative 
models of estimation, namely, linear regression, an exemplar model, and a simple estimation 
heuristic. The mapping model provided a valid account of people’s estimates outperforming 
the other models in a variety of conditions. Consistent with the “adaptive toolbox” approach 
on decision making (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), which model was best in predicting 
participants’ estimations was a function of the task environment. In the second part of my 
dissertation, I further investigated how task characteristics influence the models’ ability to 
predict participants’ estimations by focusing on the assumptions the models make about the 
estimation process: While the exemplar model relies on the establishment of an exemplar 
memory base, the mapping model requires the abstraction of knowledge. I examined how 
different task features affect these assumptions and thus explain shifts in processing 
contingent on the task structure. My results indicate that explicit knowledge about the cues is 
decisive. When knowledge about the cues was available, the mapping model was the best 
model; however, if knowledge about the task was difficult to abstract, participants’ 
estimations were best described by the exemplar model. In the third part of my dissertation, I 
applied the mapping model in the field of legal decision making. In an analysis of fining and 
incarceration decisions, I showed that the prosecutions’ sentence recommendations were 
better captured by the mapping model than by legal policy modeled with a linear regression. 
These results indicated that the mapping model is a valid model which can be applied to 
model actual estimation processes outside of the laboratory. Furthermore, they suggest that 
deviations from legal policy can be explained by considering the cognitive processes of the 
decision maker. 
 Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Wie schätzen Menschen quantitative Größen wie zum Beispiel den Verkaufspreis 
eines Autos? Oft benutzen Menschen zur Lösung von Schätzproblemen sogenannte Cues, 
Informationen, die probabilistisch mit dem zu schätzenden Kriterium verknüpft sind. Um 
den Verkaufspreis eines Autos zu schätzen, könnte man zum Beispiel Informationen über 
das Baujahr, die Automarke,  oder den Kilometerstand des Autos verwenden. Um 
menschliche Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben, werden häufig linear additive Modelle 
herangezogen. Diese Modelle nehmen an, dass Menschen alle Informationen, die sie zur 
Verfügung haben, gewichten und dann zu einer Schätzung integrieren, indem sie die 
gewichteten Informationen addieren. In meiner Dissertation schlage ich ein alternatives 
Modell zur Schätzung quantitativer Größen vor. Das Mapping-Modell präsentiert einen 
heuristischen Ansatz auf der theoretischen Grundlage von Brown und Sieglers (1993) Arbeit 
zu metrics und mappings. Im ersten Kapitel meiner Dissertation lege ich die theoretische 
Basis des Mapping-Modells dar und teste es gegen weitere, in der Literatur etablierte, 
Schätzmodelle wie zum Beispiel eine lineare Regression, ein Exemplar-Modell und eine 
Schätzheuristik. Es zeigte sich, dass das Mapping-Modell unter unterschiedlichen 
Bedingungen in der Lage war, die Schätzungen der Untersuchungsteilnehmer akkurat 
vorherzusagen. Allerdings bestimmte die Struktur der Aufgabe ― im Einklang mit dem 
Ansatz der „adaptiven Werkzeugkiste“(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) ―  im großen Maße, 
welches Modell am besten geeignet war, die Schätzungen zu erfassen. Im zweiten Kapitel 
meiner Dissertation greife ich diesen Ansatz auf und untersuche, in wie weit das 
Zusammenspiel von Aufgabenstruktur und den Annahmen, die die Modelle zum 
Schätzprozess machen, bestimmt, welches Modell die Schätzprozesse am Besten beschreibt. 
Das Exemplar-Modell setzt die Speicherung von Exemplaren im Gedächtnis voraus, 
während das Mapping-Modell die Abstraktion von explizitem Wissen über die Aufgabe 
postuliert. Meine Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Struktur der Aufgabe beeinflusste, welches 
Modell die kognitiven Prozesse am Besten beschrieb. Das Mapping-Modell war am Besten 
dazu geeignet die Schätzungen der Versuchsteilnehmer zu beschreiben, wenn explizites 
Wissen über die Aufgabe vorhanden war, während das Exemplar-Modell den Schätzprozess 
erfasste, wenn die Abstraktion von Wissen schwierig war. Im dritten Kapitel meiner 
Dissertation, wende ich das Mapping-Modell auf juristische Entscheidungen an. Eine 
Analyse von Strafakten ergab, dass das Mapping-Modell Strafzumessungsvorschläge von 
Staatsanwälten besser vorhersagte als eine lineare Regression. Dies zeigt, dass das Mapping-
 Modell auch außerhalb von Forschungslaboratorien dazu geeignet ist menschliche 
Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben. Weiter weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass 
Abweichungen von gesetzlichen Regelungen auf die kognitiven Prozesse der 
Entscheidungsträger zurückgeführt werden können.  
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Introduction 
Quantitative estimation is an important task that people have to master in their daily 
lives, such as estimating the travel time for a journey, the risk of medical treatment, or the 
quality of a job applicant. For this task people rely on several diverse mechanisms. For 
instance, numerical estimates can be directly retrieved from memory, reconstructed, for 
example, from landmark dates in temporal estimation (Friedman, 1993, 2004) or estimated 
from rates of behavioral frequency (Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998). In my dissertation, I 
focus on a further mechanism of quantitative estimation: estimation from probabilistic 
information. 
To estimate a quantity of interest, people can rely on multiple sources of information, 
for instance, cues, which are probabilistically related to the criterion, that is, the quantity 
being estimated. For instance, to estimate the selling price of a house, people could rely on 
information, such as the house size, the quality of the neighborhood, or if it has a swimming 
pool. A variety of cognitive models has been proposed to describe the cognitive processes 
involved in quantitative estimations, with the purpose to clarify which information people 
rely on and how they use and integrate multiple pieces of information. Traditionally, linear 
models, such as multiple linear regressions, have been the model of choice dominating the 
literature on multiple cue judgments (Hammond & Stewart, 2001; Brehmer, 1994). 
However, recently, linear regression approaches have been criticized, and the need for more 
cognitively oriented models postulated (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Since then, several 
alternative models have been proposed (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, in press; Hertwig, 
Hoffrage & Martignon, 1999). In my dissertation, I propose a new cognitive theory for 
estimation from multiple cues, and test it against established models of estimation as well as 
newly proposed models. 
The Traditional Approach to Estimations: Social Judgment Theory 
Following the work of Egon Brunswik (1952) and Ken Hammond (1955), multiple 
linear regression became the dominant model to describe multiple cue judgments (Brehmer 
& Brehmer, 1988; Brehmer, 1994). Following from this seminal work “social judgment 
theory” was established (for an overview, see Doherty & Kurz, 1996). According to social 
judgment theory, human estimation follows a linear additive strategy that can be captured by 
a regression model (Doherty & Brehmer, 1997). The linear additive approach assumes that 
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first each cue is weighted according to its importance. Then, an estimate is reached by 
adding up the weighted cue values (Cooksey, 1996). Optimal cue weights are found 
analytically by minimizing the squared deviation between the estimated quantity and the 
estimation (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003).  
Since their introduction to judgment research in the 1950s, regression models have 
been employed to model judgment policies in many domains, reaching from predicting 
teachers’ evaluations (Cooksey, Freebody, & Davidson, 1986), medical decisions (Wigton, 
1996), analyzing psychiatrists’ diagnostic strategies (Harries & Harries, 2001), or modeling 
the bailing policies of judges (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975). Linear additive models have also 
been very influential in other areas of psychology; prominent examples include, among 
others, Anderson’s (1981) “information integration theory,” or the work of Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1980) on the impact of attitudes and social norms on behavior. However, despite the 
success of linear models in describing the outcome of a cognitive process (i.e., the final 
estimation), they have been criticized for not capturing the process itself (Brehmer, 1994; 
Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Hoffman, 1960; for a review, see Doherty & 
Brehmer, 1997). 
The Exemplar-Based Approach to Estimation  
Recently, exemplar models have been suggested as alternative models for explaining 
human estimation processes. Exemplar models have been successful in modeling the 
cognitive process underlying categorizations (Nosofsky & Johansson, 2000; Kruschke, 
1992). Due to this success, they recently have been considered as models of estimations 
(Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Juslin et al., in press). Exemplar models assume that 
encountered objects are stored in memory and retrieved if a new object is evaluated. The 
estimation is based on a judgment of similarity between the object under evaluation and the 
exemplars stored in memory. For instance, a professor evaluating the success of a 
prospective graduate student might think about former graduate students and estimate the 
success of the prospective student based on the similarity to the former students. 
The more similar an exemplar is to the object under evaluation, the stronger its impact 
on the estimation. The final estimate is given by the average of the criterion values of all 
stored exemplars, weighted by their similarities to the object under evaluation. Similarity is 
conceptualized as cue or feature based, that is, objects are described by their values on a list 
of features. Two objects are considered similar if their values on the features match, 
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however, the features can differ in their importance for the similarity evaluation, for 
instance, two objects matching on all but one feature can still be considered as different if 
this cue is of central importance. Similarly, a mismatch on a feature can be negligible if this 
feature is of minor importance. The overall evaluation of similarity is reached by integrating 
all features based on the context model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978).  
Juslin et al. (in press) argued that people’s estimation processes can be best captured 
by exemplar models in nonlinear environments, that is, when the cues are nonlinearly 
connected with the criterion. Consistent with this argument, they showed in several 
experiments that the exemplar model was better suited than the linear additive rule in 
predicting estimations when the criterion was a multiplicative function of the cues. Thus, the 
exemplar model seems to be a valid model for quantitative estimation. 
Heuristic Approach to Estimations 
A further recent approach to decision making comes from the literature on heuristics. 
In decision tasks, such as in paired comparison tasks, simple heuristics like Take The Best 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) have successfully been employed to model the decision 
process. Especially in complex decision situations and under time pressure, the simple 
heuristics were better suited to describe behavior than more complicated models based on 
optimization procedures (Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, in press; Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006; Bröder, 2000; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). This research indicates that, in many 
real-life situations, simple heuristics can predict human behavior well. In a similar vein, 
Hertwig et al. (1999) proposed a heuristic for estimation, QuickEst. QuickEst is a 
noncompensatory model, that is, it does not integrate information, but bases its estimation on 
only one cue. The cue on which the estimation is based is found by sequentially searching 
through all available cues. Once a cue fulfils a previously set criterion, search is stopped and 
an estimation is made. Although QuickEst makes accurate estimations in environments with 
a skewed criterion distribution, so far there is no evidence that it can model human 
estimation processes (Hausmann, Läge, Pohl, & Bröder, 2007). This leaves the question, if 
estimation processes can be modeled by simple heuristics, how can a heuristic model of 
quantitative estimations be devised, and in which conditions can it describe human behavior? 
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A New Cognitive Theory for Quantitative Estimations from Multiple Cues: 
The Mapping Model  
The goal of my dissertation work was to develop a simple cognitive theory that would 
capture the cognitive process underlying quantitative estimations. Inspired by the research of 
Brown and Siegler (1993), I developed the mapping model and tested it against established 
models of estimation. Although Brown and Siegler provide a comprehensive framework of 
quantitative estimation, they do not offer a computational model of the estimation process. 
Thus, the goal was to develop a computational model that is consistent with the framework 
of Brown and Siegler.  
The Mapping Model 
Brown and Siegler postulated that two types of knowledge are necessary to make an 
estimation. First, knowledge about the mapping properties of the objects is required. This 
knowledge reflects the ordinal relation among objects, that is, how high an object ranks on 
the criterion of interest, compared to the other objects. Second, knowledge about the metric 
properties of the criterion is necessary, such as the distribution, the mean, or the range. The 
mapping model describes how knowledge about the mapping properties of an object is 
linked to the metric properties of the criterion in the estimation process. In a first step, the 
mapping models use the cue information to capture the mapping properties of an object. 
Objects are grouped together according to their cue sums, inferring the ordinal relations of 
the objects from the number of positive cue values. Second, to represent the metric 
properties of the criterion, a typical criterion value is derived for each category by 
considering the criterion values of the objects falling into the same category. 
The mapping model only uses binary cue information so that each cue can have either 
a positive or a negative value. Cues are coded so that they are positively correlated with the 
criterion. To group the objects together, the mapping model makes the simplifying 
assumption that all cues are equally important, thus, all objects that share the same number 
of positive cue values are put into the same category. In the second step, the mapping model 
derives a typical criterion value for each of the cue sum categories, represented by the 
median criterion value of the objects in the same cue sum category. To evaluate a new 
object, the mapping model computes its cue sum and estimates the typical criterion value 
corresponding to the cue sum category. 
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Dissertation Outline 
In my dissertation, I propose the mapping model as a new model for quantitative 
estimation, and test it in several experimental studies against other competing theories of 
estimation. This dissertation is structured into three chapters that are based on three 
manuscripts. 
The first chapter, The Mapping Model: A Heuristic for Quantitative Estimation, 
focuses on the theoretical foundations for the mapping model. Past research had focused on 
linear regression as the predominant model to analyze quantitative estimations. However, 
recently, regression models were criticized because they do not describe the cognitive 
process underlying estimation (Hoffman, 1960; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), and the need for 
more process-oriented models was voiced (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999). In response to this criticism, several alternative models were proposed to 
capture human estimation (e.g., Juslin et al., 2003). Thus, the goal of the first chapter was to 
derive a model that can not only capture the outcome of estimations but also provides a 
plausible description of the cognitive process. Furthermore, the model would need to 
compete with alternative approaches to quantitative estimation.   
The framework for quantitative estimation by Brown & Siegler (1993) presents a 
plausible and comprehensive account of estimation processes. However, it lacks the precise 
formulation of a computational approach to quantitative estimation. Thus, the aim was to 
provide a computational model that can be integrated into the framework of Brown and 
Siegler (1993), and test it rigorously against current models of estimation: a linear additive 
model, an exemplar model (Juslin et al., 2003), and the heuristic QuickEst (Hertwig et al., 
1999) in varying task environments.  
In the second chapter, Models of Quantitative Estimations: Rule-based and Exemplar-
Based Processes Compared, I focus on a comparison of the exemplar model and the 
mapping model. In this chapter, I follow up on some open questions in Chapter 1. First, the 
exemplar model and the mapping model both provide an account for estimation processes in 
situations in which linear additive strategies are less successful. However, the models 
assume quite different estimation processes. While the exemplar model proposes an implicit 
similarity-based process, the mapping model assumes a rule-based estimation process. Thus, 
one goal of the second chapter was to clarify under which conditions the two models 
describe human estimation. More specifically, I investigated the role of two cognitive 
components which are essential for the assumptions that the models make about the 
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estimation process: exemplar memory and knowledge abstraction. I examined which task 
features affect these components and thus could be responsible for a shift from rule- to 
exemplar-based processing. Secondly, in the first chapter, I concentrated on quantitative 
measures to compare the models. In the second chapter, my goal was to devise and include a 
qualitative test that would allow for the models’ assumption to be tested more directly. By 
constructing situations where due to the assumptions about the estimation processes they 
make qualitatively different predictions, I provided a more rigorous test of the models 
assumptions.  
The third chapter, Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level Crimes: A Cognitive Modeling 
Approach, presents an application of the mapping model to a real-world problem. In the 
previous chapters, the mapping model was exclusively tested on laboratory data. However, if 
the mapping model aims to provide a plausible account of estimation, it also needs to 
perform well on real data. Sentencing decisions provide an interesting application, as they 
are a common estimation problem, but resemble the laboratory tasks in several ways.  In 
sentencing a continuous criterion, the magnitude of the sentence has to be determined on the 
basis of multiple cues, the characteristics of the offense and the offender. In addition, 
sentences often have a highly skewed distribution, and thus offer an especially interesting 
task because the mapping model performed well in a similar environment in the laboratory. 
Moreover, in the legal domain, a recent discussion has raised the question of, how far can 
legal decision makers abide the law (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2006). This 
question is highly relevant because sentencing decisions provide highly complex material, 
and are often made under time pressure, making it probable that legal decision makers 
deviate from the rather complex legal regulations. Here, the mapping model could make a 
contribution by highlighting the importance of the cognitive process for decision making. 
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Abstract 
How do people make quantitative estimations, such as estimating a car’s selling price? 
Traditionally linear-regression-type models have been employed to answer this question. 
These models assume that people weight and integrate all information available to estimate a 
criterion. We propose an alternative cognitive theory for quantitative estimation: The 
mapping model, inspired by the work of Brown and Siegler (1993) on metrics and mappings, 
offers a heuristic approach to decision making. We test this model against established 
alternative models of estimation, namely, linear regression, an exemplar model, and a simple 
estimation heuristic. With four experimental studies we compare the models under different 
environmental conditions. The mapping model proved to be a valid model to predict 
people’s estimates. 
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The Mapping Model: A Heuristic for Quantitative Estimation 
Estimating unknown quantities represents a judgment problem encountered frequently 
in daily life. People estimate the selling price of cars, the productivity of job candidates, or 
the travel time for journeys. To make these estimates, people use cues that are 
probabilistically related to the quantity being estimated; for instance, the selling price of a 
car can be estimated on the basis of the car’s mileage, age, or accident record. How do 
people make estimates? We approach this central question by introducing a new cognitive 
model—the mapping model. We test this model against alternative models of human 
estimation. 
Beginning with the work of Ken Hammond (1955), who was in turn inspired by Egon 
Brunswik’s ideas (e.g., Brunswik, 1952), linear additive models have been the standard for 
describing human judgments (Gigerenzer & Kurz, 2001). The research on “social judgment 
theory” (for an overview, see Doherty & Kurz, 1996) that followed from this seminal work 
encompasses a large body of studies examining people’s judgments in many areas, 
including, among others, clinical judgments (Harries & Harries, 2001; Wryobeck & 
Rosenberg, 2005), teachers’ evaluations of student achievement (Cooksey, Freebody, & 
Davidson, 1986), bail decisions (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975), personnel selection and 
evaluation (Zedeck & Kafry, 1977), and medical decision making (Wigton, 1996; for 
reviews see Brehmer & Joyce, 1988; Brehmer, 1994). In all these studies, people’s 
judgments are described by fitting a regression model to the data. Following the tradition of 
social judgment theory (Hammond, 1996) we hitherto refer to the quantity being estimated 
as the criterion and to the information used to estimate the criterion as the cues. Like the 
broader class of linear additive models, linear regression assumes that for each cue, the 
relation between the cue and the criterion is abstracted and represented by a weight, where 
the specific weight of a cue defines the cue’s impact on the final estimation. 
The strong influence of linear additive models is not restricted to research on judgment 
and decision making. For instance, the linear additive model was employed in Anderson’s 
(1981) “information integration theory,” which describes integration of social as well as 
physical information. Likewise it was adopted to describe the impact of social norms on 
behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1980). Despite the model’s success in describing human 
behavior, in the present article we challenge the assumption that the underlying cognitive 
process of human judgment follows the additive integration of weighted information. In its 
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stead we propose the mapping model as a new model of human estimation. This model is 
based on Brown and Siegler’s (1993) work on metrics and mapping. Our main goal was to 
test this model rigorously against a linear additive model, and additionally against alternative 
recent cognitive models of human estimation. 
The Mapping Model  
Brown and Siegler (1993; see also Brown, 2002) suggested that real-world quantitative 
estimations rely on knowledge about the mapping properties of the objects and the metric 
properties of the criterion. The mapping properties reflect the ordinal relations among the 
objects in one domain, that is, the knowledge about which object will have a higher value on 
the criterion compared to other objects. Knowledge about the metric properties, on the other 
hand, refers to the statistical properties of the criterion, such as the mean, the median, and the 
functional form of the distribution. Brown and Siegler (1993) assumed that to make accurate 
quantitative estimations, knowledge about both types of properties is indispensable, yet they 
did not specify a computational model describing human estimation. Therefore we suggest 
one that is inspired by the ideas of mapping and metrics.  
The mapping model specifies how knowledge about the mapping and metric properties 
of objects is acquired in two separate steps. First, knowledge about the mapping properties is 
gathered from the cues. The sum of the cue values is used to infer the ordinal relations of the 
objects and to group them into categories. Second, to represent the metric properties of the 
criterion, a typical criterion value is derived for each category by considering the criterion 
values of other objects falling into the same category. The mapping model only uses binary 
cue information, so that each cue can have either a positive or a negative value. Cues are 
coded so that they are positively correlated with the criterion. The knowledge about the 
mapping properties is then derived by a simple counting strategy, adding up the positive cue 
values for all cues J of each object i and categorizing them according to their cue sums: 
(1) ∑
=
=
J
j
jii ck
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where k denotes the cue sum of object i and cji refers to the cue value of object i on cue j.  
For each cue sum category a typical criterion value is abstracted, represented by the 
median criterion value of all known objects that share the same cue sum.1 To estimate the 
criterion value of a new object, the probe (p), the cue sum of the probe is computed and the 
typical criterion value of the corresponding cue sum category is used as an estimate:  
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where pyˆ  denotes the estimated criterion value for probe p, which is estimated by the 
median (Mdn) of the criterion values of all known objects i that belong to the group of 
objects with the same cue sum k as the probe p. If a cue sum category does not exist because 
no object with a corresponding cue sum was encountered in the past, the average value of the 
adjacent categories is employed as an estimate. 
We demonstrate the mechanism of the mapping model with the illustrative example of 
estimating the selling price (i.e., the criterion) of two mobile phones, let’s call them Psi and 
Omega, offered in an online marketplace. The phones’ features (i.e., weight, display size, 
digital camera, and Internet access) can be employed as cues to estimate the selling price. To 
estimate the selling prices of Psi and Omega we can compare them on the features to four 
similar phones, A, B, C, and D, that were sold in the past (see Table 1). The mapping model 
estimates that phone Psi will sell for $100, because of the four phones sold (A–D), only 
phone D—which sold for $100—falls into the same cue sum category. For phone Omega 
with a cue sum of one, the mapping model estimates the median price of the two phones A 
and B with the same cue sum, which sold for $10 and $20, respectively, yielding an 
estimated selling price of $15.  
Table 1: Mobile Phone Example for Illustrating the Predictions of the Models  
 Phone A Phone B Phone C Phone D Phone Psi Phone Omega 
Cues 
Digital camera - - - + + + 
Internet access - + + - + - 
Weight - - + + + - 
Display size  + - - + - - 
Criterion (selling 
price, in dollars) 10 20 30 100 ? ? 
Estimations of the models (in dollars) 
Mapping  15 15 30 100 100 15 
Regression 10 20 30 100 110 90 
QuickEst 15 15 20 50 30 15 
Exemplar 10 20 30 100 30 43 
Note. A plus sign indicates a positive cue value—for example, the phone possesses a digital 
camera or is lightweight; A minus sign indicates a negative cue value—for example, the 
phone does not possess a digital camera or it is heavy. Question marks indicate that the 
selling prize is unknown. 
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Alternative Theories of Estimation 
With the mapping model, we question the widespread assumption in cognitive 
psychology that human judgments follow a linear additive process of information 
integration. We first test the mapping model against the most established representative of 
linear additive models—linear regression. Because other models have recently been 
proposed to explain estimations from multiple cues, the mapping model is also tested against 
two of these competitors: an exemplar model (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003b) and a 
heuristic strategy (Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Martignon, 1999). We use our illustrative example 
to explain the models and show how their predictions differ.  
Multiple linear regression. Linear additive models assume that explicit cue–criterion 
relationships are abstracted and represented as cue weights. Multiple linear regression 
(MLR) computes optimal weights for every cue, minimizing the squared deviations of the 
prediction from the criterion (e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 2003). The weights indicate how much 
impact a given cue has on the estimate of the criterion. The estimated criterion value, pyˆ , of 
the probe p is given by the sum of the product of the cue values, cj, of the cues j with their 
respective weights, ωj, plus an intercept, ω0: 
(3) 0
1
ˆ ωcωy
J
j
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In our example, the four sold phones are used to fit the regression model. That is, the model 
finds the weights that minimize the squared deviation of the predicted from the real criterion 
value of the phones sold. In our example optimal weights for the cues are 80, 10, 10, and 0, 
respectively, with an intercept of 10. The fitted regression model then predicts a selling price 
of $110 and $90 for the new phones Psi and Omega, respectively.  
In addition we tested two simplified versions of this standard regression model. First, 
we included a stepwise regression model that includes only significant parameters (Hastie, 
Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2001). Second, we tested a simplified version of the regression 
model that was not fit to participants’ estimations. Instead, the optimal parameters for 
solving the task were selected a priori based on the objective criterion values. However, 
across all of the following studies the standard regression model was most successful in 
predicting participants’ estimations for new independent observations that were not used to 
estimate the models’ parameters, so that for the sake of clarity we only report the results for 
the standard regression model. 
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Exemplar-based model. A promising alternative approach to quantitative estimation is 
provided by exemplar-based models (EBMs), which in the past have been successfully 
applied to explain human categorization (for an overview see, for example, Nosofsky & 
Johansen, 2000). Exemplar models assume that people categorize objects by determining 
how similar they are to formerly encountered exemplars of the categories and assigning them 
to the category with the most similar exemplars. Thus, in contrast to a linear additive model, 
exemplar models do not assume the abstraction of cue–criterion relationships but rely on a 
knowledge base of memorized exemplars. Recently, Juslin et al. (2003b; Juslin, Jones, 
Olsson, & Winman, 2003a) reformulated the original context model of Medin and Schaffer 
(1978) for the area of quantitative estimation (see also Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; 
Juslin & Persson, 2002; Smith & Zárate, 1992). Juslin, Karlsson, and Olsson (in press, see 
also Olsson, Enqvist, & Juslin, 2006) showed that exemplar models are more suitable for 
predicting people’s estimations than linear regression when the cues are nonlinearly related 
to the criterion. 
The exemplar model proposed by Juslin et al. (2003a, b) is closely related to the 
generalized context model2 (Nosofsky, 1986, 1992; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Exemplar 
models assume a memory-based inference process. To estimate the criterion of a new object 
(the probe), the similarity of the probe to the exemplars retrieved from memory is 
determined. The more similar the probe is to an exemplar, the closer the estimate will be to 
the exemplar’s criterion value. The final estimate of the criterion is the average of the 
criterion values of all memorized exemplars, weighted by their similarities to the probe: 
(4) 
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where pyˆ  is the estimated criterion value for probe p; S is the similarity of the probe p to the 
stored exemplars i with the criterion value xi; and I is the number of stored exemplars in 
memory. The similarity S between the probe and an exemplar is determined by the 
multiplicative similarity rule of the context model (cf., Medin & Schaffer, 1978): 
(5) ( ) ∏
=
=
J
j
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, , 
where the variable d specifies the similarity between the probe and the exemplar on the cue 
dimension j, and dj takes the value 1 if the values of the probe and the exemplar on cue 
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dimension j match and sj if they do not. The parameter sj is an attention weight parameter 
capturing a cue’s importance for the similarity assessment and varies between 0 and 1. A 
large value for the attention parameter s close to 1 implies that a mismatch on this cue has 
almost no effect on the overall similarity, whereas a low value for s close to 0 implies that 
the cue is very important, because the overall similarity approaches zero if the cue values do 
not match. 
The standard exemplar model assumes that the importance given to each cue varies by 
using different attention parameters (e.g., Juslin et al. 2003a, b). However, by having one 
free parameter for each cue the exemplar model is relatively complex and it is an open 
question whether this complexity is required to capture the underlying cognitive process of 
estimations. To answer this question we additionally implemented a simplified version of the 
exemplar model, which assumes that only one single attention parameter s is used for all 
cues (see also Juslin & Persson, 2002). This single parameter then represents the gradient of 
the similarity function; that is, if s is close to 0 only very similar exemplars will influence the 
estimation, but if s is close to 1 also less similar exemplars will be considered. Finally, we 
implemented a third version of the exemplar model that did not fit parameters to 
participants’ estimations; instead, the parameter values were derived by using the objective 
criterion values of the objects in the training phase. It turned out that the simplified exemplar 
model with only one free parameter was most successful in predicting individuals’ 
estimations for new independent observations, so that for the sake of clarity we only report 
the results for the simplified exemplar model with the exception of the following simulation 
study and Study 4. When the simplified exemplar model is applied to our phone example, 
using an attention parameter of s = .001 to predict the phones’ selling prices, the selling 
prices of phone Psi and Omega were estimated to be $20 and $43, respectively. 
A heuristic for estimation—QuickEst. Although regressions models are able to describe 
the outcome of a cognitive process (i.e., the final estimation), they have been criticized for 
not capturing the process itself (Brehmer, 1994; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; 
Hoffman, 1960; for a review see Doherty & Brehmer, 1997). Gigerenzer, Todd, and the 
ABC Research Group (1999) have argued that the cognitive process of making judgments 
can often be best described with simple heuristics. Recent experimental work has illustrated 
that simple heuristics can predict people’s inferential choices well, in particular when the 
application of complex strategies is more costly (e.g., Bröder, 2000; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003; Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, in press; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In this 
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vein, Hertwig et al. (1999) proposed a heuristic for quantitative estimations, QuickEst, that 
uses only a small amount of information. According to the heuristic, people process cues 
sequentially and stop searching as soon as a cue has a negative cue value. Hertwig et al. 
showed that QuickEst’s predictions are as accurate as those of linear regression when 
applied in an environment where the distribution of the objects’ criterion values is J-shaped. 
A distribution is called J-shaped if most values are small and only a few high values exist, 
such as, for instance, the distribution of incomes.  
QuickEst uses only binary cue information. Each cue can have either a positive or a 
negative value. All cues are coded such that they correlate positively with the criterion. 
Accordingly, for each cue, objects with a positive cue value will on average have higher 
criterion values than objects with a negative value. Next, for each cue the mean criterion 
value of all objects that have a negative cue value is computed, here called the nil mean size 
(Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Sparr, 2007). Likewise the mean criterion values of the objects with a 
positive cue value are determined (conditional positive mean). The idea of QuickEst is to 
stop searching for more information as soon as it becomes probable that an object has a 
small criterion value. Thus QuickEst stops search as soon as a cue with a negative cue value 
is encountered or if the cue value for the object is missing. If a positive cue value is 
encountered, the next cue is considered until all relevant cues have been looked up. QuickEst 
searches through the cues according to their nil mean size beginning with the smallest.  
In contrast to Hertwig et al. (1999) we assume that the maximum number of cues that 
are searched for is a free parameter capturing individual differences. An estimation is based 
on the cue that stopped search. If the search was stopped because a negative cue value was 
encountered, the nil mean size of that cue is used as an estimate. If search was stopped 
because the maximum number of cues had been considered, the conditional positive mean of 
the last cue is estimated. For the estimates the means are rounded to the next spontaneous 
number3 (Albers, 2001). For our phone example, the nil mean sizes of the cues are 20, 55, 
15, and 25, respectively. QuickEst starts search by looking up the information of the phones’ 
weight, the cue with the smallest nil mean size. If this cue has a positive value, it continues 
search, considering whether the phone has a digital camera, and so on. Because phone Psi 
has a positive value on weight and has a digital camera, search continues until information 
for display size is looked up. As phone Psi has a negative value on display size, the rounded 
conditional mean of this cue ($30) is estimated as the selling price. For phone Omega, search 
Chapter 1: The Mapping Model of Quantitative Estimation                            Page |   20 
stops after looking up information for weight, and its nil mean size of $15 is estimated as the 
selling price.  
Testing the theories. Conceptually the theories we consider can be distinguished by 
two aspects: (1) the way they abstract knowledge from objects encountered in the past, that 
is, their knowledge abstraction assumptions; and (2) the way the abstracted knowledge and 
the information a probe provides is processed to make a final estimation, that is, their 
process assumptions.  
The regression model assumes an additive estimation rule. To build this estimation 
rule it abstracts knowledge about the cue weights from the encountered objects, taking the 
dependencies between cues into account. Once this rule is established, previously 
encountered objects can be forgotten. For the estimation process the model integrates all 
available information, determining a weighted sum of the cue values. Like the regression 
model, QuickEst assumes that knowledge, that is, the mean criterion values of the cues, is 
abstracted from encountered objects. However, QuickEst does not integrate any information; 
instead cues are searched sequentially and an estimation is made on the basis of one single 
cue. The exemplar model does not abstract much knowledge; instead it assumes that all 
encountered objects are stored in memory. Nevertheless, the knowledge of how much 
attention a cue receives is abstracted from the encountered objects. For the estimation 
process the exemplar model assumes that the information of all stored exemplars is 
integrated, by determining a mean of the retrieved criterion values weighted by the similarity 
of the retrieved exemplars to the probe. In sum, the regression model assumes heavy 
knowledge abstraction from encountered objects and an information integration process for 
estimation. QuickEst assumes knowledge abstraction and no information integration, and the 
exemplar model assumes little knowledge abstraction but relies heavily on integration of 
information for making an estimation.  
Similar to QuickEst and regression, the mapping model assumes a rule-based 
estimation process, relying on the abstraction of knowledge. The mapping model groups 
objects into categories on the basis of their cue sums, regardless of the pattern of cue values. 
For each cue sum category the criterion values of the objects falling into this category are 
stored (see also Footnote 1). For the estimation process the cues’ information on the probe is 
integrated by a simple adding rule. Then for each probe the median criterion value of the 
corresponding cue sum category is retrieved and used as an estimate.  
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How does the mapping model compare to the other models? The mapping model 
resembles QuickEst in the way it abstracts knowledge by categorizing objects into groups. 
However, while QuickEst bases its estimation on only one cue, the mapping model assumes 
that the available information is integrated. Similar to regression, the mapping model relies 
on an additive integration of information. However, it assumes that every cue contributes 
equally to the cue sum, whereas the regression model assumes differential weighting of cues. 
Further, the estimation process of the mapping model does not terminate with the integration 
of the cue values but continues with determining the typical criterion value using the median 
of the criterion values of the objects falling in the same cue sum category. As in the 
exemplar model, this retrieval process of the mapping model can be conceptualized as 
“similarity based,” because the retrieval is guided by finding the best match between the cue 
sum category determined for the probe and the criterion values for the categories abstracted 
from the objects encountered in the past. However, the exemplar model and the mapping 
model differ in how they define similarity. The exemplar model assumes that objects are 
represented in terms of discrete cue values and similarity is a function of the matches and 
mismatches on each cue. For the mapping model similarity is a strict function of the cue sum 
category. Thus, although the simplified exemplar model and the mapping model both assume 
that cues are equally weighted, two objects that the mapping model groups together because 
they share the same cue sum could be very different for the exemplar model depending on 
the pattern of cue values.  
Although the theories that we consider differ conceptually, empirically they often lead 
to similar predictions. To test the theories against one another it is therefore important to 
identify conditions under which the predictions differ. One aspect of the environment has 
already been shown to differentiate the theories: the distribution of the criterion values. 
Hertwig et al. (2007) found that QuickEst outperformed linear regression if the criterion 
distribution was J-shaped but performed poorly when the criterion was uniformly 
distributed. In J-shaped distributions characteristically only a few objects have high criterion 
values, while most have low values. Such distributions are so named because they resemble 
a J (rotated 90 degrees clockwise) if the objects are ordered according to their ranks. 
Formally, they can often be described by a power function (i.e., y = b × xa). A distribution 
following a power law additionally implies that the rank of an object is specifically related to 
its size, so that if log rank is drawn against log size, a straight line results. Likewise we will 
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refer to a uniform distribution as a linear distribution, because a straight line results if rank is 
plotted against size. 
The use of a criterion that follows a power function has a further advantage. Test 
situations that allow discrimination between models often consist of highly artificial cases 
that are no longer representative of the original problem. Power law distributions, on the 
other hand, are among the most prevalent distributions encountered in everyday life. Since 
power law distributions are related to general growth processes (Gabaix, 1999), they can 
well describe phenomena as diverse as people’s incomes, magnitudes of earthquakes, sales 
of books or music, or the sizes of computer files, moon craters, or cities (Levy & Solomon, 
1997; for a review see Schroeder, 1991). Therefore we extend the work of Hertwig et al. 
(2007) by conducting a simulation study to investigate how all the models discussed here, 
especially the mapping model, perform in an environment with a J-shaped and a linearly 
distributed criterion, respectively. 
Simulation study  
The goal of the simulation study was to examine how accurate the various models are 
in solving estimation problems under different environmental conditions. Furthermore the 
goal was to identify environments in which the models make distinct prediction that allow an 
experimental test.  
The simulations were designed to resemble an experimental condition as closely as 
possible, while still providing enough data to result in reliable evaluations of the models’ 
accuracies. First, J-shaped and linearly distributed criterion values, ranging between 2 and 
100, were created for 50 objects by using a power function (y = bxa, with a = −1, b = 100, 
and x ranging between 1 and 50) for the J-shaped environment and a linear function (y = bx 
+ c, with b = −2 and c = 102) for the linear environment. To investigate if potential accuracy 
differences would hold over a wide range of situations, we varied two further factors: The 
cue–criterion correlation and the percentage of positive and negative cue values per cue (for 
details see Appendix A). 
We examined models’ accuracies by cross-validation (averaged over 100 trials). That 
is, we randomly selected 100 times one half of the data—the calibration sample— to 
estimate the models’ parameters, and then we tested the models on the other half—the 
validation sample—to test the models’ accuracies for new objects. Models’ accuracies were 
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characterized by the root mean square error (RMSD) of the models’ predictions and the 
criterion values.  
How accurate were the four models? In general, accuracy was strongly affected by the 
distribution of the criterion value. In the linear environment, the RMSD was on average two 
times larger than in the J-shaped environment. When fitting the data of the calibration 
sample, all four models performed better than a baseline model, which always predicted the 
average criterion value of all objects of the calibration sample (see Table 2). The exemplar 
model was the best model in both conditions, and QuickEst was worst. However, the 
validation sample represents the crucial situation of making predictions for new objects. 
Here QuickEst performed best in the J-shaped environment, and the mapping model was 
second best, t(31) = 2.15, p = .02, with an effect size of d = .45 (Cohen, 1988). In the linear 
environment, the mapping model was the best in the validation sample, followed by the 
exemplar model, t(53)= 3.08, p < .01, d = .42, and QuickEst performed worst. These results 
illustrate that the criterion distribution influences models’ accuracies differentially. They are 
in line with the results of Hertwig et al. (2007), who reported that the accuracy of linear 
regression is affected negatively by a skewed distribution, whereas the accuracy of QuickEst 
deteriorates if the criterion is linearly distributed.  
Table 2: Models’ Average Accuracies (Root Mean Square Error) in the Simulation Study for 
the Two Environments 
Model J-shaped Linear 
 Calibration sample Validation sample 
Calibration 
sample Validation sample 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Mapping 14.3 3.5 15.3 1.6 21.6 5.1 25.9 6.4 
Regression 14 2.4 16.5 1.2 20.9 4.7 27.7 6.3 
QuickEst 14.8 1.7 14.9 1.1 24.8 3.5 28.3 3.5 
Exemplar 12 3.5 15.8 1.7 17.5 4.9 27.2 6.2 
Note. The models were initially fitted to the calibration sample, which contained 50% of the 
objects; the validation sample was used to cross-validate the results and comprised the other 
50% of objects. Model predictions in the validation sample were made by using the 
parameter values derived in the calibration sample. The variation in model accuracy was 
higher in the linear environment, as the design in the linear environment varied over a higher 
number of correlations, and magnitude of correlation affected the accuracy of the models. 
The difference in model accuracy between the calibration sample and the validation 
sample highlights the problem of over-fitting: Complex models with several free parameters 
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are highly flexible in fitting any data, running the risk of fitting noise instead of fitting 
systematic structure (see Olsson, Wennerholm, & Lyxzén, 2004; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 
2002). For this reason in our experimental studies we tested the models by using a 
generalization test (cf., Busemeyer & Wang, 2000): First, participants made estimations for a 
training set, which was later used to estimate the models’ parameters. Then they made 
estimations in a test set, which was used to test the models’ predictions against each other.  
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to test how well the four models of quantitative estimation can 
predict human estimations. To control for prior knowledge, participants were presented with 
an artificial inference problem. Following the work of Juslin et al. (2003a, b), participants 
had to estimate the toxicity of fictional bugs, which were described by five dichotomous 
cues. For a rigorous test of the models, the experiment varied the distribution of the criterion 
values in a between-subjects design. In the first condition, the linear environment, the 
criterion values were linearly distributed, whereas in the second condition, the J-shaped 
environment, the distribution of the criterion values followed a power law function.  
Method 
Participants. Sixty participants took part in the experiment: 30 women and 30 men. 
The participants were randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions, balanced for 
gender. They were on average 25 years old and most were students from one of the Berlin 
universities. The data of one participant in the linear environment was later excluded because 
the participant did not put any effort into solving the task, responding with the same number 
as an estimate in every trial. Participants were paid according to their performance in the 
task; the average payment was €13 for an individual session lasting on average 1.5 hr (with 
€1 corresponding to $1.28 at the time of the study).  
Procedure and materials. The study was conducted as a computer-based experiment. 
Written instructions informed the participants that their task was to estimate the toxicity of 
different bugs on the basis of five binary cues (color of head, length of antennae, color of 
wings, size, and biotope). The toxicity of the bugs was measured by the amount of venom in 
the saliva and could vary between 20 and 1,000 mg per liter. As a cover story the 
participants were told that the toxicity of the bugs differed depending on the subspecies the 
bugs belonged to and that the cues would help them to estimate the bugs’ toxicity correctly. 
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The bugs could not be distinguished solely on the basis of the cues, as some of the 
subspecies were very similar in appearance. In these cases only a genetic test could identify 
the correct subspecies. To speed up learning of the task, the participants were informed about 
the direction of the cues, that is, which cue values indicated higher levels of toxicity, without 
learning the magnitude of the correlation.  
Depending on the experimental condition the criterion was either J-shaped or linearly 
distributed. In both conditions, the experiment consisted of a learning phase, in which the 
participants could learn to estimate the bugs’ toxicity, and a test phase, in which the toxicity 
of new bugs had to be estimated. In the training phase the participants had to estimate the 
toxicity of 20 bugs. This phase consisted of 200 trials structured in 10 blocks, each 
presenting the 20 bugs from the training set in random order. The participants were not told 
that the same bugs would be repeated; instead each time a bug reappeared, it had a new 
number. In each trial one bug was presented with its five cue values on the screen and 
participants were asked to give an estimate of the toxicity of the bug. The order in which the 
cues were presented was randomly determined for each participant.  
After making the estimation, participants were given feedback about the accuracy of 
their estimate and received points accordingly. Participants’ payment was contingent on their 
performance. After the experiment the total number of earned points was exchanged into 
euros at a rate of €0.1 for 100 points. For each estimation that exactly matched the correct 
criterion value, the participants were awarded 100 points. Deviations from the correct 
criterion value led to fewer points, with increasing inaccuracy leading to a disproportionately 
larger decrease in points. Specifically, the feedback algorithm used the mean squared 
deviation of the estimation from the actual criterion value to determine how many points 
were subtracted from the maximum 100 points for an exact estimation.  
To create a moderately exacting feedback environment (Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, & 
Marquis, 1991), which has been shown to lead to high performance (Gonzalez-Vallejo & 
Bonham, in press), the feedback algorithm incorporated a correction term to account for the 
difficulty of the task (see Appendix B for details). The correction term consisted of a 
constant that determined the magnitude of the deviation that would result in a payoff of zero 
points. Any deviation exceeding the deviation by the correction term would lead to the 
subtraction of points. The correction term was chosen so that reliance on a baseline model 
that always estimated the same value would result in zero points. Since the baseline model 
reached a better fit in the J-shaped environment, the correction terms in the two 
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environments differed. In both conditions participants received 100 points for a correct 
answer; in the J-shaped environment a maximum of 355 points was subtracted for an error 
whereas a maximum of only 127 points was subtracted in the linear environment. In the 
instructions it was explained to the participants that subtracting points for errors was 
employed to correct for chance performance.  
In addition to earning points, the participants received outcome feedback on each bug’s 
actual criterion value, the mean squared error of their estimation, and their current total 
score. In the test phase the participants made the same judgments as in the training phase, but 
without outcome feedback. They were informed that nevertheless they would earn points 
according to their accuracy. The test set consisted of 21 profiles that included the old profiles 
from the training set as well as new profiles.  
The training and the test set were constructed so that the models’ predictions for the 
test set, given the training set, would be as different as possible.4 To find a training set–test 
set combination that would allow for good discrimination between the models in both 
environments, we first chose an environment from the simulation in which the models had 
differed in their predictive accuracy. In this environment each cue had 50% negative cue 
values and correlated positively with both criteria. We randomly selected 100 training sets of 
20 bugs from this environment under the constraint that the highest and the lowest criterion 
value were always included, ensuring the full range of the criterion for the estimations. All 
criterion values were multiplied by 10 to have a larger range. Then each model was fitted to 
the bugs of the training sets, maximizing the model’s accuracy in estimating the bugs’ 
toxicity. After fitting the models’ parameters, the models’ predictions were determined for 
all objects that did not appear in the training set.  
From the 100 training sets we selected the one that allowed the best discrimination 
between all four models on the new objects, given two additional restrictions. First, to avoid 
the objection that the participants simply learned to make estimations according to the best 
performing model in the training set, we excluded all training sets in which the models’ 
accuracy differed widely in the J-shaped environment. Second, we excluded all training sets 
in which the same cue profile appeared more than four times, to ensure that the differences 
in model predictions were not due to an extreme training set. Finally from the remaining 
training sets the one that maximized the differentiability of the models in the test set was 
selected, which was the set with the highest number of cue profiles for which two models 
made predictions differing by more than 100 mg/l of estimated toxicity. 
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The final training set consisted of 20 objects with 20 different criterion values, but 
with only eight different cue profiles, so that one profile appeared once, three profiles twice, 
three profiles three times, and one profile four times (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Task Structure of Study 1 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 J- shaped criterion Linear criterion 
0 0 0 0 0 20 20 
0 0 0 1 0 23 60 
0 0 0 0 0 26 80 
0 1 0 1 0 28 140 
0 0 0 1 0 29 160 
0 0 1 0 1 33 220 
0 1 0 1 0 34 240 
0 0 1 0 1 35 260 
0 1 0 0 0 40 300 
0 1 0 1 1 41 420 
0 0 0 1 0 47 440 
0 1 1 0 1 52 480 
0 1 0 1 0 62 540 
0 1 0 1 1 71 640 
0 1 0 0 0 110 660 
0 1 0 1 1 160 720 
1 1 1 1 1 200 840 
0 1 0 1 1 250 880 
1 1 1 1 1 500 920 
1 1 1 1 1 1,000 1,000 
 
All cues correlated positively with the criterion and the cue–criterion correlations 
differed between .30 and .79 (see Table 4). For the test set, the cue profiles for which the 
four models made the most different predictions were selected. For any pairwise model 
comparison, at least four profiles allowed a good differentiation between the two models. 
Also the bugs of the training set were included in the test set. The test sets of the linear and 
the J-shaped environments and the models’ predictions based on the training set can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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Table 4: Correlations Between Cues and Criteria in Study 1 
 Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 
J-shaped criterion .79 .35 .48 .30 .42 
Linear criterion .65 .66 .37 .39 .62 
 
How well could the different models solve the estimation problem in the training 
phase? In the J-shaped environment the models’ predictions, when fitting the parameters to 
the objective criterion values, deviated from the criterion with a mean root mean square 
deviation (RMSD) of 136 and could explain about 64% of the variance. QuickEst and the 
mapping model did slightly worse than the other models. Because the training set in both 
environments consisted of the same cue profiles, the models’ accuracies could not be 
controlled for in the linear environment, but the accuracies did not differ substantially among 
the regression, exemplar, and mapping model (M = 145, SD = 11). Only QuickEst with an 
RMSD of 183 did clearly worse than the other models. Although the RMSD in the linear 
environment was higher on average, the models could explain more linear variance (average 
r² = .74). 
Results 
Overall, the mapping model explained the predictions of the participants best in the 
test phase, if all conditions were considered jointly. However, the distribution of the criterion 
played an important role. In the J-shaped environment the mapping model was clearly the 
best model, whereas in the linear environment the standard regression model and the 
exemplar model with only one parameter performed equally well. Before we come to the 
model comparisons, we first report participants’ accuracy. 
Accuracy of the participants. Participants’ accuracy was measured by the RMSD 
between participants’ estimations and the criterion and by the Pearson correlation of the 
estimations with the criterion. Participants were quite successful in learning the bugs’ 
toxicity levels during the training phase, in particular when considering that due to the 
indistinguishable cue profiles perfection was not possible. The strongest learning effects 
were observed between the first and the fourth block. Overall, the mean RMSD dropped in 
both environments from 236 (J-shaped) and 232 (linear) in the first block to 149 and 194, 
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respectively, in the 10th block. The last three blocks showed no significant learning effects, 
so the data were merged for the further analyses. The average accuracy in the linear 
environment (RMSD = 210) was worse than in the J-shaped environment (RMSD = 163), U 
= 104, p < .01. However, the average amount of variance explained did not differ; r2linear = 
.58, r2J-shaped = .58. 
Estimating the models’ parameters. As the primary measure of the models’ goodness-
of-fit, the RMSD between the participants’ estimations and the models’ predictions was used. 
The models’ parameters were estimated by minimizing the RMSD for participants’ 
estimations in the last three blocks of the training phase. The models were tested against 
each other on the basis of the RMSDs of their estimations for the test phase. Additionally we 
considered the degree of linear variance explained by the models (the coefficient of 
determination r2), because the two measures capture slightly different aspects of model fit 
and r2 is the preferred measure in the social judgment theory literature. But since the two 
measures are not independent all model tests are solely based on the models’ RMSD.5  
The models were fitted individually to each participant: For the linear regression the 
parameters were determined analytically using the cues of the training set and the individual 
participants’ estimates. The exemplar model was fitted on the last three blocks of the training 
phase with the correct cue and criterion values of the training set as the memory base. The 
best parameter for each participant was searched for by using the quasi-Newton optimization 
method as implemented in MATLAB. To avoid local minima, parameters were first derived 
by a grid search with the results serving as the starting values for the subsequent fitting 
procedure. For QuickEst only one parameter had to be estimated specifying the maximum 
number of cues considered, and here the optimal parameter value was selected by an 
exhaustive search. If different numbers of cues reached the same fit the lowest number was 
selected. The mapping model entails no free parameters, so no parameter was estimated; the 
medians for the different categories the mapping model used were determined on the basis of 
the objects’ criterion values in the training set.  
Model comparison—training phase. We first compared each model’s fit with the fit of 
a baseline model in the training phase, which predicted only one single value for all objects 
encountered; the specific value the baseline model predicted was fitted to the data of the 
training phase. The baseline model reached an average fit of RMSD = 289 in the linear 
environment and of 225 in the J-shaped environment. Because the baseline model is a rather 
naïve model of estimation, any of our four models needs to prove first that it can do better by 
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taking the dependencies of the estimations on the cue profiles into account. For the training 
phase all four models did better than the baseline model in predicting participants’ 
estimations (see Table 5). To test if one model could explain participants’ estimations 
significantly better than another model we used a non-parametric test (i.e., the Wilcoxon Z-
test). In describing the data of the training phase, the regression model did best in both 
environments, followed by the exemplar model (linear: MLR vs. EBM, Z= −4.67, p < .01; J-
shaped: Z = −4.78, p < .01), explaining more than 80% of the variance in the linear 
environment and almost 80% in the J-shaped environment (see Table 5). The mapping model 
and QuickEst did significantly worse than the other two models, particularly in the linear 
environment. As described above, for clarity we only report the results for the standard 
regression model with six free parameters and the simplified exemplar model with one free 
parameter (for the results of the other versions see Appendix D). 
Table 5: Models’ Average Accuracies in Predicting Participants’ Estimations in Study 1  
 Linear environment J-shaped environment 
 Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar  Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar
Training set 
RMSD 149 93 168 138    125 98 125 116 
SD 35 26 23 62    41 40 40 37 
r2 .75 .89 .69 .81    .77 .77 .76 .76 
SD 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.08  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Test set 
RMSD 158 166 285 161    139 342 166 166 
SD 49 56 46 40    93 124 101 70 
r2 .68 .67 .31 .67    .55 .20 .39 .47 
SD 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.13   0.23 0.23 0.24 0.17 
Note. The number of participants was 29 in the linear environment and 30 in the J-shaped 
environment. The exemplar model had one free parameter. 
However, the models’ fit for the training phase is not very meaningful for testing the 
models against each other: Even though we tried to put the models on more equal footing, 
they still differed in their complexities, that is, in the number of free parameters and the 
complexity of their functional form. Thus it is not surprising that the models with greater 
flexibility—the regression and the exemplar model—did better in fitting the data than the 
mapping model. Therefore the crucial model comparison test consists of how well the 
models predict participants’ estimations for new independent objects of the test phase. This 
generalization test goes beyond a pure cross-validation test, because the new objects of the 
test phase differed from the objects of the training phase. 
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Model comparison—test phase. The models’ predictions for the test phase were 
determined on the basis of the estimated parameters of the training phase. The baseline 
model reached a better fit in the test set than in the training set with an average fit of RMSD 
= 180 in the J-shaped environment and RMSD = 282 in the linear environment. This is 
presumably because the new profiles included in the test set had less extreme cue profiles; 
that is, the new profiles had a maximum of only four positive cues and a minimum of one 
positive cue (see Appendix C). In the linear environment, the regression model, the exemplar 
model, and the mapping model did better, on average, than the baseline model (baseline vs. 
EBM: Z = −4.68, p < .01). In the J-shaped environment, QuickEst and the mapping model 
were able to beat the baseline model (QuickEst vs. baseline: Z = −2.05, p = .04), while the 
exemplar model could not be distinguished from the baseline model (EBM vs. baseline: Z = 
−1.37, p = .18) and the regression model performed worse than the baseline model (MLR vs. 
baseline: Z = −3.47, p < .01).  
Figure 1 illustrates the models’ different successes in predicting participants’ 
estimations. The figure shows the models’ and participants’ average estimations for each 
profile of the test phase, demonstrating that in the linear environment it is difficult to 
discriminate between the models, whereas in the J-shaped environment the mapping model 
predicted participants’ estimations best. In the linear environment the regression model, the 
exemplar model, and the mapping model performed equally well and significantly better 
than QuickEst (QuickEst vs. MLR: Z = −4.5, p < .01; see also Table 5). In the J-shaped 
environment the mapping model was the best model in predicting the estimations (mapping 
model vs. EBM: Z = −3.2, p < .01) and the exemplar model was indistinguishable from 
QuickEst (QuickEst vs. EBM: Z = −.03, p = .98), but both the exemplar model and QuickEst 
outperformed the regression model (QuickEst vs. MLR, Z = −3.59, p < .01). 
Chapter 1: The Mapping Model of Quantitative Estimation                            Page |   32 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Cue profiles of the test phase
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
E
st
im
at
io
ns
 / 
P
re
di
ct
io
ns
Participants
Mapping
Regression
Exemplar
QuickEst
Linear Environment
A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Cue profiles of the test phase
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
E
st
im
at
io
ns
 / 
P
re
di
ct
io
ns
Participants
Mapping
Regression
Exemplar
QuickEst
J-shaped Environment
B
 
Figure 1: Models’ predictions and participants’ estimations in the test phase for (A) the 
linear environment and (B) the J-shaped environment of Study 1. The profiles in the test set 
are rank ordered according to the participants’ average estimations. In the linear 
environment, profiles 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, and 21 were included in the test and training set. 
In the J-shaped environment, profiles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 21 were included in the test set 
and the training set. 
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To consider individual differences, we examined which model, including the baseline 
model, was best in predicting each participant’s estimations (according to the RMSD). In the 
linear environment, the mapping model was best in predicting the estimations for 12 
participants (41%), the regression model was best for 11 (38%), the exemplar model for 5 
(17%), and QuickEst for 1 (3%) participant. In the J-shaped environment, the mapping 
model was best for 16 participants (53%), QuickEst for 6 (20%), and the baseline model for 
2 (7%). The regression model and the exemplar model, respectively, predicted the 
estimations of 3 (10%) participants best. In sum, the individual analyses led to the same 
conclusions as the analysis of the aggregated results: The mapping model was the best model 
in predicting participants’ estimations. It did as well as the regression model for the linear 
environment, and it was the outstanding model for the J-shaped environment.  
Discussion of Study 1  
Study 1 showed that the mapping model was able to predict participants’ estimations 
well in both environments, suggesting that it could be a simple alternative to standard 
estimation models. Although in the linear environment all models performed equally well, 
the exemplar model and the regression model made worse predictions compared to the 
mapping model in the J-shaped environment. Even though Juslin, et al. (2003, in press) 
showed that the exemplar model performed well in a related task, in our study, people 
apparently did not rely on an exemplar-based estimation process. However, this conclusion 
needs to be limited to the experimental situation considered, which might have been 
disadvantageous for an exemplar-based process. In particular, some of the cue profiles in the 
experiment were indistinguishable. Although this is a realistic feature in quantitative 
estimations in everyday life it could nevertheless have impeded an exemplar-based inference 
process, by making it more difficult to establish memory traces for the exemplars. Therefore 
in Study 2 an experimental situation was created that should favor an exemplar-based 
inference process and should increase the differentiability of the models in the linear 
environment. 
Study 2 
The first goal of Study 2 was to examine the reasons for the poor performance of the 
exemplar model in Study 1. As described above, using objects with identical cue profiles but 
with different criterion values could have made memorization of exemplars cognitively very 
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demanding. Therefore in Study 2 each cue profile appeared only once in the training set. 
Additionally, the objects (i.e., bugs) were given names to emphasize that the same objects 
had to be evaluated several times. This procedure made memorization of exemplars easier 
and fostered an exemplar-based inference process. It also allowed, in principle, perfect 
performance in the training phase, when following an exemplar-based estimation process. 
Thus, Study 2 provided good conditions for the exemplar model.  
To test the exemplar model against the mapping model, in the test phase of the 
experiment all possible cue profiles that could be created with the limited number of cues 
were presented to the participants, so that some of the profiles had been encountered before 
in the training phase and some were new. The objects of the training set were presented with 
new names in the test phase to test for memory effects of the pure cue profiles, excluding 
memory effects due to memorizing exemplars by their names. To examine the consistency in 
estimations all profiles were presented twice, again with new names at the second 
appearance. This allowed us to compare the consistency in estimations for the old profiles 
encountered in the training phase with the consistency for the new profiles. Larger 
consistency for known profiles than for new profiles would indicate that memory processes 
played an important role in the estimations, whereas no differences between old and new 
profiles would speak in favor of a rule-based approach, described, for instance, by the 
mapping model. Finally, in Study 2 we aimed for an increased discrimination between the 
models’ predictions.  
Method 
Participants. In Study 2, 50 participants took part and were randomly distributed to the 
two conditions, balanced for gender; 25 were women and 25 were men. The mean age was 
25 years and the participants were mostly recruited from the universities in Berlin. 
Participants were paid according to their performance with an average payment of €17 for an 
individual session lasting on average 1.5 hr.  
Design, procedure, and materials. The procedure of Study 2 was similar to that of 
Study 1, in that participants solved the same estimation task. In contrast to Study 1, the 
participants only had to learn 19 bugs in the training phase and had to estimate 64 (2 × 32) 
bugs in the test phase. They were told that in the training phase the same 19 bugs would 
appear 10 times each, whereas in the test phase they would have to evaluate unknown bugs. 
To ensure that the participants would recognize the bugs when they reappeared, each bug 
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received a male German name. The names were randomly assigned from a list of the most 
common German names. Otherwise the procedure was the same as in Study 1. Participants 
were paid according to the accuracy of their estimations. A similar feedback algorithm to 
that from Study 1 was used, with the correction terms based on the fit of the baseline model 
(for details see Appendix B).  
In Study 2 the training set and the test set were selected in a similar way to Study 1, 
though with different constraints. The main objective was to improve differentiation between 
the mapping model, the regression model, and the exemplar model in the linear environment 
and the mapping model and QuickEst in the J-shaped environment. This was limited, 
however, by the restriction of unique profiles in the training set. Additionally, in Study 2 the 
correlation of the cues with the criterion was the same for the linear and the J-shaped 
environment (but the cue–criterion correlations differed substantially within the 
environments). Because in Study 1 this correlation differed between the environment 
conditions, this could explain why the participants differed in their accuracy of estimating 
the bugs’ toxicity in the linear and the J-shaped environment. These changes led to slightly 
different training sets for the two conditions.  
As in Study 1 we examined how well the models predicted the criterion values in the 
training phase. The exemplar model estimated the criteria perfectly in both environments, 
due to the unique profiles. All other models did worse with the linear environment than with 
the J-shaped environment. In the linear environment the regression model was the second-
best model, explaining 65% of the variance of the criterion (RMSD = 177), whereas the 
worst model, QuickEst, explained only 32% of the variance (RMSD = 269). In the J-shaped 
environment, the mapping model reached the second-best accuracy for estimating the 
criterion values, explaining almost 90% of the variance (RMSD = 78), and the regression 
model was the worst (RMSD = 143, r² = .60). In sum, the models’ accuracies differed 
substantially for the training phase, which can be explained by two factors. First, we created 
a task structure that kept the cue–criterion correlations in the linear and the J-shaped 
environment equal. Second, items were selected such that the differences between the 
models’ predictions for the test phase were increased. Both factors increased the differences 
of the models’ accuracies in the training phase.  
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Results 
Overall, we were able to replicate the results of Study 1. The mapping model was 
again the best model for predicting participants’ estimations when both conditions were 
considered jointly, and it outperformed all other models in the J-shaped environment. The 
exemplar model, however, did not substantially profit from the changes in the experimental 
structure, suggesting that exemplar-based estimation processes do not occur very frequently.  
Accuracy and consistency of participants’ estimations. The accuracy of the participants 
was measured in the same way as in Study 1 with the RMSD between the participants’ 
estimations and the criterion. The participants mastered the estimation task very easily. The 
mean RMSD dropped in the linear condition from 279 in the first block to 148 in the 10th 
block. In the J-shaped environment the accuracy increased from an almost equally high error 
in the first block (RMSD = 215) to an RMSD of 51 in the 10th block. Just as in Study 1 the 
data from the three last blocks was merged to analyze the performance. The average RMSD 
in the linear environment was three times as high as in the J-shaped environment [RMSDlinear 
= 164 vs. RMSDJ-shaped = 58; U = 68, p < .01]. Likewise, the achievement measured by the 
Pearson correlation between the criterion and the estimations was on average r = .82 in the 
linear environment and r = .96 in the J-shaped environment (U = 87, p < .01). In sum, 
participants’ different accuracies in the two environments reflect the environments’ different 
difficulties. 
The cue profiles of the test phase were split into two groups, one consisting of the old 
profiles known from the training phase and the other containing only new profiles (Table 6). 
To investigate participants’ consistency, the correlations (and the RMSD) between the two 
estimations for the same profile presented twice in the test phase were determined. The 
participants were equally consistent in the two environments in their estimations for the old 
profiles, rlinear = .90 vs. rJ-shaped = .89; U = 239; p = .16, but the estimations for the new 
profiles were less consistent in the linear environment than in the J-shaped environment, 
rlinear = .67 vs. rJ-shaped = .78, U = 207; p = .04. The consistency for the new profiles was 
significantly lower than the consistency for the old profiles, rnew = .72 vs. rold = .90; Z = 
−5.03, p < .01. The higher consistency in the J-shaped environment indicates that 
participants relied more on rule-based processes in the J-shaped environment than in the 
linear environment. However, the drop in consistency from the old profiles to the new 
profiles suggests memory effects, as the application of rules should not be influenced by the 
familiarity of the profile.  
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Table 6: Mean Consistency of the Participants in the Test Set of Study 2 
 Linear  J-shaped 
 r SD RMSD SD         r SD RMSD SD 
Old profiles .89 0.08 129 48      .91 0.10 89 54 
New profiles .67 0.17 146 56  .78 0.17 86 42 
Note. There were 25 participants in the linear environment and 25 in the J-shaped 
environment.  
Response times. In Study 2 we measured the response times for the estimations. 
Response times dropped during training from a median response of 14.7 s in the first block 
to 7.5 s in the 10th block. There were no significant difference between the two conditions in 
the training phase, Mdnlinear = 8.4s vs. MdnJ-shaped = 7.1s (U = 255, p = .27), or the test phase 
(U = 238, p = .15). Participants responded faster at the end of the training phase (Mdn = 7.4 
s) than in the test phase (Mdn = 9.9 s; Z = −4.01, p < .01), but there was no difference in 
response time between old and new profiles (Z =−1.3, p = .20). 
Model comparison. The fit of the models was quantified in the same way as in Study 1. 
Again, the data of the last three blocks of the training phase were used to estimate the 
models’ parameters and the fitted models were employed to make predictions for the test 
phase. Here we focus on the model performance in the generalization test, but the models’ 
fits in the training set can be found in Appendix E. For the generalization test the items of 
the test phase were split into two groups: one consisting of the old cue profiles encountered 
in the training phase and the other of only new profiles that had not been encountered before. 
We first report the results on the old profiles and then come to the decisive comparison in 
predicting the estimations for the new profiles. In the linear environment, the regression 
model was the best model for the old profiles, with a significant advantage over the exemplar 
model (Z = −2.70, p < .01) and the mapping model (Z = −3.16, p < .01; see Table 7 for the 
means). In the J-shaped environment the exemplar model and the mapping model were 
equally good in predicting the estimations for the old profiles in the test phase (Z = −.71, p = 
.47) and significantly better than QuickEst or the regression model (mapping model vs. 
MLR: Z = −4.32, p < .01).  
However, the crucial model test consists of considering how well the models are able 
to predict participants’ estimations for new, independent profiles. As in Study 1, the baseline 
model was first used as a comparison standard for model performance. For the new profiles, 
the baseline model reached an average fit of RMSD = 213 in the linear environment and of 
RMSD = 136 in the J-shaped environment. Although the exemplar model, the regression 
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model, and the mapping model were better than the baseline model in the linear environment 
(EBM vs. baseline: Z= −3.32, p <.01), only the mapping model beat the baseline model in 
the J-shaped environment (mapping model vs. baseline: Z = −4.37, p <.01). This indicates 
that the rather naïve baseline model might not be so bad after all. Especially in the J-shaped 
environment, its estimations can be quite accurate, as most of the objects have similarly low 
criterion values. It also resonates with research on human estimation showing that people 
tend to rely on the mean if they must predict new objects without further information 
(Helson, 1964). 
When comparing the models against each other the regression model, the mapping 
model, and the exemplar model were equally good predictors of the participants’ estimations 
of the new objects in the linear environment (see Table 7; mapping vs. MLR: Z = −.18, p = 
.87; MLR vs. EBM: Z = −1.28, p = .21). In the J-shaped environment, the results become 
much clearer, particularly when we focus on the new objects. The mapping model was the 
best model; the exemplar model came in second, performing significantly worse than the 
mapping model (Z = −3.27, p < .01). Both models performed distinctly better than the 
regression model or QuickEst. In sum, the two best models (MLR and mapping) 
demonstrated a quite impressive fit, coming close to the variance in participants’ estimations 
caused by inconsistencies. This error variance provides an upper limit of the fit that can be 
reached by any deterministic model. Surprisingly, the exemplar model could not predict 
participants’ estimations better than in Study 1, although Study 2 provided better conditions 
for a memory-based estimation process. 
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Table 7: Models’ Average Accuracies in Predicting Participants’ Estimations in the Test 
Phase of Study 2 (Test Set) 
 Linear J-shaped 
 Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar
Old 
RMSD 160 139 244 165 92 156 147 88 
SD 35 36 33 35 26 9 24 31 
r2 .68 .76 .33 .68 .84 .54 .69 .85 
SD 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.11 
New 
RMSD 174 172 246 184 100 216 163 148 
SD 43 58 51 42 58 34 33 24 
r2 .38 .50 .25 .37 .61 .44 .29 .50 
SD 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.19 
Total 
RMSD 167 154 246 174 99 186 156 118 
SD 34 44 35 32 13 17 21 18 
r2 .60 .67 .27 .58 .77 .36 .44 .70 
SD 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.09 
Note. There were 25 participants in the linear environment and 25 in the J-shaped 
environment.  
Qualitative analyses. The mapping model proved itself as a valid competitor with the 
other models. However, to enhance this conclusion drawn from the quantitative model 
comparison, it is desirable to provide additional qualitative support. The predictions of the 
mapping model are based on typical criterion values abstracted during the training phase. 
The mapping model assumes that this typical criterion value is the median criterion value of 
objects with the same cue sum. Thus the criterion value of some objects in the training set 
will coincide with the typical criterion value of the mapping model (or be very close to it, if 
the median is not defined but the mean of the two adjacent objects is used), while criterion 
values of others will be clearly different from the typical criterion value. According to the 
mapping model, objects with criterion values close to the typical criterion value should be 
estimated more accurately than objects with criterion values differing substantially from the 
typical value. 
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In the linear environment, this hypothesis is also compatible with estimations based on 
the regression model, but in the J-shaped environment the mapping model is the only model 
that predicts a difference in accuracy between the estimations for objects with typical 
criterion values and objects with non-typical criterion values. To test this hypothesis, the 
average errors made on typical objects (objects with the typical criterion value or the two 
objects with adjacent criterion values) were compared with the errors made on the non-
typical objects (all other objects) in the last three blocks of the training set. In both 
environments the participants made significantly fewer errors estimating the criterion values 
for objects with typical criterion values than for objects with non-typical criterion values 
[linear: RMSDtypical = 127, SE = 13; RMSDnon-typical = 179, SE = 17; t(24) = 22.90, p < .01; J-
shaped: RMSDtypical = 38, SE = 6.7; RMSDnon-typical = 54, SE = 7.6; t(24) = 2.4, p = .03). These 
results give further support to the mapping model.  
Discussion of Study 2 
Overall, the results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1. The mapping model was 
again best in predicting quantitative estimations, if both environments are considered jointly. 
In the J-shaped environment, it clearly outperformed the other models. It reached a fit very 
close to the error variance in the data and was the best model for a distinct majority of 
participants. In the linear environment, though, it was still not possible to decide 
unambiguously which model predicted the data of the participants best—the regression 
model, the exemplar model, or the mapping model. The differentiation between the models 
was complicated by the high variance in participants’ estimations in the linear environment. 
In the training phase as well as in the test phase, the estimations showed a high degree of 
inconsistency. However, the inability of the participants to learn to estimate the criterion 
values in the linear environment accurately is interesting in itself, as it reflects the poorer 
ability of the regression model and the mapping model to predict the criterion in the linear 
environment. Only the exemplar model predicted no differences in learning between the two 
environments. Because the exemplar model remembers individual cue profiles, its 
performance is independent of the criterion distribution. 
The exemplar model predicted participants’ estimations quite well for the old profiles 
in the test phase, but this was not true for the new profiles. The good fit for the old profiles 
suggests that participants relied on retrieved exemplars when a cue profile of an object was 
recognized from the training phase. Unfortunately it does not explain how the estimations for 
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the unknown profiles were made. Here the exemplar model seemed to offer a good 
description of the estimation process for only a minority of the participants.  
Similarly, Juslin et al. (in press) showed in various experiments that the exemplar 
model described participants’ behavior quite well in a “nonlinear task,” while a regression 
model was better suited to predict participants’ estimations in a “linear task.” Similar to our 
task, the criterion distribution was linear in the linear task and J-shaped in the nonlinear task. 
However, Juslin et al. (in press) conceptualized the difference in the environmental structure 
not in terms of the distribution of the criterion but by the underlying cue–criterion 
relationship. The cue–criterion relationship specifies how the criterion is determined as a 
function of the cue values.  
The form of the distribution and the cue–criterion relationship are related in the sense 
that if representative samples are taken, a linear cue–criterion relationship will result in a 
roughly linear distribution, and an exponential cue–criterion relationship in a J-shaped 
distribution. However a linear distribution does not have to stem from a linear function and 
there are many nonlinear functions that would not result in a J-shaped distribution. So far we 
have not specified the relationship between cues and the criterion in our tasks explicitly but 
have used a random procedure to generate the criterion distribution. To rule out that this 
impedes the predictive success of the exemplar model we conducted a third study, in which 
we chose an approach similar to Juslin et al.’s (in press) to create the objects’ criterion 
values.  
Study 3 
In Studies 1 and 2 the item sets of the experiments were created by using randomly 
drawn samples from the simulation study that allowed discrimination between the models. 
Here the criterion value could only be predicted to some extent by a linear or nonlinear 
function of the cues. Therefore, to further generalize the empirical support for the mapping 
model, in Study 3 the criterion values were either a linear or a multiplicative function of the 
cue values (see Juslin et al., in press). Given the results of Studies 1 and 2 we only tested the 
mapping model against the strongest competing models, which are the standard regression 
model and the simplified exemplar model with one parameter. 
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Method 
Participants. Forty students from Berlin universities participated in the study, 25 males 
and 15 females. The mean age was 24 years. The study lasted for approximately 1.5 hr and 
participants earned on average €17. 
Design, procedure, and materials. Study 3 was constructed in the same way as Studies 
1 and 2. To generalize the task to further contexts the estimation task was changed to a 
medical task. Participants had to estimate the probability that a patient would be cured of a 
fictitious disease. Participants were told that patients could receive different types of 
medication and that the information on which drugs a patient took would help them to 
estimate the criterion, that is, the probability that the patient would be cured within a year, 
ranging from 1 to 100%. The cues were five different drugs (labeled U, V, W, X, Y), which 
a patient could either receive or not receive. Participants were told that each drug on its own 
had a positive effect, but that there could be interaction effects between the drugs. In the 
linear environment the criterion (CL) was a linear additive function of the cues (ci): 
CL = 5 + 33c1 + 22c2 + 20c3 + 15 c4 + 5c5 
In the J-shaped environment the criterion (CJ) was a multiplicative function of the cues:  
L / 25
J 1.85 1
CC e= ⋅ −   
For a large number of new cases in the generalization test we used a training set of only 16 
profiles.  
We created 20 different training–test sets that were used for both experimental 
conditions with 20 participants each. Again we aimed for an experimental item set with large 
discrimination between the models’ predictions. Therefore we first created 1,000 training 
sets consisting of 16 randomly selected cue profiles and by using the two functions we 
determined the criterion values. The respective generalization sets consisted of the 16 
profiles that did not appear in the corresponding training set. Next we excluded all sets in 
which cues correlated negatively with the criteria. Then we rank ordered the training sets 
according to how well they discriminated between each possible pair of models in the 
generalization set and chose the 20 environments that allowed maximum discrimination 
between all models. The experimental procedure was the same as that used in Studies 1 and 
2. During a training phase consisting of 160 trials, participants learned to estimate the 
criterion value connected with each profile in the training set. After each trial participants 
received feedback on the correct criterion values and their performance. The order of 
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appearance was randomized as well as the assignment of the cues to the five different drugs 
and the order in which the drugs appeared on the screen. In the test phase each participant 
estimated all possible profiles two times without feedback. Participants were paid according 
to a feedback algorithm that was determined in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2 (for 
details see Appendix B). 
Results 
Overall, Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2. The mapping model was 
clearly the best model in the J-shaped environment. However, in the linear environment the 
regression model outperformed the other models. Before we come to the model comparisons 
we report the participants’ accuracy. 
Accuracy of the participants. The participants learned to estimate the criterion quite 
well in both conditions. In the linear environment the RMSD dropped from 18 in the first 
block to 7 in the 10th block and in the J-shaped environment from 29 to 7, with a rather 
stable accuracy in the last three blocks of the training phase. Participants’ accuracy at the 
end of the training phase did not differ significantly between the two environments 
(RSMDLinear = 7 vs. RMSD J-shaped = 8; U = 176, p = .53).  
Did the participants capture the underlying function generating the criterion values? 
This can be seen in how well participants could predict the criterion values of the new cue 
profiles in the generalization set. In both environments participants were worse at estimating 
criterion values of patients with new drug combinations than with previously encountered 
combinations (RMSD old = 7 vs. RMSD new = 14, Z = −5.3, p <.01). However, they were 
significantly better in the linear environment than in the J-shaped environment (RMSD J-shaped 
= 16 vs. RMSD Linear = 12; U = 123, p = .04). This suggests that the participants in the linear 
environment captured the function generating the criterion values to some extent. 
Model comparison. As in the preceding studies, the models were fitted on the last three 
blocks of the training phase for each. For the crucial model comparison test we focused on 
the generalization test of the test phase. In particular we compared the accuracies of the 
models in predicting participants’ estimates of the criterion values for the new cue profiles, 
that is, combinations of drugs they had not seen during the training phase. Here the results 
were clear-cut. In the linear environment the regression model predicted participants’ 
estimations significantly better than all other models, with the mapping model coming in 
second (RMSD MLR = 9 vs. RMSD mapping model = 14, Z = −3.1, p <.01). In the J-shaped 
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environment the mapping model clearly outperformed all other models (RMSD mapping model = 
10 vs. RMSD MLR = 17, Z = −3.3, p < .01). The exemplar model and the regression model 
performed equally poorly. Figure 2 illustrates the accuracies of the different models in 
predicting participants’ estimations in the generalization test. 
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Figure 2: Models’ predictive accuracies for the new profiles of the test phase of Study 
3. The average root mean square deviation (RMSD) between the models’ predictions and the 
participants’ estimations for the linear and the multiplicative condition is depicted. The error 
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
Discussion of Study 3 
We conducted Study 3 to test if our results from Studies 1 and 2 would also hold if the 
criterion distributions were generated by a linear and a nonlinear function of the cue values. 
In the J-shaped environment this was clearly the case. In the linear environment, however, 
linear regression outperformed the mapping model. As the linear criterion was generated by 
a linear additive function, the regression model was now equivalent to the function 
generating the criterion values and could estimate the criterion faultlessly. Thus if 
participants were able to detect the underlying structure in the data, then the regression 
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model would capture their estimations. We will discuss this issue further in the General 
Discussion.  
In the J-shaped environment, we did not find a shift to an exemplar-based estimation 
process as advocated by Juslin et al. (in press); instead, the mapping model still described 
participants’ behavior best. This corroborates that the mapping model is the best model for J-
shaped distributions regardless of whether the underlying function has been specified.  
Study 4 
Study 4 represents a reanalysis of Experiment 1 of Juslin et al. (in press). In this study 
the authors found empirical support for a rule-based estimation process in an environment 
with a linear distribution of the criterion, whereas support for an exemplar-based estimation 
process was reported for an environment with a J-shaped criterion distribution. To test 
whether the mapping model, which Juslin et al. did not examine, offers an alternative 
account of the estimation processes, we reanalyzed the experimental data.  
Juslin et al.’s experiment differed in important aspects from our studies. First, in the 
training phase of the experiment the participants were confronted with only 11 different 
profiles, a small number, that were described by only four cues, as opposed to 20, 19, and 16 
different profiles with five cues each in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Second, although 
participants had to process less information in the training phase compared to our studies, 
much more training was provided by repeating each profile 20 times, as opposed to 10 
repetitions in our studies. This procedure should have made it easier to memorize each 
profile, thus fostering an exemplar-based estimation process. Moreover, and maybe most 
importantly, in the experiment by Juslin et al. the participants had to learn the direction of 
the cues during the training phase, while in our studies the direction of the cues was told to 
the participants. Additionally, the cue–criterion correlations of some cues were rather small 
and fluctuated during training, increasing the difficulty of learning the correct direction of 
the cues.6 We think this last difference is disadvantageous for a rule-based estimation 
process, as described by the mapping model, for which the cue–criterion correlations are 
essential. In sum, we think the experimental procedure is beneficial for an exemplar-based 
estimation process and it would be surprising if the mapping model still predicted people’s 
behavior well.  
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Method 
Design and procedure. The experiment had two conditions in which participants had 
to estimate the toxicity of bugs based on four binary cues, similar to Studies 1 and 2. Eighty 
participants took part in the experiment, forty in each condition. In the first condition, the 
linear condition, the criterion was a linear function of the cues; in the second, the 
multiplicative condition, the criterion was a multiplicative function of the cues. Similar to 
our tasks the criterion values followed either a linear or a J-shaped distribution. In an initial 
training phase with 220 trials participants learned to estimate the criterion values on a subset 
of 11 of the 16 possible bugs. In a subsequent test phase they then estimated the toxicity of 
all 16 bugs, that is, including the 5 bugs that they had not encountered before.  
Model fitting. Following the same procedure used by Juslin et al. (in press) we fitted 
the models on the second half of the training data. Juslin et al. used the standard exemplar 
model with a free parameter for each cue, so we included this version together with the 
simplified exemplar model that we have reported so far. Thus, we will report results for two 
exemplar models, one complex exemplar model with four free parameters and one simple 
exemplar model with one free parameter. As in our preceding studies we analyzed the data 
on the individual level. We estimated the exemplar models’ parameters on the second half of 
the training set starting with a memory base consisting of the correct cue and criterion values 
of the first half of the training set.7 Then we successively added the exemplars of the second 
half of the training set to the memory base in the order in which they were encountered. This 
way the memory base always represented all objects the respective participant had seen so 
far (we think this method is most appropriate, because due to random error the same cue 
profiles had varying criterion values). The regression model was fitted directly to the 
participants’ estimations from the second half of the training set. Consistent with our 
previous studies but in contrast to Juslin et al., we used an unconstrained linear regression.8 
For the mapping model we determined the directions of the cue–criterion relationship on the 
basis of the correlation of the cue with the criterion in the second half of the training set and 
then calculated the typical criterion values for each cue sum category based on the criterion 
values. With the estimated parameters from the training phase, each model predicted 
estimations for the test phase.  
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Results 
Overall, we replicated the results of Juslin et al. (in press), but our results were not 
quite as clear-cut. The regression model performed best in the linear condition and the 
exemplar model with one parameter was the best model in the multiplicative condition. 
However, the simplified exemplar model was not significantly better than the regression 
model and the mapping model performed as well as the standard version of the exemplar 
model. 
Model comparison. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the results of our Studies 1–3, all 
models performed worse in the training phase than in the test phase. In the test phase, the 
regression model performed best in the linear condition. It was significantly better than the 
mapping model and the simplified exemplar model. However, the comparison between the 
regression model and the standard exemplar model with four parameters only approached 
significance, RMSD MLR = 1.4 vs. RMSD EBM = 1.5, Z = −1.78, p = .08.  
In the multiplicative condition it was difficult to identify one best model. The standard 
exemplar model used by Juslin et al. (in press) was statistically indistinguishable from the 
mapping model, the regression model, and the simplified exemplar model. However, the 
simplified exemplar model with one parameter performed slightly better than the regression 
model (RMSD MLR = 1.8 vs. RMSD EBM = 1.7, Z = −1.65, p = .10) and was significantly better 
than the mapping model (RMSD mapping = 2.0, Z = −3.1, p < .01).  
Discussion of Study 4 
In contrast to Studies 1–3, the mapping model performed as well as or worse than the 
linear regression or the simplified exemplar model. This result highlights the dependence of 
the models’ predictive accuracy on the structure of the task and indicates boundary 
conditions for the mapping model. 
In the linear condition participants were able to pick up the linear additive structure of 
the task. Thus, in line with the reasoning of Juslin et al. (in press) and the results of Study 3, 
the regression model was the best model in the linear condition. In the multiplicative 
condition, however, the simplified exemplar model described participants’ behavior better 
than the mapping model. We assume that this difference is due to the experimental 
procedure employed by Juslin et al., which was different from that employed in our studies. 
Due to a smaller number of cue profiles and more extensive training, memorization of 
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exemplars was presumably enhanced, favoring an exemplar-based estimation process. In 
contrast, the mapping model was constrained by the small number of cues and the selection 
of the training examples. Due to the composition of the training set the mapping model could 
only establish three categories, limiting the number of possible estimates to a rather small 
number.  
However, the presumably most important difference in the tasks lies in the correlation 
of the cues with the criteria. In the experiment by Juslin et al. (in press), the direction of the 
cues had to be detected by the participants. The mapping model assumes that knowledge 
about the correct cue directions can be learned from the environment, but it does not specify 
the learning process. Thus, we assumed that participants picked up the cues’ directions from 
the training set. However, as some cue–criterion correlations were rather small, it could 
easily be that some participants got the direction of the cues wrong or ignored cues that did 
not seem predictive for the task. In such a situation—where the direction of the cue–criterion 
correlation is unclear, participants have extensive experience with the exemplars, and the 
criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues—a shift to an exemplar-based process seems 
plausible. However, if all cues reliably predict the criterion and their direction is known to 
the participants, the mapping model seems to be the better model. 
General Discussion 
To describe the cognitive process underlying quantitative estimations we proposed a 
new cognitive theory that we called the mapping model. In four studies we tested this model 
against three alternative estimation models under a variety of environment conditions. We 
examined how well the models predicted estimations in a linear environment with a linear 
additive cue–criterion relationship, as opposed to a J-shaped environment with a nonlinear 
cue–criterion relationship.  
The Success of the Mapping Model 
The mapping model is built on an existing, successful framework for quantitative 
estimations—the so-called metrics and mappings framework (Brown & Siegler, 1993, 1996; 
Brown, 2002). Implementing a computational model of this framework enabled us to test the 
mapping model against other cognitive computational models of estimations. Naturally the 
way we specified the mapping model is only one possibility and there might be other and 
better ways to do so. Nevertheless, we think that our model captures the general idea of the 
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metrics and mapping framework, and when considering the empirical evidence provided by 
Studies 1–3, the model appears successful in predicting people’s estimations. In three out of 
four studies, the mapping model was clearly superior to the other models in the J-shaped 
environment. Even in the linear environment, where a clear advantage of linear regression 
might have been expected, it performed equally well and was only outperformed when the 
criterion was perfectly predictable by a linear regression.  
Rule-based Estimation 
In the J-shaped environments the regression model was clearly not the appropriate 
model to predict participants’ estimations. In the linear environments, the results were less 
clear. The regression model predicted participants’ estimations as well as the mapping model 
in the first two studies but outperformed the mapping model in Studies 3 and 4. This 
resonates with innumerable articles that have shown that the regression model can 
successfully capture linear judgments (see Hammond & Stewart, 2001; Brehmer & Brehmer, 
1988).  
The varying results might be explained by an adaptive response to the environment 
(for a theoretical account see Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Laine, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006). Because in Studies 3 and 4 the criterion values were generated by a linear additive 
function of the cues, the regression model was the optimal model for predicting the criterion. 
Thus, in their attempts to behave adaptively, the participants might have learned to follow a 
linear additive estimation strategy, as captured by the regression model. This adaptive 
response to the environment was also enhanced by the ease with which optimal cue weights 
of a linear additive estimation strategy could be abstracted during training. In Study 3 
optimal cue weights could be reliably estimated from any pair of objects differing on only 
one cue. That is, when the cue changed from a negative to a positive cue value from one 
object to another, the criterion value always increased by a constant amount. In Studies 1 and 
2, in contrast, an estimation process in line with the mapping model was equally successful. 
The regression model could only approximately predict the criterion and it was more 
difficult to judge a cue’s contribution correctly. This might have favored an approach of 
giving equal weights to all cues, as assumed by the mapping model. It could also help 
explain why the regression model and the mapping model could not be distinguished in 
Studies 1 and 2. In a linear environment the mapping model can be equivalent to a unit 
weight regression model, so that the systematic variance captured by the mapping model and 
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the regression model potentially overlap. In addition, research on linear regression models 
has often shown a flat maximum effect, where equal weights lead to the same accuracy in 
prediction as optimal weights (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975). 
In sum, in a task where the criterion is a linear additive function of the cues, people 
appear to be able to recognize the structure underlying the data and to abstract the 
appropriate weights for a linear additive estimation process. Consequently participants’ 
estimations in such a situation are best described by the regression model. However, when 
abstracting the optimal cue weights is complicated, because the criterion is not a linear 
additive function of the cues, a shift to a unit weight model such as the mapping model 
seems to take place. 
Exemplar-based Estimations 
Research by Juslin et al. (2003b, in press) suggests that in the case of a linear cue–
criterion relationship, rule-based processes offer a better description of human estimation 
than exemplar-based models. Consistently the regression model or the mapping model was 
best in predicting estimations when the criterion values were linearly distributed. Consistent 
with Juslin et al.’s (in press; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2004) prediction that exemplar-
based processes should occur for nonlinear cue–criterion relationships, we found that the 
exemplar model outperformed the regression model in predicting participants’ estimations in 
J-shaped environments. However, in three of the four studies the mapping model as opposed 
to the exemplar model was best in predicting participants’ estimations and only in Study 4 
was the exemplar model best. Thus other factors besides the criterion distribution or the 
functional cue–criterion relationship seem to drive the models’ predictive success.  
The number of exemplars as well as the number of cues on which the exemplars differ 
and the amount of experience needed to memorize exemplars appear important: The 
exemplar model requires that all or at least a majority of the objects encountered during 
training be stored. Therefore the more information there is that has to be stored and the less 
often each object is encountered, the more difficult memorizing complete exemplars should 
become. If memorization of exemplars is difficult, a shift to a less demanding estimation 
process, captured by the mapping model, should be expected. Consistently we found that the 
mapping model performed better in Studies 1–3.  
Further, the direction and the magnitude of the cue–criterion correlations and how 
reliably they can be abstracted when gaining experience with an estimation situation could 
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influence the models’ predictive success. For the exemplar model the direction and the 
magnitude of the cue–criterion correlation is not decisive. As long as objects can be 
sufficiently differentiated by their cue profiles, the exemplar model will always reach perfect 
performance with a given set of known objects. In contrast, the mapping model relies on 
knowing the correct direction of the cues. However, the mapping model does not specify 
how knowledge about the cues’ direction is acquired, instead we made the simplifying 
assumption that participants learn the correct direction during training. This appears justified 
when the cues correlate substantially with the criterion. In Study 4, however, some of the 
cues did not predict the criterion very well, with cue–criterion correlations fluctuating 
around zero, making it difficult to detect the cues’ directions. This indicates that in a 
situation where it is difficult to abstract the direction of the relationship of the cues with the 
criterion and where the quality of the cues is dubitable, the exemplar model might be more 
suitable for predicting estimation processes than the mapping model.  
In sum, the characteristics of the estimation situation of Study 4 were beneficial for an 
exemplar-based estimation process and detrimental for a rule-based process. We identified 
two task factors that influence the predictive success of the mapping model and the exemplar 
model in predicting estimations. We expect that the mapping model will be able to predict 
estimations in situations where many predictive cues are available, prior knowledge about 
the cues exists, and training is short. The exemplar model will be better in situations where 
the quality and the direction of the cues is unclear and extensive training on objects differing 
only on a few predictive cues is available. These expectations require further empirical tests.  
Simple Heuristics for Estimation 
In Study 1 a considerable number of participants were best described by QuickEst in 
the J-shaped environment. This raises the question under which the conditions QuickEst 
might capture the process of human estimation. QuickEst does not integrate information, 
whereas the mapping model uses all information available. For probabilistic inference tasks 
it has been found that models integrating information are often good predictors of people’s 
inferences when all information is visible and easily accessible (Bröder, 2000; Newell & 
Shanks, 2003). In contrast, when information search is costly, shifts to simple heuristics that 
do not integrate information have been reported (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; 
Rieskamp & Hoffrage, in press; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). This suggests that QuickEst was 
in a disadvantageous position in our experiments, in which all information was presented 
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simultaneously on the screen. However, another recent study has also not found any 
empirical support for QuickEst (Hausmann, Läge, Pohl, & Bröder, in press). 
Complexity of the Models 
The models we considered differed in their complexity, that is, their flexibility in 
predicting different behaviors. Though complex models are better in fitting data, they face 
the problem of over-fitting—instead of describing the systematic structure of the cognitive 
process underlying estimation they might fit unsystematic error. To reduce the problems of 
model complexity in model selection we relied on a generalization test and included 
simplified versions of the models. To our surprise the complex standard regression model, 
with a free parameter for each cue, performed better than the simplified versions of the 
regression model. Thus, only by using its full complexity was the regression model able to 
predict people’s estimations.  
However the standard exemplar model (Medin & Schaffer, 1978, adapted by Juslin et 
al., 2003b), with one free parameter for each cue, apparently over-fitted the data. Overall, the 
simplified exemplar model, assuming that all cues are regarded as equally important, 
provided a better account of people’s estimations. Thus the psychological interpretations of 
the attention parameters of the original exemplar model representing the subjective 
importance of each cue should be treated very cautiously. Further the linear condition of 
Study 4 indicates that there might be inference situations in which it becomes necessary to 
assume different attention weights for the cues. This leaves open the problem of predicting a 
priori which of the two exemplar models will predict behavior better.  
The mapping model was the simplest model we considered as it entailed no free 
parameters and we only tested one version of it. Without flexibility, the model is unable to 
capture any specific ways people respond to a particular estimation situation. However, this 
disadvantage can turn out to be an advantage: the lack of flexibility reduces the danger of 
over-fitting, thereby making predictions more robust. This is particularly important because 
the environments we encounter in everyday life are typically noisy. For instance, 
environments can rarely be expressed by a linear additive function of cues, which could 
favor the unit weight approach taken by the mapping model. In a similar vein, the mapping 
model reduces the information load by ignoring the pattern of the cue values. In 
environments where it is unclear which cues can help to predict the quantity of interest, this 
might not be a utile assumption. However, if a set of predictive cues has been identified, the 
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assumption appears psychologically plausible, making the mapping model a good model of 
human estimations.  
Limitations of the Mapping Model 
What are the boundary conditions of the mapping model’s success in predicting 
quantitative estimations? For one, we showed that the mapping model can be outperformed 
by linear regression when the criterion is a linear additive function of the cues. This touches 
upon a limitation of the mapping model: It relies exclusively on the objects it has 
encountered so far, so that—in contrast to the regression model—it is unable to extrapolate 
over the range of encountered criterion values. Research on function learning has shown that 
with sufficient practice, people are quite adept at learning a variety of one-dimensional 
functions (Kalish, Lewandowsky, & Kruschke, 2004; DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 
1997; for a review see Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh, & McDaniel, 1997). However, if multiple 
cue dimensions have to be integrated into a single response, the ability to extrapolate seems 
to be restricted to linear functions. Juslin et al. (in press; see also Karlsson et al., 2004; 
Olsson et al., 2006) showed in several studies that participants did not extrapolate if the cues 
were nonlinearly connected to the criterion. Thus, we believe that the mapping model’s 
inability to extrapolate could to some extent mirror human behavior.  
The comparison with the exemplar model in Studies 3 and 4 highlighted other 
boundary conditions for the mapping model. The model assumes that the direction of the 
cue–criterion relationship can be learned from the environment. When this is complicated 
the cues’ direction assumed by the mapping model might not correspond with the subjective 
directions perceived by a decision maker, so that the predictions of the mapping model 
become inaccurate. Likewise, the mapping model does not specify which cues are used for 
the estimation process but includes all cues. In a condition where all cues are good predictors 
of the criterion this is a reasonable strategy, but in situations in which a few good predictors 
have to be picked out of a bunch of irrelevant cues, it will not work well. Further, the 
mapping model relies on a representative sample of criterion values for each category. In the 
case where a cue sum category is only represented by an outlying criterion value of one 
single object, the estimation of the mapping model can be distorted. Finally, another 
limitation of the mapping model is its application to estimation problems with only binary 
cues. How can the mapping model be extended to continuous cues? One way would be to 
dichotomize continuous cues (e.g., by a median split). However this rather crude approach 
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might result in an overly strong loss of information. A second possibility would be to reduce 
a large number of cue sum categories to a few manageable categories, for instance, by 
applying range–frequency theory (Parducci, 1965).  
Final Conclusion 
Past research on multiple cue judgments has focused on linear regression as a tool to 
analyze human judgments (Brehmer, 1994; Hammond, 1996). Although linear additive 
models can predict the outcome of estimation processes rather well, they have been criticized 
for not capturing the underlying cognitive process (e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Hoffman, 
1960; see also Doherty & Brehmer, 1997). In response to this criticism, alternative 
estimation models have recently been proposed and tested, including exemplar models 
adapted to estimation problems (Juslin et al. 2003b; Medin & Schaffer, 1978), and simple 
heuristics such as QuickEst (Hertwig et al., 1999). Following up on the criticism, we 
proposed the mapping model as a simple, new cognitive theory and showed that it can 
successfully predict human estimation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Simulation Procedure  
The simulation study examined in a 9 × 4 (in the J-shaped environment) and 9 × 6 (in 
the linear environment) factor design the impact of the percentage of negative cue values and 
the magnitude of the cue–criterion correlation. The conditions for the simulation were 
created in several steps. First, nine sets of five dichotomous cues with differing percentages 
of negative cue values were created. All cues of a set shared the same percentage of negative 
cue values, varying in steps of .10, between .10 and .90 per cue. The cue values were 
randomly assigned to the 50 objects representing an environment. Second, for each level of 
percentage of negative cue values we created further sets to manipulate the cue–criterion 
Pearson correlation. For each set with the same percentage of negative cue values we created 
different sets with different cue–criterion correlations. The cue–criterion correlations were 
varied in steps of .10 between .0 and .30 in the J-shaped environment (providing four 
different levels) and between .0 and .50 in the linear environment (providing six different 
levels). Again, all cues of a set shared the same correlation. Because the maximal possible 
correlation decreases with increasing percentages of positive cue values in the J-shaped 
environment, the number of factor levels for the correlations was lower in the J-shaped 
environment. The cue–criterion correlations were modified by randomly selecting two 
objects with different cue values and exchanging their cue values if this changed the cue–
criterion correlation in the desired direction (this step was repeated until the desired 
correlations were obtained). This resulted in a 9 (percentage of negative cue values) × 4 
(magnitude of correlation) design in the J-shaped environment and a 9 (percentage of 
negative cue values) × 6 (magnitude of correlation) design in the linear environment. In 
every condition each model was fit to half of the data and then tested on the other half. 
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Appendix B 
Feedback Algorithms 
During the training phase participants got feedback about the accuracy of their 
estimations and the number of points they were earning. The points participants received for 
their estimations were determined by the following algorithms. Any unusual deviation 
exceeding 500mg/l, as might be caused by a typing mistake, was treated as a deviation of 
500mg/l. For each environment a different correction term (e.g., 1,100 for the linear 
environment in Study 1) was used to adjust for the task difficulty. The correction term was 
chosen dependent on the baseline model and determined the magnitude of the deviation for 
which a participant would receive zero points. The magnitude of the deviation that would 
result in zero points is given by the root of the correction term multiplied by 100. Thus in the 
linear environment a participant deviating less than 332 = (1,100 × 100)½ mg/l would earn 
points whereas for a deviation exceeding 332 mg/l, points would be subtracted.  
The equations for the feedback algorithms are defined as  
y = −x²/c + 100, for x ≤ 500 and  
y = −500²/c + 100, for x > 500, 
where x is the absolute difference between a participant’s estimation and the actual criterion 
value for a given trial, y denotes the number of points that were added or subtracted from the 
participant’s account, and c is the correction term. The correction terms for Study 1 were c = 
1,100 for the linear environment and c = 550 for the J-shaped environment. The correction 
terms for Study 2 were c = 888.58 for the linear environment and c = 536.26 for the J-shaped 
environment. The correction terms for Study 3 were c = 556 for the linear environment and c 
= 512 for the J-shaped environment. 
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Appendix C 
Structure of the Test Sets in Study 1 
In Study 1 the test sets in the two environments differed slightly. Each test set 
consisted of old objects that had appeared in the training phase and new objects that the 
participants had not encountered before (see Tables C1 and C2). 
Table C1: 
Test Set in the J-shaped Environment in Study 1 
Number Profile Cue1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Exemplar Regression QuickEst Mapping
1 Old 0 0 0 0 0 23 37 30 23 
2 Old 0 0 0 1 0 33 25 30 40 
3 Old 0 0 1 0 1 34 32 30 34 
4 Old 0 1 0 0 0 75 61 50 40 
5 Old 0 1 0 1 0 41 49 50 34 
6 Old 0 1 0 1 1 130 131 70 71 
7 Old 0 1 1 0 1 52 56 50 71 
8 New 0 1 1 1 1 284 44 70 286 
9 New 1 0 0 0 0 23 559 30 40 
10 New 1 0 0 0 1 29 641 30 34 
11 New 1 0 0 1 0 33 548 30 34 
12 New 1 0 0 1 1 232 629 30 71 
13 New 1 0 1 0 1 34 554 30 71 
14 New 1 0 1 1 1 566 543 30 286 
15 New 1 1 0 0 0 75 584 50 34 
16 New 1 1 0 0 1 242 665 50 71 
17 New 1 1 0 1 0 42 572 50 71 
18 New 1 1 0 1 1 317 653 500 286 
19 New 1 1 1 0 1 438 579 50 286 
20 New 1 1 1 1 0 566 485 50 286 
21 Old 1 1 1 1 1 567 567 500 500 
Note. The profiles are ordered lexicographically according to the cues’ correlation with the 
criterion in the training set. Profiles 1–7 and 21 also appeared in the training set. The 
parameters for the models were set as follows: Exemplar model with one free parameter: s = 
.0006; regression model: intercept = 36.92, c1 = 522.39, c2 = 24.16, c3 = −86.23, c4 = −11.83, 
c5 = 81.25; for QuickEst all cues were included. 
Chapter 1: The Mapping Model of Quantitative Estimation                            Page |   58 
Table C2: 
Test Set in the Linear Environment in Study 1  
Number Profile Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Exemplar Regression QuickEst Mapping
1 Old 0 0 0 0 0 50 151 200 50 
2 Old 0 0 0 1 0 220 150 200 300 
3 Old 0 0 1 0 1 240 244 200 240 
4 Old 0 1 0 0 0 480 379 300 300 
5 Old 0 1 0 1 0 307 377 300 240 
6 Old 0 1 0 1 1 665 665 700 640 
7 Old 0 1 1 0 1 480 472 700 640 
8 New 0 0 1 1 1 240 243 200 640 
9 New 0 1 1 1 1 738 470 700 780 
10 New 1 0 0 0 1 145 889 200 240 
11 New 1 0 0 1 0 220 600 200 240 
12 New 1 0 0 1 1 608 888 200 640 
13 New 1 0 1 0 1 240 69 200 640 
14 New 1 0 1 1 1 920 693 200 780 
15 New 1 1 0 0 0 480 829 300 240 
16 New 1 1 0 0 1 686 1117 700 640 
17 New 1 1 0 1 0 307 827 300 640 
18 New 1 1 0 1 1 774 1115 700 780 
19 New 1 1 1 0 1 810 922 700 780 
20 New 1 1 1 1 0 920 632 300 780 
21 Old 1 1 1 1 1 920 920 700 920 
Note. The profiles are ordered lexicographically according to the cues’ correlation with the 
criterion in the training set. Profiles 1–7 and 21 also appeared in the training set. The 
parameters for the models were set as follows: Exemplar model with one free parameter: s = 
.0001; regression model: intercept = 151.32, c1 = 450.09 c2 = 227.37, c3 = −195.09, c4 = 
−1.67, c5 = 287.98; for QuickEst all cues were included.  
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Appendix D 
Comparison of the Standard Exemplar Model, the Simplified Exemplar Model, and the 
Regression Model 
In Study 1 we included simplified variants of the regression model and the exemplar 
model in addition to the standard versions. For the exemplar model we included a version 
with five parameters fit to each participant individually (standard exemplar), a simplified 
exemplar model with only one free parameter (simplified exemplar), and an exemplar model 
with its five parameter values optimized by using the objective criterion value instead of 
participants’ estimations (a priori exemplar). For the regression model we included the 
standard model with six free parameters fit to each participant individually (standard 
regression), a stepwise regression model that only included the cues that received significant 
weights (stepwise regression), and a regression model with the parameter values optimized 
by using the objective criterion value instead of participants’ estimations (a priori 
regression).  
The parameters of the simplified variants of the exemplar model and the regression 
model were estimated in the same way as for the standard versions. For the a priori exemplar 
model and the a priori regression model the parameters were optimized by using the 
objective criterion values of the training set. The simplified exemplar model and the standard 
exemplar model were fitted on the last three blocks of the training phase with the correct cue 
and criterion values of the training set as the memory base. The best parameters for each 
participant were searched for by using the quasi-Newton optimization method as 
implemented in MATLAB. To avoid local minima, parameters were first derived by a grid 
search with the results serving as the starting values for the subsequent fitting procedure. The 
parameters for the standard regression model and the stepwise regression model were 
obtained by respectively determining a multiple linear regression and a stepwise regression 
on the last three blocks of the training set. The stepwise regression model reduced the 
number of employed cues substantially; on average only 3.7 (SD = 1.06) cues were used in 
the linear environment and only 1.5 (SD = .77) in the J-shaped environment.  
Naturally, of the different versions of the exemplar and regression models, when fitted 
to the data of the training phase the most complex ones did significantly better than the 
simplified versions. In the crucial generalization test of the test phase, however, the 
simplified exemplar model was clearly superior to the standard version of the exemplar 
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model and the a priori exemplar model (all Zs < −2.48, ps < .01). The standard version of the 
regression model in all cases did significantly better than the two simplified versions except 
in the J-shaped environment, where the a priori regression model was equally as good as the 
standard regression model (Z = −.59, p = .57). Here we report the RMSDs of all versions for 
the test phase (see Table D1). 
In Study 2 we again tested all versions of the exemplar model and the regression 
model in the model comparison. But similar to in Study 1, the stepwise regression and the 
regression with the parameters set a priori performed worse than the full model. The 
simplified exemplar model also performed again significantly better than the standard 
exemplar model and the a priori exemplar model. 
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Table D1 
Average Predictive Accuracy of the Models in the Test Set of Study 1  
 Standard 
exemplar 
Simplified 
exemplar 
A priori 
exemplar 
Standard 
regression 
Stepwise 
regression 
A priori 
regression 
Linear environment 
RMSD 219 161 206 166 182 282 
SD 60 40 37 56 58 45 
J-shaped environment  
RMSD 242 166 179 342 359 352 
SD 89 70 73 124 123 72 
Note. The J-shaped environment condition had 30 participants and the parameters 
determined a priori for the exemplar model were s1= .0055, s2 = .0008, s3 = .0088 s4 = .0005, 
and s5 = .0006; the parameters for the regression model were intercept = 36.92, c1= 522.39, 
c2 = 24.16, c3 = −86.23, c4 = −11.83, and c5 = 81.25. The linear environment condition had 
29 participants and the parameters determined a priori for the exemplar model were s1= 
.0274, s2 = .0002, s3 = .0049, s4 = .0001, and s5 = .0001; the parameters for the regression 
model were intercept = 151.32, c1= 450.09, c2 = 227.37, c3 = −195.09, c4 = −1.67, and c5 = 
287.98. 
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Appendix E 
Model accuracies for the training phase of Study 2 
In Study 2 all models performed better than the baseline model in predicting 
participants’ estimations for the training phase. Because the training phase consisted of 
unique profiles, we expected the exemplar models to reach a fit close to the participants’ 
accuracy. As anticipated, the exemplar model performed very well, explaining over 74% of 
the variance in the linear environment and 90% in the J-shaped environment. The models’ 
accuracies are reported in Table E1. 
Table E1 
Model Accuracies in the Training Set of Study 2 
Environment 
 Linear 
J-shaped 
 
Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar Mapping Regression QuickEst Exemplar
RMSD 192 153 253 138 83 150 144 56 
SD 30 28 18 54 18 11 19 35 
r2 .58 .71 .31 .74 .88 .58 .75 .92 
SD 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.08 
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Footnotes 
1. We chose the median as opposed to the mean to represent the typical criterion value 
of a cue sum category, because it provides a more robust measure of central tendency. 
However, the use of the median implies that in a learning situation in which the decision 
maker gets familiar with the estimation problem the criterion values of all encountered 
objects need to be stored to compute the median. In contrast, using the mean would not 
require storing all criterion values—the criterion value of each new object could be used to 
update the mean. More specifically the mean Mk,n of all encountered objects n falling in the 
cue sum category k can be determined by )()1( 11 −− −⋅+= n,kn,kn,kn,k Mxn/MM , where xk,n 
represents the criterion value of the newly encountered objects and Mk,n-1 represents the 
mean of all objects encountered before. Thus, this updating rule requires less demand on 
memory, because the decision maker only needs to store the mean and the number of objects 
encountered so far. In the reported studies we do not model the learning process of how 
people represent cue sum categories, but it is a task for future research to test whether the use 
of the mean as opposed to the median might have the advantage of providing a better 
description of the initial learning process.  
2. In the case of binary cue information the multiplicative similarity rule of the original 
context model is a special case of a multidimensional scaling approach to modeling 
similarity as used by the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1992). Thus the exemplar 
model we used is comparable to Nosofsky’s model in how similarity is modeled. 
3. According to Albers (2001), spontaneous numbers are multiples of powers of 10 
{a× 10i: a ∈  {1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7}}, where i is a natural number. They form a psychologically 
sensible set of coarse numbers, which increase in their crudeness as the numbers increase in 
magnitude (see also Hertwig et al., 1999). 
4. The training and test sets in Studies 1 and 2 were selected on the basis of the 
predictions of the standard exemplar model. For the sake of clarity we focus throughout this 
article on the simplified exemplar model with one parameter—the strongest version of the 
exemplar model; however, the simplified versions of the models were only included post 
hoc. Thus the design of Studies 1 and 2 were based on the standard version of the exemplar 
model. 
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5. We used two measures of goodness-of-fit, the RMSD between the estimation and the 
criterion and the coefficient of determination (r²). These two measures are closely related but 
capture slightly different aspects of the model fit. Both are based on the sum of squares error 
(SSE); but whereas the RMSD averages the SSE across the number of estimations, the 
coefficient of determination puts the squared error in relation to the total variance. This 
relationship can be demonstrated by the following equations: 
RMSD = mwSSE LSE /)( , 
r² = (1 - SSE (wLSE))/SST 
where SSE is the sum of squares error; wLSE the parameter that minimizes SSE (w), SST the 
sum of squares total defined by )( meani i yy −∑ , and m the sample size (cf., Myung, Pitt, & 
Kim, 2005, p. 426). 
6. The cue–criterion correlations of some cues fluctuated around zero. For example, in 
the first three quarters of the training phase of the linear condition the third cue was 
positively correlated with the criterion, but in the last quarter of 55 trials it was negatively 
correlated with the criterion.  
7. Additionally, we fitted the exemplar model in the exact same way as reported by 
Juslin et al. (in press) and replicated the reported fits. We chose an iterative fitting procedure 
to model the growing memory base during the training phase, because in Juslin et al. the 
criterion values were not deterministic but changed for the identical profiles due to a random 
error. In Studies 1, 2, and 3 the iterative fitting procedure was unnecessary due to the 
deterministic criterion values.  
8. Our results for the regression model differ from the results reported by Juslin et al. 
(in press) because we implemented an unconstrained regression model. Juslin et al. restricted 
the intercept to be the minimum criterion value in the training set and all cue weights had to 
add up to 1 (see Juslin et al. in press, Appendix, p. 49). The unconstrained regression model 
performed better in both conditions—in particular in the multiplicative condition our results 
were much better than those reported by Juslin et al. 
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Abstract 
In the area of categorization it has been argued that explicit, rule-based processes and 
implicit, similarity-based processes compete to control behavior. A similar division of labor 
has been suggested for multiple-cue judgment and estimation tasks (Juslin, Karlsson & 
Olsson, in press). Recently, however, Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) proposed a simple 
rule-based model, the mapping model, that outperformed the exemplar model in a task that 
was thought to promote exemplar-based processing. This raised the question of under which 
circumstances a shift to exemplar-based processing can be observed. In the present research 
we investigate the impact of task structure on two core assumptions of the mapping model: 
the establishment of an exemplar memory base and the abstraction of explicit knowledge 
about the task. Our results indicate that knowledge about cues is decisive. When knowledge 
about cues existed, the mapping model was the best model; however, if knowledge about the 
cues was difficult to abstract, participants’ estimations were best described by an exemplar 
model.  
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Models of Quantitative Estimations:  
Rule-Based and Exemplar-Based Processes Compared 
How do people estimate a continuous quantity, such as the selling price of their house 
or the quality of a job candidate? In many cases people base their estimations on cues that 
are probabilistically related to the quantity being estimated. For example, when estimating 
the selling price of a house people could rely on information such as the size of the house, 
the attractiveness of the neighborhood, or the presence of a deck. Cognitive models of 
estimation try to explain which cues people use and how they integrate them to estimate a 
continuous criterion, that is, the quantity of interest. 
Previous research has been dominated by the use of linear additive models for 
describing people’s estimations, such as multiple linear regression. Recently new estimation 
models have been successfully introduced as alternatives to the standard regression 
approach. First, Juslin, Karlsson, and Olsson (in press) have argued that people frequently do 
not rely on rules when making estimations, but on an exemplar-based process. According to 
the exemplar model people estimate the criterion of an object by retrieving the criterion 
values of similar exemplars from memory. Second, Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) have 
argued that people follow a rule-based process, which differs considerably from the process 
assumed by linear additive approaches. Introducing the mapping model, Helversen and 
Rieskamp proposed that people estimate the criterion value of an object by first categorizing 
the object by the number of positive cue values and then using a typical criterion value of 
past objects with the same number of positive cues as an estimate. Although the exemplar 
model and the mapping model argue for conceptually different estimation processes, both 
models have been proposed for estimation tasks in which the standard regression approach 
did not provide a good account of people’s estimations. The goal of the present article is to 
test these two models rigorously against each other to examine in more detail in which 
situations people follow an exemplar-based or a rule-based process for making quantitative 
estimations. 
Models of Estimation 
Consistent with the widespread assumption that human cognition comprises competing 
multiple systems (Ashby, Alfonso-Resese, Turken, &Waldron, 1998; Hahn & Chater, 1998; 
Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), models of quantitative estimations can be broadly 
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classified by the underlying processes they assume. In general, explicit, rule-based processes 
are distinguished from more implicit, similarity-based processes (Hahn & Chater, 1998; 
Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006; Patalano, Smith, Jonides, & 
Koeppe, 2001; Nosofsky et al., 1994). The dominant approach to quantitative estimation 
falls clearly into the category of rule-based models. Accordingly, estimation processes are 
conceptualized as a process of weighting and adding information, which can be described by 
linear additive models such as multiple linear regression (Anderson, 1981; Brehmer, 1994; 
Brunswik, 1952; Hammond, 1955; Hammond & Stewart, 2001). Regression models assume 
that for each cue, the relation between cues and criterion is abstracted and explicitly 
represented as a cue weight; the judgment is then made by summing the weighted cue 
values. The cue weights that best describe the judgment policy are found by a regression 
analysis (Cooksey, 1996; Doherty & Brehmer, 1997). In this vein, linear regression has been 
successfully applied to analyze judgments in many areas, such as clinical diagnostics (e.g. 
Harries & Harries, 2001), legal and medical decision making (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975; 
Wigton, 1996), and personality evaluations (e.g. Zedeck & Kafry, 1977, for a review, see 
Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). 
Lately, however, alternative models have been suggested to describe the estimation 
process (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press; Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Martignon, 1999; Juslin et 
al., in press). Following the idea that cognitive processes are largely a function of the 
characteristics of the task environment (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson & Kruschke, 
1998; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 2003; Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Laine, 2003; Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006), Juslin et al. (in press) suggested a shift to exemplar-based processing in 
nonlinear decision tasks. In contrast to a linear estimation task, where the criterion is a linear 
function of the cues, a task is assumed to be nonlinear if the criterion follows from a 
nonlinear combination of the cues. Recently Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) proposed a 
new rule-based model for quantitative estimation, the mapping model, that also 
outperformed linear regression in a nonlinear decision task. Even more puzzling, testing the 
two models against each other led to inconsistent results. In the third experimental study of 
Helversen and Rieskamp the mapping model was clearly superior to the exemplar model, but 
when the mapping model was tested against the exemplar model in a reanalysis of the first 
experimental study of Juslin and colleagues, the results were contradictory. In our past work 
(Helversen & Rieskamp, in press) we presented substantial evidence to support the idea that 
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the mapping model is a strong competitor to the exemplar model and generated some 
expectations about the task characteristics leading to exemplar-based or rule-based 
estimation processes.  
In the present article we venture to test these expectations. We claim that the 
nonlinearity of the environment, although important, is not a sufficient factor to trigger 
exemplar-based estimation processes. Instead, we argue, the two models make specific 
assumption about the cognitive process underlying estimation. Following these assumptions, 
two cognitive components of the estimation process are essential: For an exemplar-based 
process, the quality of the exemplar memory is essential, whereas for a rule-based process, 
the abstraction of explicit task knowledge is decisive. In the following, we will introduce the 
two models of estimation and then discuss how the structure of the estimation task affects 
the essential cognitive component of each model and consequently explains the diverging 
results reported by Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) and Juslin et al. (in press; Olsson, et 
al. 2006).  
Competing Theories 
Both Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) and Juslin and colleagues (2003; in press) 
argued that linear additive approaches such as linear regression can predict participants’ 
behavior in a linear estimation task, but not in a nonlinear task. For nonlinear environments 
they suggested competing theories. Helversen and Rieskamp proposed the rule-based 
mapping model, whereas Juslin et al. suggested a similarity-based exemplar model. 
The Mapping Model 
The mapping model assumes a simple rule-based estimation process. Accordingly, 
people estimate the criterion of an object by first categorizing the object by the number of 
positive cue values and then using the typical criterion value of past objects with the same 
number of positive cues as an estimate. For example, when estimating the price of a house, 
the mapping model assumes that people first count the number of positive features of the 
house that favor a high price (e.g. great location, a deck, a swimming pool). Then the 
number of positive features is used to categorize the house into a certain price class and the 
typical price for houses within this price class is used an estimate.  
The mapping model is inspired by the framework for quantitative estimation 
developed by Brown and Siegler (1993). Brown and Siegler proposed that two types of 
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information are necessary for an estimation: knowledge about the mappings, that is, the 
ordinal relation of the objects according to the criterion of interest; and knowledge about the 
metrics, that is, the numeric properties of the objects, such as the distribution, the range, or 
the mean of possible estimates. The mapping model relies on binary cue information; each 
cue is coded as having a positive or a negative cue value and all cues are coded so that they 
correlate positively with the criterion.  
In a first step, knowledge about the mappings is inferred from the cue values by 
counting the number of positive cue values and grouping objects together according to their 
cue sums. This implies that all cues are weighted equally. In a second step, knowledge about 
the metric properties is derived by abstracting a typical estimate for each category, 
represented by the median criterion values of the objects falling into the same category. 
When estimating the criterion value for a new object, first the category it falls in is 
determined by counting the number of positive cue values, and then the typical estimate for 
this category is abstracted and given as an estimate. 
The Exemplar Model 
In contrast, the exemplar model assumes a similarity-based process. According to the 
exemplar model people estimate the criterion of an object by retrieving the criterion values 
of similar exemplars in memory. For example, when estimating the price of a house, the 
exemplar model assumes that people recall the selling prices of similar houses that were sold 
in the vicinity and use them to estimate the selling price for the house under evaluation. 
Exemplar models have been successfully employed to explain human behavior in 
categorization (Juslin et al., 2003; Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). As a result 
of this success they were recently extended to the area of quantitative estimation (Juslin et 
al., 2003, in press; Olsson et al., 2006).  
Exemplar models assume that estimations rely on the similarity of an object to 
previously encountered objects that are stored in memory. To make an estimation, these 
previously encountered exemplars are retrieved and compared to the probe, that is, the object 
under evaluation. The more the probe resembles a retrieved exemplar, the closer the estimate 
for the probe will be to the exemplar’s criterion value. More specifically, the estimate 
consists of the average criterion values of the retrieved exemplars, weighted by their 
similarity to the probe:  
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where pyˆ  is the estimated criterion value for the probe p; S is the similarity of the 
probe to the stored exemplars; xi is the criterion value of the exemplar i; and I is the number 
of stored exemplars in memory. The similarity S between a stored exemplar and the probe 
depends on how many features the exemplar and the probe share. It is calculated using the 
multiplicative similarity rule of the context model (cf., Medin & Schaffer, 1978), defined as 
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For each cue j it is determined whether the cue values of the probe p and the stored 
exemplar i match. If they match, d equals one, and if they do not match, d equals the 
attention parameter sj, which captures the impact of a cue on the overall similarity and varies 
between zero and one. The closer sj is to zero, the more important the cue. If sj = 1, this 
implies that the cue j is irrelevant for the evaluation of the overall similarity. The original 
exemplar model assumes a separate sj parameter for each cue j (Juslin et al., 2003; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978). However, as the original exemplar model seems to be prone to overfitting, 
we additionally considered a simplified version with one single attention parameter s for all 
cues (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press). In this case, s is an attention parameter indicating 
how closely a retrieved exemplar needs to resemble the probe to be considered for the 
estimation. The closer s is to zero, the more similar an exemplar has to be to the probe to 
have an impact on the estimation. 
Model Competition 
Both the exemplar model and the mapping model provide new and successful 
modeling approaches to quantitative estimation. However, both models were proposed to 
explain estimation processes in nonlinear estimation environments. Furthermore, two 
previous experimental studies led to rather conflicting result regarding which model 
provided a better account of observed estimations. In the third experimental study reported 
by Helversen and Rieskamp (in press), the mapping model clearly outperformed the 
exemplar model in predicting participants’ estimations. In contrast, the reanalysis of the first 
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experiment of Juslin et al. (in press) as reported in Helversen and Rieskamp revealed an 
advantage of the exemplar model over the mapping model in predicting estimations. 
Surprisingly, the studies were very similar: In both studies, participants estimated a 
continuous criterion based on multiple binary cues. The criterion was a multiplicative 
function of the cues, and the participants received outcome feedback to learn the task. What 
factors led to these conflicting results, and how can an illuminative test of the two models be 
performed?  
In general, human cognition can be understood as an adaptation to different 
environments (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Payne et al., 1993; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). From this view it follows that estimation processes will differ 
depending on the estimation situation. We argue that the conflicting results found by 
Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) can be explained by characteristics of the task that affect 
two essential cognitive components of the models: exemplar memory and knowledge 
abstraction. Our goal is to test the importance of these components for estimation processes.  
Exemplar memory. Exemplar models assume the retrieval of previously encountered 
exemplars from memory. Thus the quality of memory traces for encountered exemplars 
plays a key role. Exemplar models can only be successfully applied if memory traces for 
exemplars exist and can be accurately retrieved. Differences in the quality of exemplar 
memory could explain the contradictory results reported in the two studies by Helversen and 
Rieskamp (in press) and Juslin et al. (in press). The studies differed in some aspects that 
potentially affected the quality of exemplar memory. For one, in the study by Juslin and 
colleagues the training objects were repeated twice as often as in the study by Helversen and 
Rieskamp. In addition, a lower number of exemplars (i.e. 11 vs. 16) and less complex 
exemplars (4 vs. 5 cue dimensions) were used in the training phase of the study by Juslin et 
al. in comparison to the study by Helversen and Rieskamp. The more often each exemplar is 
repeated, the better participants should be able to establish accurate memory traces. 
Furthermore, the fewer training objects that exist and the fewer cue values that have to be 
stored, the easier it should be to accurately encode and retrieve the training exemplars. Thus 
both factors could enhance an exemplar-based estimation process.  
In line with this argument, Smith and Minda (1998) found that in a categorization task 
exemplar-based processes occurred later in training, while at the beginning of training 
participants were better described by an additive prototype model (i.e. a rule-based process). 
Moreover, they found that the exemplar model performed better when it learned a small 
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category with few dimensions than when it tackled a big, more dimensional category (Minda 
& Smith, 2001), suggesting that exemplar-based processes should be more accessible, the 
fewer training exemplars have to be learned and the more frequently training exemplars are 
encountered. 
Knowledge abstraction. Differences in the availability of task knowledge could also 
explain the diverging results reported by Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) and Juslin et al. 
(in press). While the exemplar model relies on accurate representation of encountered 
exemplars in memory, the mapping model requires the abstraction of explicit task 
knowledge. 
In the third experimental study of Helversen and Rieskamp participants were informed 
about the directions of the cues, providing explicit knowledge that could be directly applied 
in the estimation task. However, in the study by Juslin and colleagues, no prior information 
about the cues was given to the participants, making it more difficult to form explicit 
knowledge of the cue directions. For the mapping model, knowledge about the predictability 
and the directions of the cues is crucial. Objects can only be grouped into meaningful 
categories if the valid cues are used and the directions of the cues are known. Furthermore, 
prior knowledge about the cue directions decreases the computational demands of the 
mapping model and could thus foster rule-based processing. In contrast, the exemplar model, 
relying on the similarity relations of the objects, does not depend on any knowledge about 
the cues but can be applied successfully as long as objects are sufficiently differentiable. 
Thus, if no prior knowledge about the cues exists, this could cause a shift in the direction of 
exemplar-based processing. In particular, if cue directions are difficult to learn, it might be 
equally demanding to abstract the cue directions than to store the exemplars in memory.  
In sum, the mapping model relies on the abstraction of knowledge about the cues and 
should profit more than the exemplar model from explicit information about the cue 
directions being provided. In contrast, the exemplar model seems to be particularly suited to 
capturing the estimation process when it is difficult to gain explicit knowledge about the 
cues, but intensive training and less complex training material make it possible to establish 
accurate exemplar memory. We investigated the influence of these factors in two studies, 
manipulating the quality of the memory traces established as well as the access to knowledge 
about the cues by varying features of the task. 
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Methods of Model Selection and Qualitative Tests of Models 
Model selection can be a challenging task. For one, the complexity of the models 
needs to be taken into account. Although more complex models are better in fitting data they 
run the risk of overfitting; that is, they not only capture systematic variance but also fit 
unsystematic variance in the data. Second, models often make very similar predictions, 
which makes it difficult to devise tests that reliably differentiate between the models.  
We addressed the problem of model selection with a twofold approach. First, similar to 
Helversen and Rieskamp (in press), we used a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 
2000). To take model complexity into account, we first estimated the models’ parameters by 
using the data of a training phase. The estimated parameter values were then used to predict 
participants’ estimations for new test objects. Second, we devised a qualitative test. 
Qualitative tests are preferable to pure quantitative models tests (Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & 
Myung, 2006). They are less dependent on specific parameter values and they provide a 
critical test of the model assumptions, providing information about the correspondence of the 
pattern in the data with model predictions. Therefore, we aimed to find qualitative 
predictions that were specific for each model and could not be derived from the competing 
model. 
For this purpose we focused on the assumptions the models make about which objects 
should be treated similarly and for which objects the estimations should differ. The mapping 
model groups objects according to their cue sums, ignoring which specific cue has a positive 
value. This implies that the model treats all objects with the same cue sum alike and makes 
the same estimations, whereas objects with different cue sums will be treated differently and 
estimations will differ. The exemplar model, on the other hand, relies on the similarity 
relations of the objects to the stored exemplars. Thus two objects that are maximally 
different should also differ in which exemplars they resemble and thus in the criterion values 
estimated. This opens the possibility of qualitatively differentiating between the models. For 
example, while the mapping model will predict the same value for two objects that share the 
same number of positive cue values but do not match on a single cue, the exemplar model 
will differ in its estimations (across a wide range of parameter values).1 We used these 
assumptions of the models to design qualitative model comparison tests in addition to the 
quantitative model comparison tests. 
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Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was to investigate the influence of exemplar memory on model 
performance. We manipulated the ease with which exemplars could be stored in memory by 
varying the number of training exemplars. In a multiple-cue estimation task participants 
evaluated job candidates according to the policy of their company. Each job candidate was 
characterized by six cues, which the participants could use for their evaluation. In a training 
phase participants were presented with a number of candidates who had been evaluated by 
their supervisors. Based on this training sample they could learn how their company 
evaluated job candidates. In a subsequent test phase, we tested how well they generalized 
this knowledge to new job candidates and which model was best in predicting their 
evaluations. We manipulated the size of the training set. In the first condition participants 
encountered a large number of training exemplars (24), in the second condition a small 
number of training exemplars (8). 
Method 
Participants. In Study 1, 40 participants took part, 20 in each condition. The majority 
of participants were students from one of the Berlin universities, with an average age of 24 
years (SD = 4); 30% of the participants were male. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the experimental conditions, balanced for gender. The study lasted for about 1 h 45 
min and participants were paid an average of €16 for their participation. One participant in 
the condition with a low number of training exemplars was excluded from the analysis as he 
did not improve in evaluating the training candidates during the training phase. 
Procedure and material. The study was conducted as a computer-based experiment. 
The task of the participants was to evaluate the quality of job candidates for an IT position 
on a scale of 1 to 100 points. The more points a job candidate received the more suited he or 
she would be for the position. Participants received information about the job candidates on 
six cues and each cue could have two possible characteristics (i.e. cue values). The six cues 
and their binary characteristics were knowledge of programming languages (C++ vs. Java), 
knowledge of foreign languages (French vs. Turkish), additional skills (SAP (a software 
system) vs. web design), previous work experience (software development vs. system 
administration), previous employment area (business vs. academia), and knowledge of 
operating systems (UNIX vs. Windows). 
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Participants were told which of the two possible characteristics of the cues matched the 
companies’ demands; characteristics that matched the companies’ preferences were marked 
in green, while characteristics that did not meet the companies’ requirements were marked in 
red. During training participants learned how many points job candidates with different 
combinations on the six cues had been awarded in previous assessments. The criterion, that 
is, how many points a job candidate received, was determined as a multiplicative function of 
the cue values (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press; Juslin et al., in press): 
(12) 1 2 3 4 5 6
(22   20   17   15   14   ) / 200.68 e c c c c c cC + + + + + 12= ⋅  
where C is the points the job candidates received and c1 to c6 the values on the six 
dimensions. A positive characteristic of a cue was coded with a cue value of 1 and a negative 
characteristic was coded with a cue value of zero. The assignment of the weights to the cues, 
which characteristic of a cue was coded as positive or negative, as well as the order of the 
cues on the screen was randomly determined for each participant. 
The study consisted of two parts, a training phase and a test phase. During the training 
phase participants could learn the company’s evaluation policy by judging job candidates 
who had previously been evaluated by their supervisors. In each trial participants saw and 
were asked to evaluate one job candidate. After each trial they received feedback about the 
number of points this candidate had received from his or her supervisor, how close their 
estimate had been, and how many points they earned in this trial (see below). Then the next 
candidate appeared. All training candidates were repeated 10 times, structured in 10 blocks; 
the order of appearance in each block was randomly determined.  
We manipulated the number of training candidates in this study: In one condition the 
training set consisted of a large number (24) of different training candidates; in the other 
condition the training set comprised a small number (8) of training objects. After the training 
phase participants continued with a test phase in which they had to evaluate 30 more job 
candidates. The test phase was similar to the training phase, with the difference that 
participants did not receive immediate feedback about the accuracy of their evaluations and 
only learned how many points they had earned after they had finished the test phase. The 30 
test candidates were evaluated twice. Eight of the candidates in the test phase had also 
appeared during training and 22 were new candidates participants had not encountered 
before. 
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Participants’ payment was based on their performance. In each trial participants could 
earn up to 100 points depending on how accurately they estimated the quality of the job 
candidates. The more they deviated from the criterion the fewer points they earned. The 
exact number of points subtracted for a given deviation was calculated by a feedback 
algorithm, based on the squared deviation from the estimation to the criterion. This resulted 
in a rapidly decreasing number of points with less accurate estimations. Additionally, the 
feedback algorithm incorporated a correction term that determined the deviation that would 
result in a payoff of zero. It was calculated on the basis of a baseline model that always 
estimated the average criterion value. Any deviation exceeding the correction term led to the 
subtraction of points. To exclude the subtraction of a high number of points due to a typing 
error, the feedback algorithm was truncated. Any deviation larger than 50 was treated as a 
deviation of 50. A similar feedback algorithm had been successfully used by Helversen and 
Rieskamp (in press) to create a moderately exacting feedback environment (Hogarth, Gibbs, 
McKenzie, & Marquis, 1991). After the experiments points were exchanged into euros at a 
rate of €0.1 for every 150 points. 
Selection of training and test sets. To test which model could explain the participants’ 
behavior best we relied on a generalization test (see Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). That is, we 
compared which model was better in predicting the participants’ estimations for a test set 
consisting of objects they had not encountered during training. However, we did not just 
compare the quantitative fits of the models, but additionally conducted a qualitative test of 
the models’ assumptions (see Pitt et al., 2006). Qualitative tests have the advantage that they 
provide a critical test of model assumptions and can be constructed to be widely independent 
of model parameters. For this purpose we focused on two qualitative predictions that were 
derived from the models’ assumptions about the estimation process. Due to these different 
assumptions of the models it was possible to derive different ordinal predictions, that is, 
predicted patterns of results that are qualitatively different.  
First, according to the mapping model, the same value is estimated for any two objects 
with an equal number of positive cues, regardless of the similarity of the two objects. In 
contrast, if two objects are very dissimilar, that is, if they do not match on a single cue, the 
exemplar model’s estimations should differ. For the experimental task with six cues, an 
estimation situation in which the mapping model makes identical predictions and the 
exemplar model makes different predictions occurs for objects with a cue sum of three. To 
clarify, for any cue profile with three positive and three negative cues (e.g. 111000, with 
Chapter 2: Rule-Based and Exemplar-Based Processes                                 Page |   79 
each number representing the cue value of one cue), the mapping model makes the same 
prediction for an object with the reversed cue profile (i.e. 000111). In contrast, the exemplar 
model will most likely make different estimation predictions, because these two objects are 
maximally dissimilar—that is, they do not share any cue values. 
Second, we devised an additional experiment situation in which the exemplar model 
made similar predictions, and the mapping model made different predictions for the test 
objects. The mapping model makes different predictions for objects when they have different 
cue sums, for instance, objects with cue sums of 2 and 4. In contrast, for these objects, which 
necessarily share some cue values, the exemplar model can make very similar estimations. 
For the test phase we selected test objects with cue sums of 2 and 4 for which the exemplar 
model indeed made similar predictions. 
To summarize, our qualitative test comprised two conditions in which the exemplar 
model and the mapping model made qualitatively different predictions. While the mapping 
model predicted a difference between the estimations for objects with a cue sum of 4 and a 
cue sum of 2 and no difference for objects with a cue sum of 3, the exemplar model made the 
opposite predictions. However, the strength of the qualitative predictions depends on the 
specific training and test objects. For instance, if all training objects had the same criterion 
value, it would be impossible to differentiate between the models. Accordingly, we aimed at 
selecting training set–test set combinations where the qualitative predictions of the two 
models would differ as widely as possible. 
We first selected the training set–test set combination for the condition with 24 
exemplars. To ensure that the training set would well represent the total set, we constrained 
the selection of training objects to contain objects with all possible cue sums approximately 
in proportion to the frequency in the whole set: Each sample had to contain one object with a 
cue sum of 0, two with a cue sum of 1, five with a cue sum of 2, eight with a cue sum of 3, 
five with a cue sum of 4, two with a cue sum of 5, and one with a cue sum of 6. 
To find a training set–test set combination for which the models made qualitatively 
different predictions, we generated 100 different training samples. Next, we calculated 
model predictions for the remaining objects based on the respective training samples. For the 
mapping model with no free parameters the predictions could be directly determined from 
the training samples. In contrast, for the exemplar model we first calculated the optimal 
parameters to predict the criterion of the training set and then made predictions based on 
these parameter values. From the 100 samples we selected the training set–test set 
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combination for which the models differed most in their qualitative predictions. For the test 
set we included objects with cue sums of 2 and 4 for which the mapping model made widely 
different estimations but the exemplar model made similar estimations. Further, we included 
pairs of objects with a cue sum of 3 for which the mapping model made identical predictions 
but the exemplar model made different predictions. Additionally, we included some extra 
objects on which the models differed strongly in their predictions to enhance quantitative 
comparisons (see Table 8 for the test set, and see Appendix A for the training set of Study 1). 
Lastly, we included 8 objects in the test set that had appeared in the training set. In total, the 
test set consisted of 30 objects, 22 new objects selected for the qualitative tests and the 
additional 8 old objects.  
Table 8: New test objects in the condition with a large number of training objects 
Objects Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Cue 6 Criterion Mapping Exemplar
Test 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 7 
Test 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 8 
Test 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 3 8 
Test 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 3 7 
Test 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 16 24 8 
Test 4 1 0 1 1 0 1 18 24 9 
Test 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 20 24 8 
Test 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 21 24 8 
Test 3a 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 8 6 
Test 3a 1 1 1 0 0 0 13 8 26 
Test 3b 0 0 1 0 1 1 6 8 2 
Test 3b 1 1 0 1 0 0 12 8 25 
Test 3c 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 8 3 
Test 3c 1 1 0 0 1 0 11 8 14 
Test 3d 0 1 0 1 1 0 8 8 14 
Test 3d 1 0 1 0 0 1 9 8 24 
Test 3e 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 8 3 
Test 3e 0 1 1 1 0 0 9 8 27 
Test/extra 1 0 1 0 1 1 17 24 10 
Test/extra 0 1 1 0 1 1 16 24 16 
Test/extra 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 
Test/extra 1 0 1 1 1 1 37 44 100 
Note. Test 2 denotes objects with a cue sum of 2, Test 3 objects with a cue sum of 3, where 
pairs with the same letter indicate opposite cue profiles, and Test 4 objects with a cue sum of 
4. Test/extra indicates objects that were additionally included in the test set to increase the 
differences in model predictions. 
To select the training set–test set combination for the condition with eight exemplars 
we repeated the procedure described above. To make conditions more comparable, the 100 
training sets with 8 training objects were randomly drawn from the condition with 24 
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training objects, with the restriction that the training sample contained one object with a cue 
sum of 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and two objects with a cue sum of 3. Again, we obtained model 
predictions for the remaining objects and selected a test set that maximized the differences in 
qualitative predictions. Again, the test set consisted of 22 new objects that were not included 
in the training set and the 8 known objects from the training phase. The training and the test 
sets are reported in Appendix A.  
Finally, we explored the prediction of the models for the models’ parameter space, to 
determine the range of parameter values for which the models make qualitatively different 
predictions. For the mapping model this is a simple task because it has no free parameters, so 
that it makes one single prediction for a specific object. In contrast, the exemplar model’s 
predictions depend on its values for the attention parameter. We covered the parameter space 
of the attention parameter s by using the values .001, .1, 2, .5, .7, and .9. Figure 3 illustrates 
how the predictions of the exemplar model change with increasing parameter values. 
 
Figure 3: Qualitative model predictions. The models’ predictions for the two 
qualitative tests, when varying the values of the exemplar model’s attention parameter s. The 
“4 vs. 2” denotes the predicted average differences in estimations for the criterion values of 
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test objects with a cue sum of 4 and test objects with a cue sum of 2. The “3” refers to the 
predicted average differences in estimations for the criterion values of the pair of test objects 
with a cue sum of 3, with maximally different cue profiles (e.g. 111000 and 000111). (A) 
The predictions for the condition with a small number of training objects. (B) The 
predictions for the condition with a large number of training objects 
With small parameter values a clear difference in the qualitative predictions of the 
models can be observed: In this case the mapping model predicts different estimations for 
objects with a cue sum of 4 versus 2, implying large differences in the estimations, which are 
substantially larger than the zero difference of the same estimates for pairs of objects with a 
cue sum of 3. In contrast, the exemplar model predicts small differences in estimations for 
objects with a cue sum of 4 versus 2, which are smaller than the difference of estimations for 
pairs of objects with a cue sum of 3. The small values for the attention parameter of the 
exemplar model are most plausible, because they are exactly the ones Helversen and 
Rieskamp (in press) found to be the best estimates for the exemplar model (i.e. the average 
estimated parameter values varied between .001 and .17). Thus, when assuming small 
attention parameter values that perform best in predicting participants’ estimations, the two 
models make distinct ordinal predictions. Moreover, the results show that over the whole 
range of parameter values, the models’ predictions do not overlap and that even for 
parameter values for which the exemplar model predicts the same ordinal data pattern as the 
mapping model, strong quantitative differences are to be expected.  
Results 
Overall, the mapping model predicted participants’ estimations significantly better 
than the exemplar model in both conditions. Somewhat unexpectedly, the advantage of the 
mapping model was higher in the condition with a small number of training objects than in 
the condition with a large number of training objects. However, before we come to the 
model comparisons, we first report the participants’ accuracy. 
Participants’ accuracy. Participants learned to evaluate the training candidates fairly 
well in both conditions. We measured the participants’ accuracy via the root mean square 
deviation (RMSD) between the criterion values and the participants’ estimations. In the 
condition with a large number of training objects RMSD dropped from 15.56, SD =5.62 in 
the first block to 3.86, SD = 2.07 in the 10th block. Similarly, the RMSD in the condition with 
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a small number of training objects dropped from 22.97, SD = 6.76 in the first block to 3.04, 
SD = 4.04 in the 10th block. The participants’ accuracy in the test phase did not differ 
between the two conditions, RMSDlarge = 5.84, SD = 1.87 versus RMSDsmall = 7.42, SD = 
3.39; U = 137, p = .14. However, in both conditions, accuracy in the test phase was worse 
than in the training phase, RMSDtraining = 3.98, SD = 2.32 versus RMSDtest = 6.61, SD = 2.80; 
Z = −4.16, p < .001. Participants were more accurate in the test phase in estimating the old 
objects known from the training phase than the new objects, RMSDold = 4.49, SD = 6.10 
versus RMSDnew  = 6.69, SD = 2.21; Z = −3.99, p < .001.  
Overall, participants were quite consistent in their estimations. Consistency was 
measured as the Pearson correlation between the first and the second presentation of the test 
objects. In both conditions consistency was similarly high, rlarge(20) = .95, SD = .06 versus 
rsmall (19) = .94, SD = .06; U = 137, p = .14. Overall, participants were more consistent in 
estimating old objects than new objects, rold = .98, SD = .05 versus rnew = .85, SD =.15; Z = 
−4.88, p <.001. 
Model parameters. To test which model predicted participants’ estimations best, we 
first fitted both models on the last blocks of the training phase for each participant 
individually. In the condition with a large number of training objects we used the last three 
blocks and in the condition with a small number of training objects the last four blocks to fit 
the models on a sufficient number of training objects. Based on the parameters estimated we 
made predictions for the test phase. Goodness-of-fit was determined as the RMSD of the 
model prediction from the participants’ estimations. Additionally, we report the coefficient 
of determination r². The exemplar model’s parameter was estimated by using participants’ 
estimations for the last blocks of the training phase with a knowledge base consisting of the 
objects from the training phase with their correct criterion values. The best value for its free 
attention parameter was found by a grid search followed by a nonlinear least square method 
(as implemented in MATLAB). For the condition with a large number of training objects a 
mean attention parameter value of s = .01 (SD = .01) was estimated; likewise, a mean 
attention parameter value of s = .01 (SD = .05) was estimated for the condition with a small 
number of training objects. As expected, these values are rather small and correspond to the 
findings of Helversen and Rieskamp (in press). For the mapping model no parameters 
needed to be estimated. We simply calculated the typical criterion value for all objects of the 
training set with the same cue sum (using the correct criterion values of the objects). 
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In addition to the reported model comparisons, we also tested two further models to 
rule out that they would predict participants’ behavior better than the mapping model or the 
simplified exemplar model we report. We included a standard exemplar model with a free 
parameter for every cue, as this is the exemplar model originally suggested by Juslin and 
colleagues (2003; see also Medin & Schaffer, 1978). We also tested a linear regression 
model, as it has been shown to describe participants’ behavior well in other estimation tasks 
(Brehmer, 1994; Helversen & Rieskamp, in press; Juslin et al., in press). Both models 
performed worse than the mapping model and the simplified exemplar model.2  
Quantitative model comparison. In the training set both models described 
participants’ estimations fairly well (for means see Table 9). We used the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon test to analyze which model explained participants’ estimations best. For the 
training phase the exemplar model performed better than the mapping model in both 
conditions, Zsmall = −2.20, p = .03; Zlarge = −3.21, p < .01. However, the better fit of the 
exemplar model during training can be explained by its higher flexibility and should not be 
decisive for model selection. The crucial test is how well the models predict participants’ 
estimations in the test phase for the new objects they did not encounter during training. 
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Table 9: Model accuracies in Study 1 
 Number of training objects 
 Large  Small 
 Mapping Exemplar  Mapping Exemplar 
Training set      
RMSD 5.37 4.38  3.63 3.53 
SDRMSD 1.12 1.66  2.77 2.81 
r² 0.94 0.95  0.97 0.98 
SDr² 0.03 0.03  0.05 0.24 
Test set: Old      
RMSD 5.28 3.27  5.94 5.85 
SDRMSD 1.70 2.54  8.24 8.21 
r² 0.97 0.98  0.91 0.92 
SDr² 0.02 0.02  0.22 0.22 
Test set: New     
RMSD 5.87 15.45  5.74 22.63 
SDRMSD 2.32 2.37  3.51 1.82 
r² 0.75 0.39  0.77 0.41 
SDr² 0.19 0.16  0.16 0.10 
Test set: Total     
RMSD 5.80 13.39  6.63 20.00 
SDRMSD 1.93 2.10  4.02 2.06 
r² 0.91 0.67  0.86 0.52 
SDr² 0.06 0.10  0.18 0.09 
Note. NTotal = 39, with N = 20 in the high training condition and N = 19 in the low training 
condition. RMSD = root mean squared deviation 
Here, the mapping model clearly outperformed the exemplar model in both conditions. 
In the condition with a large number of training objects it reached a RMSD of 5.87, SD = 
2.32, compared to the exemplar model with a RMSD of 15.45, SD = 2.37; Z = −3.92, p < .01. 
Also in the condition with a small number of training objects the mapping model was clearly 
superior, RMSDmapping = 5.74, SD = 3.52 versus RMSDexemplar = 22.63, SD = 1.82; Z = −3.82, 
p <.01 (see also Table 9). Somewhat unexpectedly, the exemplar model performed better in 
the condition with a large number of training objects than in the condition with a small 
number of training objects (U = 5, p <.01). This appears to be contrary to the prediction that 
the exemplar model’s performance should improve with fewer training objects. However, 
these results have, in fact, no implication for this prediction, because the mapping model 
outperformed the exemplar model in both conditions, which suggests that participants did 
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not rely on exemplar-based processes in either condition. Consistent with this interpretation, 
the mapping model performed equally well in both conditions; U = 167, p = .53.  
Qualitative model comparison. Though the quantitative model comparison already 
indicated that the mapping model was better suited to predict participants’ estimations, we 
additionally relied on a qualitative test. The qualitative test was designed to specifically test 
the models’ assumptions about the cognitive process underlying estimations. To test the 
models’ predictions, we determined for each participant and model the mean difference 
between the estimations for the objects with a cue sum of 2 and 4 and for the pair of objects 
with a cue sum of 3. As expected from the parameter space analysis illustrated in Figure 3, 
for both experimental conditions the models made clearly distinct qualitative predictions, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Qualitative test in Study 1. (A) Qualitative predictions of the models and the 
participants’ estimations in the condition with a large number of training objects (N = 20). 
(B) Qualitative predictions of the models and the participants’ estimations in the condition 
with a small number of training objects (N = 19). Sum of cue values 3 gives the average 
difference in estimations for the criterion values of the pair of test objects with a cue sum of 
3 with maximally different cue profiles. Sum of cue values 4 vs. 2 gives the average 
difference in estimations for the criterion values of test objects with a cue sum of 4 and test 
objects with a cue sum of 2; error bars denote ±1 SD. 
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In the condition with a small number of training objects, the exemplar model predicted 
a small difference of 1.2 points while the mapping model predicted a difference of 22 points 
for test objects with cue sums of 2 and 4. In contrast, for the pairs of objects with a cue sum 
of 3, the mapping model predicted no difference, while the exemplar model predicted that 
estimations would differ by 18.4 points. Although not quite as pronounced, the same 
interaction was predicted in the condition with a large number of training objects. The 
predictions of the mapping model were clearly supported by the data. In both conditions 
participants’ estimations differed strongly for the objects with a cue sum of 4 and a cue sum 
of 2. With a mean difference of 18.1 points (SD = 4.5) in the condition with a small number 
of training objects and 17.2 points (SD = 5.3) with a high number of training objects, they 
were close to the difference predicted by the mapping model. Likewise, the participants’ 
estimations for the objects with the same cue sum but maximally different cue profiles 
corresponded to the assumptions of the mapping model. The difference in estimations 
between pairs of objects with the same cue sum were on average M = 1.3 (SD = 2.1) for the 
condition with 24 training objects and M = −1.8 (SD = 3.2) for the condition with 8 training 
objects. 
Discussion of Study 1 
Study 1 supported the mapping model in an estimation task with multiple predictive 
cues and a nonlinear criterion. It predicted well how participants estimated values for objects 
they had not seen during training, obviously capturing the process underlying the 
estimations. In comparison, the exemplar model performed quite poorly; although it was able 
to accurately describe the estimations during training, it could not predict the estimations for 
the test phase. These results indicate that the number of training objects is not a crucial factor 
for model performance on its own.  
However, one reason we did not find an effect of the number of training objects could 
be that the establishment of a stable exemplar memory requires more training, even if the 
number of exemplars is rather small. In our study every training object was repeated 10 
times, leading to a quite accurate performance of the participants in the estimation task. 
Nevertheless, studies investigating exemplar-based approaches often provide more training. 
For instance, Minda and Smith (2001) presented training objects up to 60 times each and 
Juslin et al. (in press) presented each object 20 times. Furthermore, Smith and Minda (1998) 
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suggested that exemplar-based processes only occur later in training. Thus a higher amount 
of training could be necessary to detect a shift in processing. 
A second possibility for why the mapping model outperformed the exemplar model in 
both conditions is that we provided knowledge about the cue directions. This knowledge 
could trigger rule-based processing in accordance with the mapping model. If cue directions 
are known, the processes assumed by the mapping model require only a minimum of 
computation. However, if cue directions first need to be learned, this leads to a higher effort 
that has to be invested for the knowledge abstraction the mapping model requires. In 
contrast, for an exemplar-based estimation it is not necessary to know the direction of a cue. 
The amount of computation is the same, regardless of whether the cue directions are known. 
Accordingly, exemplar-based processes could be favored if participants do not know the cue 
directions. We tested these predictions in Study 2. 
Study 2 
Study 1 failed to elicit a shift to exemplar-based processing. In Study 2 we addressed 
two possible reasons for the poor performance of the exemplar model in Study 1. For one, 
establishing reliable exemplar memory could require extensive training. Thus, we increased 
the training to 20 blocks, to ensure that stable memory traces could be established. Second, 
the availability of explicit knowledge about the cues could have primed rule-based 
processing in Study 1. Because the exemplar models’ performance is largely independent of 
explicit task knowledge, providing no information about the cues should present conditions 
favorable for the exemplar model. However, a shift to exemplar-based processing might not 
only depend on the availability of knowledge, but also on the ease with which knowledge 
can be abstracted. If picking up the cue directions during training is easy, the mapping model 
could still prevail. In Study 1 (see Table 10) all cues correlated substantially with the 
criterion, which should make it fairly easy to pick up the cues’ directions (Hoffman & 
Murphy, 2006; Klayman, 1988a). Thus, to additionally manipulate the ease with which the 
cue directions could be learned we also manipulated how demanding it was to detect the 
correct directions of the cues. For this purpose we created a training set in which only half of 
the cues were predictive whereas the other half were useless for estimating the criterion 
values. This should increase the difficulty of inferring the cues’ directions for predicting the 
criterion (Brehmer, 1973). 
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Table 10: Cue–criterion correlations in Study 2 
 Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Cue 6 
Criterion (six predictive cues) 0.37 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.47 0.43 
Criterion (three predictive cues) 0.79 0.15 0.17 0.58 0.56 0.11 
 
In addition, an estimation situation in which only a few cues are predictive is a difficult 
one for the mapping model. The mapping model assumes that all cues are included in the 
estimation process. Therefore if the participants learn that only a few cues are predictive and 
the others can be ignored, the prediction of the mapping model, which uses all cues, can 
become completely wrong. Thus, if no knowledge about the cues is available and in addition 
it is demanding to abstract this knowledge in the training phase, this should provide optimal 
conditions to observe a shift form a rule-based to an exemplar-based estimation process.  
Method 
Participants. In Study 2, 80 students from one of the Berlin universities participated 
(average age = 25 years, SD = 3); 33% of the participants were male. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions, balanced for gender. The 
study lasted for about 1 h 30 min and participants were paid on average €14 for their 
participation. 
Design, procedure, and material. In Study 2 we increased the training phase, 
providing twice as many learning trials in comparison to Study 1. In addition, we 
manipulated the prior knowledge about the directions of the cues and the ease with which the 
cues’ directions could be learned with two between-subjects factors, providing a 2 × 2 
experimental design. Similar material to Study 1 was used. Again, participants were asked to 
evaluate the quality of job candidates based on the six binary cues described in Study 1. 
However, in Study 2 only half of the participants were told which cue values were regarded 
as positive and which as negative. The other half needed to discover the cues’ directions 
during the training phase. Additionally, we manipulated how easily the cues’ directions 
could be learned. One half of the participants were provided with the identical set of training 
objects used in the training phase of the condition with 8 training objects in Study 1. For this 
set of training objects all cues correlated substantially with the criterion (in all cases r > .35). 
For the other half of participants we used a different set of training objects, so that three cues 
correlated highly with the criterion (r > .5) and three correlated poorly (r <. 2). The exact 
cue–criterion correlations are reported in Table 10. The selection of objects for the training 
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and test phases for the second condition was achieved in the same way as in Study 1 with the 
additional constraint on the cue–criterion correlations and the exclusion of extreme profiles 
(with all positive or all negative cue values, which had to be excluded to achieve the desired 
cue–criterion correlations). 
Similar to Study 1, Study 2 consisted of a training phase and a test phase. In the 
training phase participants could learn the companies’ policies for evaluating job candidates 
by observing how many points the training candidates had received from their supervisors. 
The training sets in both conditions consisted of eight training exemplars. In comparison to 
Study 1, we increased the duration of the training to 20 trials per candidate, structured in 20 
blocks. In each block the eight training candidates were presented in a random order. 
Participants were paid contingent on their performance, based on the same feedback 
algorithm used in Study 1. However, to prevent participants from becoming discouraged by 
overly negative feedback in the beginning of the study, we truncated the feedback algorithm, 
similar to in Study 1. However, to counteract the higher difficulty in the conditions with no 
prior information, we decreased the maximum deviation: In Study 2 any deviation larger 
than 30 was treated like a deviation of 30. The training phase was followed by a test phase 
consisting of 30 objects with 22 new and 8 old objects that participants evaluated twice. The 
test objects were selected in the same way as in Study 1 to allow a qualitative test of the 
models. The training and test sets are reported in Appendix A (Tables A2 and A3). After the 
test phase, participants who had not been informed about the cue directions were asked to 
indicate which cue values went with higher criterion values.  
Results 
As in Study 1, the mapping model outperformed the exemplar model when the 
direction of the cues was known to the participants. However, when the cue direction had to 
be learned during training, which model predicted the participants’ estimations best 
depended on the number of predictive cues, that is, cues that correlated substantially with the 
criterion. In the condition in which all cues were predictive, the mapping model was still the 
best model in predicting the estimations. Only in the condition in which the direction of the 
cues was unknown to the participants and only three cues were predictive did the exemplar 
model outperform the mapping model.  
Participant performance. The participants learned to evaluate the job candidates 
correctly in all conditions, dropping from an average RMSD of 27.31, SD =12.61 in the first 
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block to 3.77, SD = 5.90 in the 20th block. However, training accuracy depended on the 
knowledge of the cue directions. Participants were more accurate in their estimations when 
they knew the cue directions (RMSD = 2.07, SD = 2.03) than when they did not (RMSD = 
7.43, SD = 6.79; U = 364, p < .01). If the cue directions were known, participants did better 
if all cues were predictive (RMSD = 1.40, SD = 2.03) than if only half were predictive 
(RMSD = 2.75, SD = 1.82; U = 94, p < .01). However, if the cue directions were not known, 
participants performed equally well (RMSDthree predictive cues = 6.11, SD = 4.09 vs. RMSDsix 
predictive cues = 8.74, SD = 8.62; U = 193, p = .86). Overall, participants’ estimation accuracy 
was better for the training phase than for the test phase (RMSDtraining = 4.75, SD = 5.66 vs. 
RMSDtest = 11.82, SD = 5.79; Z = −7.62, p < .01).  
To measure the consistency of participants’ estimations we calculated the Pearson 
correlation between the two judgments of the same objects during the test phase. A similar 
pattern to that found for participants’ accuracy emerged: Participants were more consistent 
when they knew the cue directions (r = .92, SD = .11) than when they learned them during 
training (r = .81, SD = .17; U = 448, p < .01). When the participants knew the cue directions, 
the number of predictive cues did not matter (rthree predictive cues = .92, SD = .11 vs. rsix predictive 
cues = .92, SD = .10, U = 193, p = .86). However, when the cue directions were learned 
during training, participants were more consistent when all cues were predictive (r = .86, SD 
= .15) than when only three cues were predictive (r = .76, SD = .17, U = 122, p = .04). 
Overall, participants were more consistent in estimating the old objects than estimating the 
new objects (rold = .93, SD = .14 vs. rnew = .79, SD = .22; Z = −5.50, p < .01).  
Knowledge of cue directions. To examine whether our manipulation of the ease with 
which the cue directions could be learned had an effect, we compared how many mistakes 
participants made in reporting the correct directions of the cues. As expected, participants 
performed better when all six cues were predictive (i.e. correlated substantially with the 
criterion) than when only three cues were predictive. When all cues were predictive, 7 (35%) 
participants indicated for at least one cue an incorrect direction; whereas when only three 
cues were predictive, 14 (70%) participants made at least one mistake. In particular, the 
participants had difficulty in correctly reporting the direction of the low-quality cues (i.e. 
those that correlated only slightly with the criterion), with a total of 16 mistakes in 
comparison to only 8 mistakes with the high-quality cues. 
Quantitative model comparison. As in Study 1 we used the last four blocks of the 
training phase to estimate individually the exemplar models’ attention parameter. 
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Furthermore, we used the objects’ correct criterion values in the training phase to determine 
the median estimates for the mapping model’s estimation categories. The categories were 
formed on the basis of all six cues.3 In this way we determined the models’ predictions for 
the new objects in the test phase. Model performance was measured as the RMSD between 
model predictions and participants’ estimations. Additionally, we report the r² as a second 
measure of goodness-of-fit. Again, we also included a version of the exemplar model with a 
free parameter for every cue and a linear regression model in the comparison. As neither of 
the two models was the best model in any condition, we do not report the model fits here. 
Although our conclusions are not affected by these results, they are reported in Appendix B 
to provide a complete picture. 
Again, the exemplar model (RMSDtotal = 4.51, SD = 5.29) outperformed the mapping 
model (RMSDtotal = 4.89, SD = 5.54) during training in describing participants’ estimations, Z 
= −5.25, p <.01. This was expected, as the exemplar model is more flexible than the mapping 
model. Interestingly, both models fitted the participants better when participants knew the 
cue directions than when they did not, Umapping = 375, Uexemplar = 364, both p < .01; following 
a similar pattern to the accuracy of the participants. Table 11 reports for all conditions the 
mean RMSDs and SDs. 
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Table 11: Model accuracies in Study 2 
 Number of predictive cues 
 Six predictive cues  Three predictive cues 
 Cue directions  Cue directions 
 Known  Unknown  Known  Unknown 
 Mapping Exemplar  Mapping Exemplar  Mapping Exemplar  Mapping Exemplar
Training set           
RMSD 1.77 1.40  8.86 8.40  2.89 2.68  6.03 5.61 
SDRMSD 1.77 2.03  8.56 8.07  1.75 1.78  3.94 3.63 
r² .99 .99  .88 .87  .93 .94  .74 .74 
SDr² .01 .01  .17 .20  .07 .07  .27 .26 
Test set: Old           
RMSD 3.44 3.25  8.39 8.92  3.12 2.99  6.35 6.02 
SDRMSD 3.73 3.90  7.94 8.05  2.46 2.44  3.22 3.03 
r² .98 .98  .89 .87  .92 .92  .72 .72 
SDr² .06 .06  .19 .20  .11 .11  .23 .23 
Test set: New           
RMSD 6.34 23.50  16.34 22.22  10.36 14.78  12.24 8.71 
SDRMSD 4.00 2.85  7.36 4.29  4.50 3.47  2.21 1.92 
r² .71 .37  .43 .40  .66 .24  .17 .39 
SDr² .27 .17  .25 .23  .17 .09  .16 .16 
Test set: Total           
RMSD 5.98 20.29  14.88 19.90  9.11 12.80  11.09 8.16 
SDRMSD 3.47 2.48  7.02 4.20  3.86 3.01  1.95 1.94 
r² .89 .51  .64 .52  .69 .36  .28 .49 
SDr² .12 .11  .23 .19  .16 .09  .16 .18 
Note. NTotal = 80, with N = 20 in each condition. RMSD = root mean squared deviation 
Again, the crucial model comparison test consisted of how well the two models were 
able to predict participants’ estimations for the new independent objects of the test phase. 
Figure 5 shows that in the condition replicating the Study 1 condition with a small number of 
training objects (where the participants knew the cue directions and where all cues were 
predictive), with the only difference being having a larger number of training trials, the 
mapping model again clearly outperformed the exemplar model, RMSDmapping = 6.33, SD = 
4.00 versus RMSDexemplar = 23.50, SD = 2.85, Z = −3.92, p <.001. Thus, by simply having 
more training, the participants did not switch to an exemplar-based estimation process. 
Similarly, when the cue directions were known but only half of the cues were predictive, the 
mapping model predicted the participants’ estimations better than the exemplar model, 
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RMSDmapping = 10.36, SD = 4.50 versus RMSDexemplar = 14.78, SD = 3.47, Z = −3.92, p < .01. 
Furthermore, the mapping model was still the superior model when the participants had to 
learn the directions of the cues, and all cues were predictive, RMSDmapping = 16.34, SD = 7.36 
versus RMSDexemplar = 22.22, SD = 4.29, Z = −2.80, p < .01. However, when the participants 
needed to abstract the directions of the cues during training and this was difficult because 
only three cues were predictive, the exemplar model outperformed the mapping model, 
RMSDmapping = 12.24, SD = 2.20 versus RMSDexemplar = 8.71, SD = 1.92, Z = −3.62, p < .01. 
 
Figure 5: Models’ accuracy in predicting the participants’ estimations for the new 
objects in the test phase of Study 2. (A) Models’ accuracy when the cues’ directions were 
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known (N = 40; 20 for each condition). (B) Models’ accuracy when the cues’ directions were 
not known (N = 40; 20 in each condition). 
An additional analysis of the correlation between the models’ accuracy and the number 
of mistakes participants made when indicating the cue directions provided further evidence 
for a shift in processing. In the condition with unknown cue directions and six predictive 
cues, the mapping model performed worse the more cue directions a participant had 
indicated incorrectly, r(20) = .64, p < .01, suggesting that the difference in performance 
between the conditions with known and unknown cue directions was at least partly due to 
the failure of some participants to learn the cue directions. In contrast, in the condition with 
only three predictive cues this relation was not significant, r(20) = .21, p = .38, suggesting a 
shift in processing. 
Qualitative model comparison. Similar to Study 1, we also tested which of the 
qualitatively different predictions of the two models were in line with the observed 
estimations. Again, we compared the predictions of the exemplar model and the mapping 
model by taking the difference in estimations for the pairs of objects with a cue sum of 3 and 
the objects with cue sums of 2 and 4. For the pairs of objects with a cue sum of 3 the 
mapping model made the same predictions whereas the exemplar model made different 
predictions. In contrast, for the objects with cue sums of 2 and 4 the mapping model made 
the different predictions and the exemplar model made similar predictions.  
Figure 6 shows that the results of the qualitative tests clearly supported the quantitative 
model comparison tests. When the participants knew the cue directions, their estimations 
were in line with the mapping model’s predictions. Similarly, when the participants did not 
know the cue directions, but all cues were predictive, the participants showed a similar 
pattern to that  predicted by the mapping model. Only in the condition in which the 
participants did not know the cue directions and only three cues were predictive was the 
qualitative pattern of the estimations consistent with the exemplar model’s predictions. 
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Figure 6: Qualitative test in Study 2. (A) Qualitative tests for the condition with known 
cue directions but only three predictive cues are shown. (B) Qualitative tests for the 
conditions with known cue directions and six predictive cues. (C) Qualitative tests for the 
condition with unknown cue directions and three predictive cues. (D) Qualitative tests for the 
condition with unknown cue directions and six predictive cues. Sum of cue values 3 gives 
the average difference in estimations for the criterion values of the pairs of test objects with a 
cue sum of 3 with maximally different cue profiles. Sum of cue values 4 vs. 2 gives the 
average difference in estimations for the criterion values of test objects with a cue sum of 4 
and test objects with a cue sum of 2. Error bars denote ±1 SD; N = 20 in each panel. 
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Discussion of Study 2 
Study 2 confirmed our prediction that a rule-based process as described by the 
mapping model depends on accurate knowledge abstraction, which is not necessary for the 
exemplar model. In line with this theoretical foundation, which model was most capable of 
predicting participants’ estimations in Study 2 crucially depended on accurate knowledge 
about the cue directions. In the two conditions in which participants were told which cue 
values were regarded as positive evidence, the mapping model was clearly better in 
explaining participants’ behavior. However, when the participants had to learn the cue 
directions during training and when this was difficult, because only three cues substantially 
correlated with the criterion, the exemplar model was the superior model. These results are 
consistent with the results reported by Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) and Juslin et al. (in 
press) and shed light on why the authors had found support for the mapping model in one 
study, while in another study the exemplar model was superior.  
Although the mapping model clearly outperformed the exemplar model in the two 
conditions in which all cues were predictive, it should be noted that the mapping model 
predicted the estimations worse when the participants learned the cue directions than when 
the participants were informed about the directions. This result is partly attributable to some 
participants who failed to learn the cue directions. Furthermore, the condition where the cue 
direction had to be learned was apparently also quite difficult, indicated by a high variance 
between participants’ estimations and the relatively poor performance during training. Thus, 
although participants managed to learn most of the cue directions, this happened at the 
expense of accuracy.  
General Discussion 
Past research has proposed that multiple distinct processing systems control human 
cognitive behavior. Which system wins out depends on the structure of the task (e.g. Ashby 
et al., 1998; Juslin et al., in press). For instance, explicit, rule-based processes are assumed to 
be constrained to tasks in which stimulus dimensions are separable and can be selectively 
attended to, while implicit, similarity-based processes catch on if the stimulus dimensions 
are integral (Ashby et al., 1998). Likewise, Erickson and Kruschke (1998; Ashby et al., 
1998) argued that rule-based processing in categorization is restricted to easily verbalizable, 
uni-dimensional rules. 
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Following up on this line of research, our goal was to test how two recent models of 
quantitative estimation, the rule-based mapping model (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press) and 
a similarity-based exemplar model (Juslin et al., 2003; in press), are affected by different 
task structures. This test was based on theoretical considerations of the crucial cognitive 
components that are essential for the two models: the establishment of accurate knowledge 
abstraction for the mapping model and of accurate exemplar memory for the exemplar 
model. This theoretical grounding allowed us to investigate the link between cognitive 
processing and task characteristics. Accordingly we predicted that the mapping model would 
describe participants’ estimations well when knowledge about the task was available or 
could be easily abstracted during the task. In contrast, exemplar-based processes should be 
triggered when knowledge abstraction is difficult but the stimulus material allows the 
accurate storage and retrieval of training exemplars. Our results supported our predictions. 
The mapping model performed best when the participants were informed about the cues’ 
directions or could abstract them during training. However, when abstracting knowledge 
about the cues was difficult but exemplar memory could be used for accurate estimation, the 
exemplar model was best in predicting participants’ estimations. In the following we will 
discuss the relevance of establishing accurate knowledge abstraction and exemplar memory 
for quantitative estimations in more detail. 
Exemplar Memory: Number of Training Trials and Number of Objects 
Our results showed that simply increasing the amount of training is not sufficient to 
trigger an exemplar-based estimation process. Even after we doubled the amount of training 
in Study 2 and used a small number of objects that had to be learned in the training phase the 
mapping model still outperformed the exemplar model in predicting participants’ 
estimations, supporting a rule-based estimation process. Thus, when the participants had 
access to explicit task knowledge, no shift to an exemplar-based processing occurred even 
when the training intensity was increased. However, these results only hold in the cases 
where participants were informed about the cue directions. This suggests that the opportunity 
to establish stable memory traces of the exemplars does not necessarily lead to reliance on 
exemplar-based processes. Rather, the processes underlying estimation seem to be triggered 
early on: In situations in which sufficient knowledge is provided about the task structure 
people start with a rule-based estimation process and do not necessarily switch to an 
exemplar-based process even if extensive training is provided. In contrast, when only little 
knowledge is available about the task structure exemplar-based processes might become 
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more frequent and are enforced by an increased amount of training and a smaller number of 
training instances (Smith & Minda, 1998). 
Knowledge Abstraction  
Providing explicit knowledge about the cues led to a strong effect on the estimation 
process. The mapping model, which relies on the abstraction of explicit knowledge about the 
task, clearly suffered when no knowledge about the cue directions was given to the 
participants prior to the task. Furthermore, in both conditions the participants performed 
worse during training, indicating that if knowledge about the task needs to be acquired 
during training, learning can be impeded. 
However, the exemplar model was only better in predicting participants’ estimations 
when just a subset of the cues substantially correlated with the criterion. This suggests that 
lacking knowledge about the cue directions is not sufficient to trigger exemplar-based 
processing, but that the accuracy and difficulty with which rule-based estimation processes 
could be employed played an important role when a shift to exemplar-based processing 
occurred (see also Ashby et al., 1998; Juslin et al., in press; Olsson et al., 2006). 
The condition with no prior information about the cue directions and only three 
predictive cues provided especially problematic circumstances for the mapping model, 
because it affected two of its core assumptions. First, the mapping model assumes that 
explicit knowledge about the cues is abstracted. This was difficult to achieve, as no 
information about the cues was available and the cue directions were difficult to pick up. 
Second, the mapping model assumes that all cues are equally important. However, in this 
task, in fact, only three cues were substantially correlated with the criterion. Thus, if 
participants learned to ignore the less valid cues (Castellan, 1973; Klaymann, 1988b), the 
mapping model should not be able to predict participants’ estimations accurately. 
This raises the question of why the mapping model performed well when only three 
cues were predictive and information about the cue directions was available. The good 
performance of the mapping model in this condition implies that participants regarded all 
cues as equally important for making the estimations. Thus, following a rule-based process 
as described by the mapping model in this condition implies that the participants did not 
accurately learn the task structure. Instead, to improve their estimation accuracy it would 
have been advantageous to use only the predictive cues for an estimation. Apparently, 
providing the participants with explicit knowledge about the direction of the cues led to the 
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inference that all cues were relevant to predict the criterion and thereby triggered a rule-
based process. This finding is consistent with a “rule bias” as documented by Ashby and 
colleagues (1998; see also Olsson et al., 2006). This rule bias implies an initial preference for 
rule-based over more implicit processing, such as exemplar-based processes. In sum, our 
results indicate that also in quantitative estimation problems people mainly follow an 
exemplar-based process when a rule-based process does not provide an accurate solution to 
the estimation task. The theoretical considerations of the crucial cognitive components that 
are essential for the two models, namely, the establishment of accurate knowledge 
abstraction for the mapping model and of accurate exemplar memory for the exemplar model 
allows the prediction of under which condition a shift to exemplar-based processing can be 
expected. 
Conclusion 
Previous research has described estimation processes almost exclusively with multiple 
linear regression models. Recently new cognitively motivated models, such as the exemplar 
model by Juslin et al. (in press) and the mapping model by Helversen and Rieskamp (in 
press; see also Brown & Siegler, 1993) have been proposed to model estimation processes. 
Interestingly, these models represent two different views on estimation processes. While the 
exemplar model proposes an implicit, similarity-based process, the mapping model assumes 
a rule-based process (Ashby et al., 1998; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin et al., 2003, in press). 
Consistent with previous research on the interplay of rule-based and similarity-based 
systems in categorization problems, we found evidence for an initial preference for rule-
based processes in quantitative estimation tasks. Furthermore, the experimental studies 
reported in the present article successfully illustrate the link between the cognitive processes 
assumed by the models and the structure of the environments. We showed that the models’ 
assumptions about the estimation process were directly affected by different structures of the 
estimation task, which consequently determined which estimation process prevailed. This 
highlights not only the impact of task characteristics on information processing, but also the 
importance of explicit assumptions about the cognitive process for computation modeling 
approaches. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Training and test sets for Studies 1 and 2 
The following tables describe the sets of items that were used in Study 1 and Study 2. 
Table A1 describes the set of items for the training phase of Study 1. Table A2 describes the 
set of items for the training and test phases of the condition with a low number of training 
objects in Study 1 and for the condition with six predictive cues in Study 2. Table A3 
describes the set of items for the training and test phases of the conditions with three 
predictive cues in Study 2. 
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Table A1: Sets of objects for the training phases of Study 1 
Training 
condition Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Cue 6 Criterion 
A & B 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
A & B 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
A & B 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
A 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
A 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
A 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
A 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
A 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
A 0 1 0 0 1 1 7 
A & B 0 1 0 1 0 1 7 
A 0 1 1 0 1 0 9 
A 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 
A & B 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 
A 1 0 1 1 0 0 10 
A 1 1 0 0 0 1 10 
A 0 1 0 1 1 1 14 
A & B 1 1 0 1 1 0 24 
A 1 1 1 0 0 1 24 
A 1 1 1 0 1 0 26 
A 1 1 1 1 0 0 27 
A & B 0 1 1 1 1 1 33 
A 1 1 1 1 1 0 55 
A & B 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 
Note. A & B = objects that were used for the training condition (A) with a large number of 
training objects and for the training condition (B) with a small number of training objects. A 
= objects that were additionally used in the training condition (A) with a large number of 
training objects. 
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Table A2: Sets of objects for the training and test phases of Study 1 for the condition with a 
small number of training objects and of Study 2 for the condition with six predictive cues 
Objects Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Cue 6 Criterion Mapping Exemplar
Test/training 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Test/training 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
Test/training 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 
Test/training 0 1 0 1 0 1 7 8 7 
Test/training 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 8 10 
Test/training 1 1 0 1 1 0 24 24 24 
Test/training 0 1 1 1 1 1 33 33 33 
Test/training 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 
Test 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 2 7 
Test 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 9 
Test 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 2 10 
Test 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 7 
Test 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 2 9 
Test 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 2 7 
Test 3a 0 0 1 0 1 1 6 8 2 
Test 3a 1 1 0 1 0 0 12 8 24 
Test 3b 1 0 1 0 0 1 9 8 6 
Test 3b 0 1 0 1 1 0 8 8 24 
Test 3c 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 8 2 
Test 3c 0 1 1 1 0 0 9 8 20 
Test 3d 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 5 
Test 3d 0 1 1 0 1 0 9 8 21 
Test 3e 1 1 0 0 0 1 10 8 5 
Test 3e 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 8 21 
Test 4 1 0 1 0 1 1 17 24 10 
Test 4 1 0 1 1 1 0 20 24 10 
Test 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 21 24 7 
Test 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 26 24 10 
Test/extra 1 0 1 1 1 1 37 33 100 
Test/extra 1 1 1 1 0 1 50 33 100 
Note. Test/training indicates the eight objects that constituted the training set in the condition 
with a small number of training objects in Study 1 and the two conditions with six predictive 
cues in Study 2. These eight objects also appeared in the respective test sets. Test 2 denotes 
objects with a cue sum of 2, Test 3 objects with a cue sum of 3, where pairs with the same 
letter indicate opposite cue profiles, and Test 4 objects with a cue sum of 4. Test/extra 
indicates objects that were additionally included in the test set to increase the differences in 
model predictions. 
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Table A3: Sets of objects for the training and test phases of Study 2 for the condition with 
three predictive cues 
Objects Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Cue 6 Criterion Exemplar Mapping 
Test/training 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 
Test/training 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 
Test/training 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 4 3 
Test/training 0 1 1 0 1 0 9 9 8 
Test/training 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 8 
Test/training 1 1 0 1 1 0 24 24 25 
Test/training 1 1 1 1 0 0 27 27 25 
Test/training 1 0 1 1 1 1 37 37 37 
Test 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 9 3 
Test 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 3 
Test/extra 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 24 3 
Test 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 8 3 
Test/extra 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 18 3 
Test 3a 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 3 8 
Test 3a 1 1 1 0 0 0 13 16 8 
Test 3b 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 3 8 
Test 3b 1 1 0 0 1 0 11 24 8 
Test 3c 0 1 0 1 0 1 7 3 8 
Test 3c 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 16 8 
Test 3d 0 1 1 0 0 1 8 4 8 
Test 3d 1 0 0 1 1 0 9 24 8 
Test 3e 0 1 0 0 1 1 7 9 8 
Test 3e 1 0 1 1 0 0 10 27 8 
Test/extra 0 1 0 1 1 1 14 13 25 
Test 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 16 9 25 
Test 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 18 9 25 
Test 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 21 8 25 
Test 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 26 9 25 
Test/extra 1 1 1 1 1 0 55 25 37 
Test/extra 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 37 37 
Note. Test/training indicates the eight objects that constituted the training set in the two 
conditions with three predictive cues in Study 2. These eight objects also appeared in the 
respective test sets. Test 2 denotes objects with a cue sum of 2, Test 3 objects with a cue sum 
of 3, where pairs with same letters indicate opposite cue profiles, and Test 4 objects with a 
cue sum of 4. Test/extra indicates objects that were additionally included in the test set to 
increase the differences in model predictions. 
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Appendix B 
Accuracies of the Regression Model and the Standard Exemplar Model  
In the following we report the performance of the regression model and the standard 
exemplar model in predicting participants’ estimations. For Study 2 we additionally tested a 
regression model and a standard exemplar model with a free attention parameter for every 
cue. The predictions of the regression model were obtained by running a multiple linear 
regression with the cues of the training phase as predictors and participants’ estimations in 
the last four blocks as the dependent variable. On the basis of the obtained cue weights, 
predictions for the test phase were made. The standard exemplar model was fitted in the 
same way as the simplified exemplar model, but s was allowed to vary freely for each cue. 
The regression model and the standard exemplar model performed worse than the mapping 
model and the simplified exemplar model when all cues were predictive. Only when half of 
the cues were predictive and cue directions were known was the mapping model better than 
the regression model and the standard exemplar model (both Z = −3.92, p < .01), but the 
regression model outperformed the simplified exemplar model (Z = −2.95, p < .01). In the 
condition of Study 2, where the cue directions were unknown and only three cues were 
predictive, the regression model (Z = −2.95, p < .01) and the standard exemplar model (Z = 
−2.24, p = .02) performed better than the mapping model and equally as well as the exemplar 
model, Zregression = −1.53, p = .13; Zexemplar = −1.57, p = .12. The standard exemplar model 
predicted the estimations of 5 (25%) participants best, the regression model provided the best 
estimations for 3 (15%), and the simplified exemplar model for 12 (60%). An overview of 
the accuracies of the regression model and the standard exemplar model in Study 2 is 
reported in Table B1. 
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Table B1: Accuracies of the regression model and the standard exemplar model in predicting 
participants’ estimations 
 Number of predictive cues 
 Six predictive cues Three predictive cues 
 Cue directions Cue directions 
 Known  Unknown Known  Unknown 
 Regression 
Exempla
r  
Regressio
n Exemplar Regression Exemplar  
Regressio
n Exemplar
Training set          
RMSD 12.89 1.20  14.70 7.31 2.92 2.45  4.24 4.53 
SDRMSD .30 1.72  2.54 6.96 1.04 1.69  1.69 2.58 
r² .88 1.00  .81 .91 .94 .95  .85 .85 
SDr² .003 .01  .12 .14 .05 .06  .13 .14 
Test set: Old          
RMSD 13.33 3.19  15.61 8.35 3.56 3.07  5.63 5.35 
SDRMSD .92 3.82  3.04 6.30 1.90 2.35  2.72 2.49 
r² .86 .98  .79 .90 .91 .92  .76 .77 
SDr² .05 .06  .11 .15 .10 .11  .23 .20 
Test set: New          
RMSD 27.03 29.94  27.94 28.18 13.90 16.57  10.01 10.05 
SDRMSD 2.57 8.20  3.52 6.68 3.57 3.30  2.54 3.10 
r² .39 .35  .24 .33 .36 .14  .39 .33 
SDr² .15 .18  .14 .20 .09 .11  .22 .27 
Test set: Total          
RMSD 24.16 25.75  25.28 24.72 12.08 14.31  9.14 9.17 
SDRMSD 2.15 7.10  3.10 5.72 3.06 2.88  2.22 2.49 
r² .37 .43  .33 .43 .45 .25  .47 .42 
SDr² .09 .15  .11 .16 .10 .12  .21 .24 
Note. NTotal = 80, with N = 20 in each condition. RMSD = root mean squared deviation 
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Footnotes 
1. Although this pattern holds true for a wide range of parameter values it should be 
noted that the strength of the qualitative differences in model predictions depends on the 
composition of the training set as well as on the parameter values for the cues. Therefore we 
selected training set–test set combinations where strong qualitative results should be 
expected. 
2. For the model comparison we used the nonparametric Wilcoxon test. The standard 
exemplar model performed significantly worse than the mapping model in the test phase and 
worse than the simplified exemplar model in both conditions, in all cases Z < −4.3, and p < 
.01. The regression model was significantly worse than the mapping model (Z = −5.44, p < 
.01, for both conditions) but performed equally as well as the simplified exemplar model (in 
all cases Z = −1.02, p = .32). 
3. We also tested a version of the mapping model that included only the three cues that 
were substantially correlated with the criterion. However, overall this model did not perform 
better than a mapping model that considered all cues. 
Chapter 2: Rule-Based and Exemplar-Based Processes                                 Page |   109 
Authors’ Note 
Bettina von Helversen and Jörg Rieskamp, Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development, Berlin, Germany. We would like to thank Anita Todd for editing a draft of 
this manuscript. This work has been supported by a doctoral fellowship of the International 
Max Planck Research School LIFE to the first author. Correspondence concerning this 
article should be addressed to Bettina von Helversen. 
 
Bettina von Helversen 
Max Planck Institute for Human Development 
Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany 
Phone: ++49-30-82406699 
Fax: ++49-30-82406394 
Email: vhelvers@mpib-berlin.mpg.de 
 
Chapter 3: Cognitive Modeling of Sentencing Decisions                              Page |   110 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: 
Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level Crimes: 
A Cognitive Modeling Approach 
Chapter 3: Cognitive Modeling of Sentencing Decisions                              Page |   111 
 
Abstract 
Laws and guidelines regulating legal decision making are often imposed without 
taking the cognitive processes of the legal decision maker into account. In the case of 
sentencing, this raises the question of to what extent the sentencing decisions of prosecutors 
and judges are consistent with legal policy. Especially in handling low-level crimes, legal 
personnel suffer from high case loads and time pressure, which can make it difficult to 
comply with the often complex rulings of the law. To understand sentencing decisions it is 
beneficial to consider the cognitive processes underlying the decision. An analysis of fining 
and incarceration decisions in cases of larceny, fraud, and forgery showed that prosecutors’ 
sentence recommendations were not consistent with legal policy. Instead they were well 
described by a cognitive theory of quantitative estimation that assumes sentence 
recommendations rely on a categorization of cases based on their characteristics. 
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Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level Crimes: A Cognitive Modeling Approach 
How are criminal sentences determined? Although legal systems differ from country to 
country, judges worldwide struggle with the problem of determining which factors should be 
considered and how they should be combined to form appropriate and just sentences. Even if 
the legal system provides guidelines to regulate the sentencing process, the question still 
remains how well judges and other legal personnel follow the prescribed policies (Ruback & 
Wroblewski, 2001). Research on sentencing has a long tradition of identifying deviations 
from legal policy: Extralegal factors such as race or gender have been found to influence 
sentencing, and in some cases legal factors are not properly taken into account (e.g., Davis, 
Severy, Kraus, & Whitaker, 1993; Ebbesen & Konečni, 1975; ForsterLee, ForsterLee, 
Horowitz, & King, 2006; Henning & Feder, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Ojmarrh, 2005). This 
indicates that the cognitive processes of legal professionals do not always lead to sentencing 
that is consistent with the sentencing policy specified by the law (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; 
Ebbesen & Konečni, 1975; Hertwig, 2006; Tata 1997; Van Duye, 1987).  
The goal of this article is to investigate to what extent sentencing decisions deviate 
from legal regulations and how these deviations can be explained by cognitive models of the 
sentencing process. For this purpose we test whether prosecutors’ sentence recommendations 
can be better explained by a cognitive model or by adherence to legal policy. Additionally 
we examine whether the same cognitive processes underlie both fining and incarceration 
decisions.  
Heuristics in Legal Decision Making 
The legal decision environment is highly complex and the workload of legal personnel 
heavy; decisions need to be made under time pressure and often little or no feedback 
regarding the quality of the decision is available (Gigerenzer, 2006). Even if specific rules 
exist to guide the decision process, they are often too complex to be executed in the allotted 
time (Ruback & Wroblewski, 2001). Not surprisingly, then, research on sentencing has 
found that often only a small part of the available information is used (Ebbesen & Konečni, 
1975, 1981) to determine a sentence. 
Heuristics are simple strategies that allow decisions to be made without much 
information or complex computations. Although there is disagreement on to what extent 
heuristics allow good decisions and how they should be formalized (Gigerenzer, 1996; 
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Kahneman &Tversky, 1996), there is converging evidence that heuristics provide good 
accounts of people’s decision processes (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In particular, when making complex decisions 
under time pressure, reliance on heuristics increases (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; 
Rieskamp & Hoffrage, in press), making the legal domain an area conducive to decision-
making heuristics. In fact, reliance on heuristics has been shown in several areas of legal 
decision making, such as bail decisions (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami, 2003; Leiser & 
Pachman, 2007), tort law (Guthrie, Rachlinksi, & Wistrich, 2001), and sentencing (Englich, 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2006; for an overview see Colwell, 2005; Engel & Gigerenzer, 2006). 
Especially for the domain of low-level offenses where the decision situation can be 
relatively transparent and the costs of wrong decisions low, reliance on heuristics might be a 
way to deal with the immense workload involved. Although regrettably widely ignored by 
research (for an exception, see Albrecht, 1980), the majority of the cases in courts are low-
level crimes and petty offenses. For example, in Germany, about 80% of the cases are 
punished with a fine (Langer, 1994; Meier, 2001), an alternative to incarceration that can 
only be imposed in minor cases. Thus, particularly in cases sentenced with a fine, heuristics 
might be prevalent.  
Sentencing Decisions by the Prosecution 
As in most legal systems, in Germany the sentence is determined by the judge. 
However, the judge makes this decision after hearing sentencing recommendations from 
both the prosecution and the defense. Research has shown that the sentencing 
recommendation of the prosecution is the single most important factor influencing the 
decision of the judge (Ebbesen & Konečni, 1975; Schünemann, 1988). For instance, Englich 
and Mussweiler (2001) found that, all things being equal, the recommendation of the 
prosecution significantly influenced a criminal’s sentence; similarly Dhami and Ayton 
(2001) showed that in bail decisions, British magistrates followed almost without exception 
the recommendation of the prosecution. Additionally the prosecution can directly impose 
fines by penalty order. If the defendant accepts the fine, the case never goes to trial. These 
findings indicate that to understand which factors influence a sentence’s magnitude, it is 
indispensable to first investigate the process by which the prosecution determines the 
sentence recommendation.  
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How should the prosecution do this? German sentencing is regulated by the German 
penal code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB; Tröndle & Fischer, 2007), more specifically by articles 
21, 23, 46, 47, and 49 and by decisions of the German Federal Court of Justice. Both judge 
and prosecution are bound by the same legal regulations. The general goal is to achieve an 
appropriate sentence that is proportional to the guilt of the offender. For each offense there 
exists a sentencing range that establishes a minimum and a maximum sentence that can be 
imposed. Within these often rather broad sentencing ranges, the placement of the sentence 
depends on the seriousness of the case and is largely left to the discretion of the judge. The 
judge’s task, as well as the prosecution’s, is to evaluate the factors mitigating or aggravating 
the guilt of the offender and to determine the sentence accordingly. Which factors should be 
considered as mitigating or aggravating is specified in the penal code. Article 46 of the StGB 
alone lists over 20 factors relevant for the sentencing decision although it cautions that it is 
not an exhaustive list.1 
What the German penal code (§ 46) does not provide is explicit guidelines on how the 
factors should be combined. However, the German Federal Court of Justice recommends that 
mitigating and aggravating factors be balanced in an integrative evaluation of the overall 
picture (Schäfer, 2001). According to the predominant opinion in the legal literature, this is 
best accomplished with a three-step sentencing process: All relevant factors are evaluated 
according to the direction of their effect on the sentence (aggravating or mitigating), then 
weighted by their importance, and finally added up to form the sentence (Bruns 1985, 1988; 
Foth, 1985; Schäfer, 2001; but see Mösl, 1981, 1983; and Theune, 1985a, 1985b). Thus, the 
legal prescription asks for a linear additive decision process.  
Models of Sentence Magnitude 
How can the underlying cognitive process of sentencing decisions be described? In 
many areas of psychology multiple linear regression models are applied to analyze decision 
policies (Doherty & Kurz, 1996; Brehmer, 1994, Cooksey, 1996). Likewise, in the legal 
domain these have been the predominant models used to analyze sentencing policies and to 
identify which factors influence sentence magnitude (Engen & Gainy, 2000; Johnson, 2006; 
Kautt, 2002; Kautt & Spohn, 2002). Regression models are especially attractive to model 
sentencing, as the three-step model is consistent with their linear additive approach 
(Brehmer, 1994; Hammond, 1996). More specifically, regression models assume that 
quantitative judgments, such as determining the magnitude of a sentence, can be modeled as 
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a process of weighting and adding information (Doherty & Brehmer, 1997; Einhorn, 
Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, in press). Each factor is 
weighted according to its importance and the judgment is determined as the sum of the 
weighted factor values. The weights that best characterize the sentencing process are found 
by minimizing the squared deviation between the actual and the estimated sentence (cf. 
Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Cooksey, 1996): 
(1) 00
ˆ ββ +∑==
J
j j
cjpy , 
where the estimate, ŷp, for the case p is given by the sum of the product of the factor values, 
cj, of the factors j with their respective weights, βj, plus an intercept, β0. 
If prosecutors and judges in fact weigh mitigating and aggravating factors against each 
other and then add up the weighted factor values to arrive at a final sentence, sentencing 
should be well captured by multiple regression. In this case multiple regression allows us to 
identify the factors that influenced the sentencing decision. Furthermore, if the sentencing 
policy corresponds to the law, all legally relevant factors should make a significant 
contribution, whereas extralegal factors should not be considered. Thus, analyzing 
sentencing with a multiple linear regression approach allows us to compare the judges’ and 
prosecutors’ sentencing policies to the policy required by law. 
The Mapping Model: A Cognitive Theory of Quantitative Estimation  
Even though multiple regression can capture decision outcomes, its value as a model 
of human judgment processes is debatable. Researchers have doubted that people actually 
perform the relatively complex calculations required by multiple regression and therefore 
have argued that multiple regression does not provide a valid description of the cognitive 
process underlying a decision (Brehmer, 1994; Einhorn et al., 1979; Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999; Hoffman, 1960). In response to this criticism we have proposed an alternative, called 
the mapping model, that we consider to be a psychologically plausible alternative to multiple 
regression. The mapping model provides a cognitive theory for quantitative judgments and 
has been successful in predicting people’s estimations (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press).  
Generally, the mapping model assumes that when people make a judgment about a 
case or object, they assign the object to a category and use a typical criterion value for this 
category as an estimate. Categories are formed on the basis of previously encountered 
objects, and the category membership is defined by the objects’ characteristics or features. 
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The typical criterion value of a category is represented by the median criterion value of all 
cases belonging to this category. For example, to estimate the selling price of a house, the 
mapping model assumes that one would consider the house’s features that speak in favor of a 
high price (e.g., great location, a deck, a swimming pool), categorize the house according to 
its average value on theses features into a certain price class, and estimate a price that is 
typical for houses within this price class, that is, the median price for which houses in this 
category were sold for. 
Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) showed that the mapping model in comparison to 
multiple regression was particularly suitable for predicting people’s estimations if the cases’ 
criterion values followed a skewed distribution, which is typical of sentencing decisions 
(Meier, 2001). Helversen and Rieskamp (in press) tested the mapping model under highly 
controlled experimental settings; yet these conditions are similar to the conditions of 
sentencing decisions, suggesting that the mapping model might be a good model for 
sentencing decisions. 
How is the mapping model applied for sentencing decisions? Commonly, each case is 
described by several characteristics or factors relevant for sentencing. To apply the mapping 
model, first cases are categorized according to their mean value on these factors.2 To allow 
comparisons of factors with different dispersions all factors are normalized by applying 
range frequency theory (Parducci, 1974). Using range frequency theory for normalization 
instead of a purely statistical technique (i.e., z-transformation) has the advantage that a 
psychologically more plausible representation of how the magnitude of a factor value is 
subjectively perceived by an individual is accomplished (for details see Appendix A). After 
normalizing all factors the mean factor value for all encountered cases is determined. This 
mean value represents the seriousness of the case. Next, the minimum and the maximum 
value of cases’ seriousness are determined and the range is divided into seven equally sized 
categories; that is, category boundaries are chosen so that the distance between category 
boundaries is the same for all categories. Due to humans’ limited cognitive capacities (see 
also Miller, 1956) only a limited number of categories is assumed. Next, the typical sentence 
for each category is computed by taking the median sentence of all previously encountered 
cases that fall into the same category. The sentence for a new case is simply determined by 
establishing its category membership and then using the typical sentence of that category as 
a sentence for the new case. Figure 7 gives an overview of the processing steps assumed by 
the mapping model. 
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Figure 7: The processing steps of the mapping model. In the first step, the relevant 
cues are evaluated and rated according to their severity. In the second step the cues are 
integrated by establishing the average severity score. Then, the case is categorized according 
to its average score and the typical criterion value, that is the sentence for this category is 
retrieved. In the last step the retrieved criterion value is used as an estimate 
To give an example how the mapping model can be applied to sentencing we will 
describe how a typical case would be sentenced according to the mapping model. Imagine a 
case of shoplifting: The defendant has confessed stealing minor goods in five cases. The net 
worth of the stolen goods amounts to $100 and the defendant has three prior convictions for 
theft. In the first step the prosecutor considers the cues, that is the characteristics of the case 
relevant for sentencing such as the number of charges, the amount of money stolen and the 
number of prior convictions. Next, she rates the severity of each cue; for instance, the 
amount of money stolen was low, but three prior convictions are of medium severity and so 
forth, thereby standardizing the cues. After that she forms an overall impression of the case, 
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taking the average of the cues’ severity scores. Based on this average score she categorizes 
the case as a theft of medium seriousness and retrieves the typical sentence for this category. 
In the last step she determines the sentence recommendation based on the retrieved category 
value. 
When comparing the mapping model with the regression model two important 
differences can be emphasized. First, unlike the regression model, the mapping model gives 
all factors the same weight for assigning a case to a category. Second, in contrast to the 
regression model, the influence of one single factor in the mapping model can interact with 
the other factors. The factors determine which category is used to make an estimate. Thus, 
how an estimate changes when one factor provides positive compared to negative evidence 
depends on the evidence of the other factors. Here the mapping model differs substantially 
from the regression model, where a factor’s impact on the estimate is independent of the 
other factors. 
Fines versus Incarceration  
The second goal of this article was to investigate differences between fines and 
incarceration sentences. Low-level offenses can be sentenced by one or the other. Although 
much research has examined which factors influence sentencing length in incarceration 
sentences (ForsterLee et al., 2006; Johnson, 2006; Langer, 1994; Oswald, 1994; 
Schünemann, 1988), to our knowledge there is a lack of research on fining and the 
differences between incarceration and fining decisions (for an exception see Albrecht, 1980; 
Oswald, 1994). However, fining and incarceration are often viewed as serving different 
sentencing goals (Schäfer, 2001). This suggests that fining and incarceration decisions could 
be based on different factors and the cognitive processes underlying the decisions could also 
differ.  
Fining decisions could be especially likely to induce heuristic decision making. As 
fines constitute the majority of the sentences (Meier, 2001), they represent the biggest 
proportion of the prosecution’s workload. More serious cases might be allotted more time 
and be processed more systematically, as they are less frequent, incur more public interest, 
and have a higher probability of appeal. Thus cases sentenced by a fine could differ 
systematically from cases that are sentenced with incarceration. To investigate these 
questions, we conducted an analysis of trial records for three common offenses. 
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Study: Analysis of Trial Records 
The first goal of the study was to model sentencing decisions for common minor 
offenses, investigating how well the sentencing procedure corresponds with the legal policy 
and if sentencing decisions are best described by a cognitive theory of quantitative 
estimations. The study’s second goal was to examine whether fining differs systematically 
from incarceration decisions and which factors influence sentence magnitude in the two 
decisions. 
We approached these goals by conducting an analysis of trial records. In comparison to 
an experimental approach, this type of analysis has the advantage that it is based on real 
cases and does not need to be limited to the small number of factors that can be manipulated 
in an experimental study. Furthermore, the complexity of the real cases as well as the time 
pressure of the daily case load could be decisive for the cognitive process underlying the 
sentencing decisions, favoring the analysis of real case data. 
Method 
We focused on three common offenses against property, namely, theft, fraud, and 
forgery. This allowed us to include different offenses while measuring the severity of the 
offense on a common scale—money—and keeping the sentencing range equal (0–5 years for 
a common case and 3–6 months to 10 years for an aggravated case).To investigate the 
sentencing process we collected trial records from a small Brandenburg Court (the 
Amtsgericht Bad Freienwalde), for the years 2003 to 2005. All records with a main charge of 
theft, forgery, or fraud (§§ 242, 243, 244, 248, 263, and 267) were included in the analysis. 
Trial records included the indictment, the transcript of the trial, orders by the prosecution, 
and the verdict. Based on these documents we identified offense and offender characteristics 
relevant for sentencing, the sentencing range, and the recommendations of the prosecution 
and the defense. 
Categorization system. Offense and offender characteristics were classified by a 
categorization system that was based on the German penal code (§§ 46, 47, 52, 53, 242, 243, 
244, 248, 263, and 267) in close cooperation with legal experts in the area of sentencing. 
Classification of a factor rested upon the indictment, the trial transcripts, and the verdict. 
Besides the legal factors, the categorization system also included extralegal factors that have 
been found to affect sentencing (e.g., Ebbesen & Konečni, 1975; ForsterLee et al., 2006). 
Table 12 provides an overview and a description of the factors. 
Chapter 3: Cognitive Modeling of Sentencing Decisions                              Page |   120 
Table 12: Overview of the categorization system 
Factors Description Values 
Offender information  
 Gender Male vs. female 0 vs. 1 
 Nationality German vs. non-German 0 vs. 1 
 Age  20–80 years 
 Family status Married or single with kids vs. single and no kids 0 vs. 1 
 Occupational status Employed, apprenticed, or student vs. unemployed 0 vs. 1 
 Economic status Above poverty line vs. below poverty line (ca. €900 per 
month) 
0 vs. 1 
 Diminished capacity  No diminished capacity vs. diminished capacity 
(Diminished capacity was assumed if the defendant had a 
psychological or medical diagnosis of a mental or organic 
disorder) 
0 vs. 1 
 No. of prior convictions  0–14 
 Type of last sentence Fine, incarceration, or incarceration with probation Dummy 
coded  
 Probation status Offender was not on probation when the offense was 
committed vs. was on probation 
0 vs. 1 
Offense characteristics  
 Net worth of property 
violated 
 €0–80,000 
 No. of charges  1–112 
 No. of offenders  1–3 
 Mitigating evidence I Coded as a summary factor; one point was added if there 
was external pressure to commit the crime (e.g., an 
emergency situation or blackmail), the crime was a failed 
attempt, the offender’s role was secondary, or the 
offender’s capacity was diminished due to alcohol 
0–2 
 Mitigating evidence II  One point was added if the offender had no prior 
convictions or the net worth of property violated was 
below €30 
0–2 
 Remorse Defendant showed no remorse vs. showed remorse, 
offered reparation or amends   
0 vs. 1 
 Confession Defendant did not confess vs. defendant confessed 0 vs. 1 
 Aggravating evidence One point was added if any of the following conditions 
was fulfilled: a high number of offenses (> 5), over a long 
period of time (> 6 month); the offense was carefully 
planned; perseverance in the face of obstacles; incited 
others to commit the crime; used unnecessary violence 
0-2 
Legal regulations  
 Offense type Theft, fraud, or forgery Dummy 
coded  
 Summary penalty A summary penalty was not given vs. a summary penalty 
was given 
0 vs. 1 
 Penalty order Sentencing by trial vs. sentencing by penalty order 0 vs. 1 
 Sentencing range Max. sentence 5 years vs. max. sentence 10 years  0 vs. 1 
 
The categorization system included personal information on the offender, as well as 
legally relevant factors concerning the offender’s criminal and personal history. To capture 
the severity of the crime several characteristics of the offense were coded, such as the 
number of charges and the net worth of property violated. The presence of mitigating and 
aggravating factors concerning the conduct of the crime were coded in two summary factors 
capturing the amount of mitigating and aggravating evidence. If the description of a case in 
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the indictment and the trial protocols left doubt about the presence of a mitigating or 
aggravating factor the verdict was used as a reference. Only if the behavior in question was 
mentioned in the rationale of the verdict was it considered as mitigating or aggravating 
evidence. Additionally, the presence of a confession and mitigating behavior after the crime, 
such as remorse, were coded as two separate factors. A further mitigating summary factor 
coded whether the net worth of property violated was low enough to count as a less severe 
case (§ 248) and whether the offender had no prior record; these are two characteristics 
specifically identified by the German penal codes that mitigate the sentence regardless of the 
overall impact of property violated or of any prior record. Additionally we included three 
factors concerning legal regulations, such as, for instance, the sentence range applied. 
Finally, we did not include the recommendation of the defense in the analysis, because in 
most cases the defendant did not have a defense attorney present during the trial. 
For most variables a nominal or ordinal level of measurement was assumed. Nominal 
variables were binary coded, indicating the presence or absence of a factor; ordinal variables 
were dichotomized by a median split. For the variables number of charges, offenders, and 
prior convictions, amount of mitigating or aggravating evidence, and net worth of property, 
an interval scale was assumed. Two independent raters coded the cases. The raters’ 
agreement was satisfactory on all subjectively rated factors (r = .77, SD = .12). Non-random 
missing data were analyzed and missing values substituted with the mean of the variable, 
because no effect on the dependent variable was found and the overall number of cases was 
rather small.  
Dependent variables. Dependent variables were the type of sentence (fine or 
incarceration) and the number and magnitude of daily payments (for fines) and the length of 
a prison term in months (for incarceration) as recommended by the prosecution and the 
verdict. According to the German legal system a fine is constructed as a number of daily 
payments of a certain magnitude. The number is determined in correspondence to the 
severity of the crime, whereas the magnitude depends on the income of the defendant. As the 
aim of this study was to compare sentencing for prison terms and fines we focused on the 
number of daily payments as the dependent variable for fines corresponding to length of 
prison sentence. The number of daily payments can vary between 5 and 365; more severe 
offenses are sentenced by incarceration. The dependent variable for incarceration length was 
number of months sentenced to prison, irrespective of whether the offender was let off with 
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probation. To identify the differences between fines and incarceration, we analyzed the 
sentences for fines and incarceration separately. 
Description of the court, the offenses, and the offenders. The Amtsgericht Bad 
Freienwalde is a small court in the Brandenburg district of Märkisch-Oderland, close to the 
Polish border under the jurisdiction of the Frankfurt (Oder) district attorney’s office. The city 
of Bad Freienwalde has a population of 13,000 with an unemployment rate of 12%. Overall, 
99 cases of theft, fraud, and forgery were tried in this court during 2003 and 2004. From the 
99 cases, 15 were excluded because the major charge was none of the offenses under 
consideration, juvenile law was applied, or the case did not lead to a conviction. Of the 
remaining 84 cases, 82% were tried by the same judge. The 84 cases were prosecuted by 45 
different attorneys with a maximum of 5 cases by the same attorney. In 49 cases the main 
charge was theft, in 20 it was fraud, and in 15, forgery. On average, property worth €2,497 
was violated (SD = €8,826). The offenders were predominantly German males; 69 were men 
and 15 women. Eight offenders did not have German citizenship. The mean age of the 
offender was 36 years, ranging from 20 to 80 years. About half of the offenders were 
sentenced to a fine (M = 48 days; SD = 27) and half to a prison term (M = 8 months; SD = 6). 
Model selection. The main goal of our study was to identify the cognitive process 
underlying sentencing and to determine if a cognitive model of sentencing could predict the 
magnitude of a sentence. For this purpose we tested which theory describes the sentencing 
process better: legal policy as modeled by a multiple linear regression model (e.g., Cooksey, 
1996) or the mapping model, a cognitive theory for quantitative estimation (Helversen & 
Rieskamp, in press). 
Testing these two models on the data of real cases raised two crucial methodological 
problems: First, real cases involve an enormous number of factors that could potentially 
predict the sentence. In our cases we recorded 22 factors that could influence the sentencing 
decision. How can we find out which factors have a substantial effect? One common 
technique when using regression models for identifying important factors relies on 
significance tests. In these models the estimated impact of a factor can depend on the other 
factors included in the regression equation, so that often procedures are performed where 
factors are step-wise either included or excluded from the regression equation (cf., Cohen et 
al., 2003). However, when considering a larger number of factors this procedure is very 
unsatisfying, because factors that were added to the equation at the beginning of a step-wise 
forward procedure might not have been added had other factors already been included. 
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Therefore, different statistical procedures applied to the same original set of factors often 
lead to inconsistent results (i.e., different regression equations), which can lead to very 
different conclusions.  
The second methodological problem we faced concerns the models’ complexity, that 
is, their flexibility in describing different results. In particular, we were interested in testing 
the regression model against the mapping model; these models differ in their number of free 
parameters and therefore in their potential to describe different processes. Therefore, we 
sought a methodology that would take the models’ complexity into account when testing 
them against each other. 
To tackle these two methodological problems we followed a Bayesian approach, 
specifically the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) method (see Raftery, 1995, and also 
Raftery, Madigan, & Hoeting, 1997). This Bayesian method identifies the model or the 
models that are most probable given the data. Furthermore, BMA provides reliable estimates 
of the predictors’ influence on the dependent variable and it allows comparison of models of 
different complexities by taking the models’ free parameters into account. BMA was 
proposed especially to examine the uncertainty of parameter estimates and for model 
selection. To identify the most probable models, the Bayesian method calculates the 
posterior probability of a model given the observed data. Pragmatically this is performed by 
determining the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which approximates the so-called 
Bayes factor (Raftery, 1995; Schwarz, 1978). The method additionally allows one to specify 
the probability that a factor will have an impact on the dependent variable: Taking model 
uncertainty fully into account, the average amount of evidence speaking for an effect of a 
factor is determined by summing the posterior probabilities of all models that include this 
factor (for details see Appendix B). 
The most reliable method for model selection, according to Raftery (1995), is to 
construct all possible models that can be built with the available factors and then select the 
models with the highest posterior probability given the data. However, including all 
candidate predictor variables would result in an enormous number of possible models, as 15 
predictor variables already amount to 32,768 models. Thus we reduced the number of factors 
by first including all factors that substantially correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., 
showed a value of r > .3) and then additionally adding factors such as confession or remorse 
that were not necessarily correlated with sentence magnitude but are of special theoretical 
importance, because they frequently appear as mitigating reasons in the rationale of the 
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verdict. For the fines we included 11 factors and for the incarceration decisions 9 factors (see 
Tables 2 and 3).  
Next we calculated the BIC values for all models resulting from all possible 
combinations of the factors. This amounted to 2,048 models in the case of fining decisions 
and 512 models in the case of incarceration decisions for each model class, the mapping 
models and the regression models. We first ran the analysis separately for the two model 
classes, to investigate if the factors identified by the two types of models would differ. Then 
we included all models in the comparison to identify which class of models most probably 
underlies the decision behavior given the observed data.  
For all of the models we calculated the BIC′ value based on the amount of variance 
explained (R²) as a measure of goodness-of-fit of the model and the number of free 
parameters (see Raftery, 1995). Details on the computation and the equations can be found in 
Appendix B. The BIC′ value gives the odds with which a specific model is preferred to a 
baseline. In the case of regression, usually a null model is chosen as a baseline model. The 
null model only includes an intercept (i.e., estimates the mean criterion value for all objects) 
and no predictor (i.e., free parameter). It explains zero of the variance in the data and its BIC′ 
is zero (see Equation 2); The BICk′ of a specific model Mk is defined so that if the BICk′ 
value is positive, the null model is preferred, while a negative BICk′ value provides evidence 
for the model Mk under consideration. The lower the BICk′ value, the more the model is 
supported by the data. 
(2) ( ) nqRnCBI kkk log1log 2 +−=′  
where 2kR  is the value of R² for model Mk, qk is the number of free parameters for that model, 
and n is the number of data points. 
For the regression models a least squares regression was run with the factors as 
predictor variables and the sentence recommendation of the prosecution as the dependent 
variable. For the mapping models the category borders and the typical sentence for each 
category were estimated from the data. First the perceived factor score was calculated based 
on range frequency theory with one free parameter for all factors, capturing the relative 
importance of range and frequency information (for details see Appendix A). Then case 
seriousness was computed by averaging the factor scores over all factors, the minimum and 
maximum case seriousness was determined, and the range was divided into seven equally 
sized categories. For each category the typical sentence was calculated by taking the median 
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of all cases that fell into this category. The typical sentence was estimated for all cases 
falling into one category and the amount of variance in the sentence recommendation of the 
prosecution explained (R²) was computed. Based on the BIC′ value we calculated the 
posterior probability of each model, assuming equal priors for all models. Additionally we 
computed the probability of each factor being included and an approximation of a Bayesian 
point estimator of beta weights and standard errors for each factor (see Appendix B).  
Results 
Overall, the more parsimonious mapping models offered the more probable description 
of the data, but both model types identified the same factors as influencing sentencing. 
Although sentencing decisions for fines and prison times were both based on the factors net 
worth of property and number of charges, the role of mitigating and aggravating evidence 
differed for the two sentence types. Fining decisions were more influenced by aggravating 
evidence and the number of prior convictions while incarceration length was more affected 
by mitigating evidence (II). Neither for fines nor for incarceration decisions did extralegal 
factors such as sex, age, or nationality play a role. In the following we report the results of 
the analysis for fines and incarceration separately. 
Magnitude of fines. Overall, the verdict could be almost perfectly predicted by the 
recommendation of the prosecution (r = .99), as illustrated in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of the sentence recommendation for fines by the prosecution and 
the corresponding verdict by the judge. The magnitude of the fines is given in number of 
days a payment has to be made. 
Accordingly, we concentrated on the recommendation of the prosecution as the more 
interesting dependent variable. The recommended sentence, in turn, correlated significantly 
with a number of offense and offender characteristics (see Table 13). As expected, the 
presence of a confession and mitigating evidence II, coding low worth of property violated 
and no prior record, correlated negatively with the recommended sentence. The net worth of 
the property violated, the number of prior convictions, the number of charges, and the 
amount of aggravating evidence correlated positively with the magnitude of the sentence. All 
other factors did not correlate significantly with sentence length or showed no variation in 
the sample. 
Table 13: Results of correlation analysis and model comparison for fines 
Five best models 
 
Fines (no. 
of days) 
Pearson 
correlation 
(p values) 
Mapping 
model 1 
Mapping 
model 2 
Mapping 
model 3 
Mapping 
model 4 
Mapping 
model 5 
Probability Beta SD
Age .34 (.02) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ .08 .03 .11
No. of prior 
convictions .32 (.03) ● ○ ● ○ ○ .56 .19 .10
No. of 
charges .36 (.02) ● ● ○ ● ○ .64 .16 .17
Net worth 
of property  .46 (.001) ● ● ● ● ● .97 .36 .11
Confession -.50 (.001) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ .15 -.08 .19
Penalty 
order .50 (.001) ● ● ● ● ● .91 .53 .14
Summary 
penalty .53 (.001) ○ ○ ● ○ ● .46 .24 .12
Aggravating 
evidence .39 (.01) ● ○ ● ○ ○ .59 .32 .13
Mitigating 
evidence II -.48 (.001) ○ ● ○ ○ ○ .25 .15 .12
Remorse -.20 (.20) ○ ○ ○ ● ○ .13 -.16 .11
Nationality .32 (-03) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ .14 .08 .12
PMP  .15 .13 .09 .07 .06    
BIC′  -56 -55 -55 -54 -54    
R²  .74 .74 .73 .73 .73    
Note: N= 44; Probability denotes the probability that the factor had an effect and is given by 
Equation B3 (Appendix B). BIC′ denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion. PMP denotes 
posterior model probability. An open circle denotes that a factor was not included in the 
model; a solid circle denotes that a factor is included in the model. For the analyses, the 
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factors confession, remorse, and mitigating evidence II were recoded so that they correlated 
positively with sentence magnitude. The five best models all belonged to the class of 
mapping models 
Modeling—critical factors. Model analysis showed that a few factors are sufficient to 
describe the data. BMA for the two model classes gave a similar picture of which factors 
influence sentencing. Altogether 11 factors were considered (see Table 13), resulting in 
2,048 possible models for each model class. Thus the prior probability of a model was about 
.0005. Of the 2,048 linear regression models under evaluation, 95% had a posterior 
probability below .002, with the two best models reaching a posterior probability of 5% and 
6% and explaining 64% and 68% of the variance in the sentencing recommendations, 
respectively. There was strong evidence that the factors net worth of property, penalty order, 
and aggravating evidence affected sentence recommendation. Additionally there was weak 
evidence for the factors summary penalty and number of prior convictions. The estimated 
beta weights can be found in Table 2.  
Applying the BMA method to the class of mapping models similarly led to discarding 
a large proportion of models: 96% had a posterior probability below .001. However, the two 
best models reached a posterior probability of 15% and 13%, respectively. They both 
explained a much higher amount of variance (74%) in the sentence recommendations than 
the best regression models. Similar to the regression models, there was strong evidence for 
the factors net worth of property and penalty order. The factors aggravating evidence, 
number of prior convictions, and number of charges were supported by some evidence. In 
contrast to the regression model the factor summary penalty received less support.  
In sum, the BMA analyses of the two model classes rendered that the choice of model 
had only a slight influence on which factors were identified as important. In both model 
classes, the most important factors were net worth of property, whether the sentence was 
recommended by a penalty order or after a trial, and the presence of aggravating evidence. 
Additionally the number of prior convictions, the number of charges, and if the sentence was 
a summary penalty played a role, while age, nationality, and a confession or other mitigating 
evidence did not influence the sentence recommendation. This is clearly inconsistent with 
the legal requirement that all legally relevant factors be taken into account. Particularly 
surprising is that confession and remorse were not considered, as they are usually mentioned 
as extenuating factors in the rationale for the verdict.  
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Model comparison. After examining which factors influenced the sentencing decision 
in cases punished with a fine, we now tested which type of model was better suited to 
explain the decision process underlying fining, mapping or regression. For this comparison 
we included all models and calculated the posterior probabilities, assuming that all models 
have the same prior probability. This resulted in a comparison of 4,096 models with a prior 
probability of .0002. Over all models, 17 reached a posterior probability above .01, summing 
up to a joint probability of .74, compared with a joint probability of .26 for the remaining 
4,079 models. All of them belonged to the class of mapping models (see Table 2 for the five 
best models). Overall, the mapping models reached a much higher posterior probability: The 
joint posterior probability of all mapping models was .99999 compared to .00001 for the 
regression models. This is illustrated by Figure 9, showing the posterior probabilities of the 
best 1,500 models. The majority clearly belong to the mapping model class. 
 
Figure 9: The posterior model probability of the best 1,500 of all 4,096 models to 
describe the fining process, differentiated by model class. Of the 1,500 best models, 99% 
belong to the class of mapping models and 1% to the class of regression models. 
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Incarceration length. Similar to the fines, the recommendation of the prosecution was 
the best predictor of sentence length (r = .95). Accordingly, we again focused on the 
sentence recommendation of the prosecution as the main dependent variable. Altogether we 
considered nine factors. Seven offense or offender characteristics correlated above .3 with 
the length of prison sentence. As expected, the factors net worth of property violated, 
summary penalty, aggravating evidence, number of charges, and number of offenders 
correlated positively with the sentence length, while the second mitigating factor (coding a 
low worth of property violated and no prior record) correlated negatively with recommended 
sentence length (see Table 14). The factor penalty order was not applicable as a sentence by 
penalty order is not allowed for prison sentences. Somewhat unexpectedly, the presence of a 
confession and special circumstances leading to diminished capacity correlated positively 
with sentence length. This effect, however, is probably due to the comparatively serious 
nature of these cases and does not reflect a negative evaluation of these factors for 
sentencing. Although remorse did not correlate with sentence length, we additionally 
included it in the analysis. 
Table 14: Results of correlation analysis and model comparisons for incarceration 
Five best models 
 
Incarceration  
(no. of 
months) 
Pearson 
correlation 
(p value) 
Mapping 
model 1 
Mapping 
model 2 
Mapping 
model 3 
Mapping 
model 4 
Mapping 
model 5 
Probability Beta SD
No. of 
charges .40 (.01) ○ ○ ● ● ● .32 .31 .01 
Diminished 
capacity .41 (.01) ○ ● ● ● ● .45 .41 .01 
Net worth 
of property .62 (.001) ● ● ● ● ○ .91 .57 .01 
Summary 
penalty .65 (.001) ● ○ ○ ○ ○ .61 .20 .02 
Aggravating 
evidence .58 (.001) ● ○ ○ ○ ● .63 -.10 .02 
Mitigating 
evidence II  -.41 (.01) ● ● ○ ● ○ .78 .24 .01 
No. of 
offender .31(.05) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ .04 -.01 .01 
Confession .29 (.07) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ .03 -.09 .01 
Remorse -.01 (.98) ● ○ ○ ○ ○ .58 .07 .01 
PMP  .53 .10 .10 .07 .06    
BIC′  -49 -46 -46 -45 -45    
R²  .82 .76 .76 .78 .75    
Note: N = 40; Probability denotes that the probability that the factor has an effect and is 
given by Equation B3 (Appendix B). BIC′ denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion PMP 
denotes the posterior model probability. A solid circle denotes that a factor was included in 
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the model; an open circle denotes that a factor was not included in the model. For the 
analyses, the factors mitigating evidence II and remorse were recoded so that they correlated 
positively with sentence magnitude. The five best models all belonged to the class of 
mapping models 
Modeling—critical factors. Similarly to the analysis of the fining decisions, we used 
the BMA method to determine the factors with the highest probability of influencing 
sentence length. The factors included in the models were number of charges, net worth of 
property, diminished capacity, mitigating (II) and aggravating evidence, confession, 
summary penalty, number of offenders, and remorse, resulting in 512 models per model 
class with a prior probability of .002.  
Five regression models reached a posterior probability above .05, with the best model 
clearly superior to the other models with a probability of .28, compared to the second best 
model with a probability of .11. The best model explained 75% of the variance in the 
recommended incarceration length and reached a BIC′ value of –41. There was strong 
evidence for the effect of the factors number of charges, net worth of property, and 
diminished capacity. Additionally, there was some support that mitigating evidence II 
influenced sentencing recommendations for prison terms. The corresponding beta weights 
can be found in Table 14.  
For the mapping models, also five models reached a probability above .05. The best 
model reached a probability of .55 and explained 82% of the variance in sentence length, 
much more than the best regression model or the second best mapping model with a 
posterior probability of .10 and an r² of .76. However, the factors supported by the mapping 
models differed from the factors supported by the regression models. Similar to the 
regression models, net worth of property received strong support, and mitigating evidence II 
some support. However, there was hardly any evidence for number of charges, and 
diminished capacity was somewhat less important. Instead, there was additional evidence for 
the summary penalty, aggravating evidence, and remorse.  
In sum, the analyses showed consistently that—despite the stipulations of the law—
only a few factors were necessary to describe sentencing. However, which factors were 
considered important differed between the two model classes. Although both model classes 
supported the factors net worth of property violated, mitigating evidence II, and diminished 
capacity, applying the regression models provided evidence for the factor number of charges, 
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whereas the mapping models indicated the factors summary penalty, aggravating evidence, 
and remorse.  
Model comparison. To find out which class of models was better suited to explain 
incarceration decisions, we again entered all models in a joint comparison. The final analysis 
comparing 1,024 models from both model classes supported the mapping model as the 
superior type of model. The best five models belonged to this model class (see Table 14). 
The posterior probabilities of these models added up to a joint probability of .86, compared 
with a probability of .14 for the remaining 1,019 models. Again, the class of mapping 
models was more strongly supported than the regression models. The posterior probability of 
all mapping models added up to .96, compared to .04 for the regression models. This is 
illustrated by Figure 10, depicting the posterior probabilities of the best 100 models. 
 
Figure 10: The posterior model probability of the best 100 models describing the 
incarceration decisions, differentiated by model class. Of the 100 best models, 65% belong 
to the class of mapping models and 35% to the class of regression models 
The joint model comparison also supported the evaluation of the factors’ importance 
by the mapping model (see Table 14). There was strong evidence for the factors net worth of 
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property and mitigating evidence (II), and some support for summary penalty, aggravating 
evidence, remorse, and diminished capacity. 
Discussion 
There are two ways in which sentencing decisions can deviate from the law: First, the 
decision can be based on a different set of factors than required by the law; second, the way 
these factors lead to a sentence can be inconsistent with the prescribed legal policy. The 
present article examined both routes by testing two different models of decision making and 
by identifying the crucial factors influencing sentencing, following a Bayesian approach.  
The model comparison test allowed us to identify which type of model—one 
consistent with the legal theory or one derived from cognitive psychology—captured the 
sentencing decisions best. Furthermore we were able to identify the factors that were crucial 
for each model class to predict the sentencing. Our results show that the prosecutors neither 
considered all factors required by law nor exhibited decision processes consistent with the 
policy assumed by the legal literature. Instead, the decisions of the prosecutors were best 
described by a heuristic for quantitative estimation, the mapping model (Helversen & 
Rieskamp, in press). In the following we will first discuss the results on which factors 
predicted sentence recommendations and differences between fines and incarceration 
sentences. Then we will turn to the model comparison and the significance of the BMA 
method for sentencing research. Finally we will discuss limitations of the current study. 
Predictors of Sentencing Decisions 
Prosecutors clearly deviated from the law concerning the factors that had an impact on 
sentencing length. According to the law, all legally relevant factors in the analysis should 
have affected the sentence recommendation. However, in both types of sentencing decisions 
only a few factors were sufficient to predict the prosecutors’ recommendations. It is in 
particular surprising that factors such as confession or remorse did not always lead to lower 
sentences, as they are usually stated as mitigating factors in the rationale for the verdict. The 
results are, however, in line with psychological research on judgment and decision making, 
which has repeatedly shown that humans often lack insight into their judgment policies 
(Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988) and tend to base their decisions on only a few factors (Brehmer, 
1994).  
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Interestingly, the factors influencing fining and incarceration decisions varied 
substantially. For one, the magnitude of the fine was higher if the sentence was imposed via 
penalty order than if by trial, whereas incarceration length was influenced by diminished 
capacity. However, as there were no cases of diminished capacity in the sample receiving 
fines and sentencing by penalty order is not allowed for incarceration sentences, these 
differential effects are not very surprising. More interestingly, fines were influenced by prior 
record and aggravating evidence, but not by mitigating evidence. This suggests that the 
prosecution, deciding which factors were relevant, might have relied on an image of a 
“typical” case. Factors that indicated deviation from the norm were considered for the 
sentence while factors that constituted the “normal” case were not (Mösl, 1983; Tata, 1997). 
Fines are usually imposed in less serious cases. Thus, in cases punished by a fine the 
prosecution might have already “used up” the influence of any mitigating information by 
sparing the offender an incarceration sentence, while in cases punished with incarceration 
the mitigating information was taken into account, reducing sentence length. 
Model Comparison 
In both types of sentencing decisions, our analyses clearly illustrated that cognitively 
derived mapping model provided a much better explanation for the sentencing process than 
the regression model that is consistent with legal regulations. For the fining decisions, just 
about any mapping model was more probable than a regression model. Even in the 
incarceration decisions the five best models belonged to the mapping model class. These 
results are in line with those of Helversen and Rieskamp (in press), who demonstrated the 
success of the mapping model in comparison to the regression model in a laboratory 
estimation task. Because the regression model was outperformed by the mapping model, this 
result suggests that prosecutors do not weigh each factor individually and sum up the 
weighted evidence as one would expect from standard legal procedure. Instead, the cognitive 
process underlying sentencing decisions was more in line with the mapping model. 
Therefore, when prosecutors make sentencing decisions they apparently use the evidence 
provided to group cases of similar seriousness together, where the seriousness of a case 
depends on its average value on the factors considered relevant. Finally, a typical sentence is 
stored for each category and used to evaluate a present case.  
The finding that cognitive models are more suitable to predict legal decision making is 
consistent with previous findings, indicating that legal decision-making processes often do 
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not concur with the procedures assumed by the law (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Hertwig, 
2006; Van Duyne, 1987). However, although our study illustrates that a cognitive model was 
more suitable to predict sentencing than a model consistent with standard legal procedure, 
we emphasize that following the mapping model to make sentencing decisions does not 
necessarily represent a case of biased decision making. In contrast, Helversen and Rieskamp 
(in press) showed that in situations in which the criterion is nonlinearly distributed, the 
mapping model was more accurate in predicting the criterion than a regression model. Thus, 
in sentencing situations in which the distribution of the cases’ seriousness is highly skewed, 
the mapping model might be, in fact, more suitable than a regression model for making 
sentencing decisions. Particularly in low-level crimes, where legal decision makers operate 
under severe time constraints, making sentencing decisions according to the mapping model 
could be an adaptive response.  
Nevertheless, making a decision according to the mapping model compared to a 
weighted additive model will often lead to different sentences. This raises the question of 
which process sentencing should follow. It also resonates with a discussion in the German 
legal literature in the 1980s. Instigated by a decision of the German Federal Court of Justice, 
the relevance of “normal” and “average” cases as reference points for sentencing was 
discussed (see Bruns, 1988; Mösl, 1981, 1983; Theune, 1985a, 1985b). Likewise in England, 
similarity-based decision aids for sentencing have been under discussion (e.g., Tata, 1998). 
In principle, because the German penal code does not regulate how the relevant factors 
should be integrated, processes as assumed by the mapping model might be legally 
justifiable. Although this is ultimately a legal question, psychological insights into the 
cognitive processes underlying legal decisions could inform a legal discussion on sentencing 
laws and might provide valuable input for the development of institutions. 
Bayesian Approach 
The way we analyzed the data and tested the two competing models differs 
substantially from the standard approach taken in policy-capturing research (e.g., Cooksey, 
1996). According to the standard approach, one single regression model is estimated by 
applying a specific statistical test procedure. This approach has the disadvantage that it can 
lead to rather different results and conclusions depending on the statistical procedure chosen. 
Moreover, the interpretation of the influence of single factors is rather complicated, because 
the influence depends on the other factors included in the equation.  
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In contrast, the Bayesian approach we followed led us to consider all possible models 
that could be constructed with the available predictors and for each model the posterior 
probability was estimated. The two competing model classes were tested against each other 
by considering all models of each class and not simply one best model. This model 
comparison test provided very strong empirical support for the mapping model. Moreover, 
by considering which factors were included in models with large posterior probabilities, it 
was possible to provide more reliable conclusion about the factors that are important for 
sentencing decisions.  
Limitations of the Study 
Our study focused on one single German court. This naturally raises the question of 
how well the results generalize. Many studies have shown the importance of location and the 
legal culture of a jurisdictional district (e.g., Johnson, 2006; Kautt, 2002; Langer 1994). 
Especially, which factors influence sentence magnitude could differ between districts and 
thus our results concerning the importance of factors should be treated with caution. 
Furthermore, our results were based on a rather small sample, which could reduce the 
generalizability of the results even within the jurisdictional district. Nevertheless, for the 
restricted data set we could illustrate the benefits of a cognitively inspired approach to legal 
decision making. Future research is necessary to test if these results can be replicated with 
larger samples for a wider range of jurisdictional districts. Although this needs to be tested, 
we do not have a reason to assume that prosecutors from Brandenburg differ in their 
cognitive processes from prosecutors in other parts of Germany. If anything, a higher case 
load and more time pressure should be expected.  
Even when generalizing outside of Germany, similar results might be anticipated, 
given that the general features of the task remain the same. That is, as long as the prosecutor 
or the judge has to integrate several factors to determine a final sentence, the mapping model 
could offer a valid description of the process. However, legal systems where sentencing is 
strictly regulated by sentencing guidelines, as, for instance, in the United States, could 
provide exceptions. Thus further studies investigating the generalizability of the utility of the 
mapping model to explain sentencing are necessary.  
In a similar vein, it is important to note that this study focused on low-level offenses. It 
is an open question if the same cognitive processes underlie the sentencing of more severe 
cases, such as capital crimes. It appears reasonable that for more severe cases more factors 
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are taken into account for sentencing decisions, which therefore might be more in line with 
legal policy.  
Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper provides evidence that in sentencing, cognitive models are necessary to 
understand the decision process. Our results suggest that the sentence recommendations of 
prosecutors were not consistent with the requirements of the law; instead, sentence 
recommendations were well described by the mapping model, a cognitive theory for 
quantitative estimation (Helversen & Rieskamp, in press). This study joins a growing body 
of research questioning the ability of decision makers to comply with legal regulations and 
emphasizes the importance of understanding cognitive processes for the development of 
institutions. 
Appendices 
Appendix A 
Range Frequency Theory 
According to range frequency theory (Parducci, 1974), human judgments of 
magnitudes and size are context dependent, that is, they depend on the range of the stimulus 
values as well as on the frequency with which a stimulus value appears. The judged 
magnitude J of a stimulus i is given by the weighted sum of the range value R and the 
frequency value F (cf. Parducci, 1974, p. 209): 
(A1) Ji = wRi + (1 – w)Fi,  
with 0 < w < 1. The range value R represents the proportion of the current range below the 
current stimulus Si: 
(A2) Ri = (Si – Smin)/( Smax – Smin), 
where Si denotes the current stimulus value and Smin and Smax are respectively the smallest 
and the largest stimulus in the set. 
The frequency value Fi represents the proportion of all current values below the 
current stimulus: 
(A3) Fi = (ri – 1) / (N – 1), 
where Fi represent the frequency value of the stimulus i, ri is the rank of stimulus i, and N 
the number of stimuli in the set.
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Appendix B  
Bayesian Model Averaging 
The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) gives the odds with which a specific model 
is preferred to a baseline model.To calculate a model’s BIC′ value we compared it with the 
null model (a baseline model with no independent variables), following Raftery (1995, 
Equation 26, p. 135): 
(B1) ( ) nqRnCBI kkk log1log 2 +−=′ , 
where R²k is the value of R² for model Mk, qk is the number of free parameters for that model, 
and n is the number of data points. The kCBI ′  gives the BIC value for the null model 
compared to the model Mk. The BIC′ of the null model is zero. Accordingly, if the kCBI ′  is 
positive the null model is preferred to the model Mk. However, if the kCBI ′  is negative, 
model Mk is preferred to the null model, and the smaller the kCBI ′ , the more Mk is supported 
by the data. 
The posterior probability of a model is defined as: 
(B2) ( ) ( ) ( )∑ = −−≈ Kl lkk BICBICDMp 1 2121 'exp/'exp , 
(cf. Raftery, 1995, Equation 35, p. 145) where p gives the probability of model Mk given the 
data D in comparison with all models from set K assuming an equal prior probability of 1/k 
for all models. 
The posterior probability pr that a factor B has an effect (B ≠ 0) is given by the sum of 
the posterior probabilities of all models ( )DMp k  that include B, here referred to as model 
set A: 
(B3) [ ] ( )∑=≠
A
k DMpDBpr 0 , 
(cf. Raftery, 1995, Equation 36, p. 145).  
The beta weight and the standard error of the beta weights can be estimated by an 
approximation to a Bayesian point estimator and an analogue of the standard error. 
Approximations are given by: 
(B4) [ ] ( ) ( )∑ ′≈≠
A
k DMpkDE ,ˆ0, 111 βββ  
(cf. Raftery, 1995, Equations 38 and 39, p. 146), where 
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( ) ( ) 1/ 0k kp M D p M D pr Dβ′ ⎡ ⎤= ≠⎣ ⎦ , E denotes the expected value of the beta weight 1β , 
and ( )k1ˆβ  is the maximum likelihood estimator of 1β  under Model Mk. 
Respectively, the standard error can be approximated by: 
(B5) [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) [ ]2112121112 0,ˆ0, ≠−′+≈≠ ∑ βββββ DEDMpkkseDSD
A
k , 
where ( )kse21  is the standard error of 1β  under Model Mk (cf. Raftery, 1995, p. 146). 
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Footnotes 
1. Besides the factors stated in § 46, German law allows sentence adjustments to 
achieve general prevention as well as specific prevention objectives (Meier, 2001; Schäfer, 
2001). Furthermore the sentencing range can be lowered if mitigating reasons as specified in 
articles 21, 23, and 49, exist. As our sample did not included mitigated sentencing ranges 
according to these articles, we relied on the sentencing ranges as specified for common and 
aggravated cases of theft (§242 ff.), fraud (§263), and forgery (§267). 
2. To simplify the statistical analysis we inverted all factors that were negatively 
correlated with sentence magnitude, so that after inversion all factors were positively 
correlated with sentence magnitude. Please note that this is only a statistical simplification; 
alternatively the difference between the mean score on aggravating factors and the mean 
score on mitigating factors could be taken.
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General Discussion 
The goal of this research was to investigate the processes underlying estimation from 
multiple cues and to examine if a heuristic model can be formalized to describe the 
estimation process. I proposed the mapping model as a possible cognitive theory for 
estimation and tested it in multiple experiments against several models of estimation put 
forward in the literature. Overall, the results clearly supported the mapping model as a 
realistic model of human cognition. It described participants’ estimations in diverse 
laboratory tasks, reaching from estimating the toxicity of bugs, the probability of cure from a 
disease, and the evaluation score of job candidates. Furthermore, it was well suited to 
capture prosecutors’ sentence recommendations for low-level crimes. Additionally, the 
research provided evidence that estimation processes are adapted to the environment. Thus 
how well the mapping model described participants’ estimations depended on the 
characteristics of the task. In the following, I will discuss under which conditions the 
mapping model performed well, when other models might be better suited to describe the 
peoples’ estimations and the resulting implications for the estimation process. Further, I will 
discuss the problems of model selection and the methods I used to address them. Finally, I 
will consider possible extensions and limitations of the approach and its generalizability to 
other areas of research. 
Mapping Model 
Overall, the mapping model proved to be a suitable model for human estimation. In 
several studies it described participants’ estimations as good as or better than a linear 
regression model, an exemplar model, or QuickEst, a noncompensatory heuristic. Even 
though the mapping model is a deterministic model that ignores interindividual differences 
between the participants, it was surprisingly good at predicting individual estimations. 
Consistent with the idea that cognitive processes are adapted to the structure of the 
environment, the model’s success was clearly dependent on the structure of the estimation 
task. In my dissertation I specified conditions under which the mapping model predicts 
participants’ estimations well. The first chapter provided evidence that the mapping model is 
influenced by the statistical structure of the estimation environment. It performed well in 
nonlinear environments, that is, if the criterion was a nonlinear function of the cues or 
followed a J-shaped distribution. The second chapter highlighted the importance of another 
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aspect of the task: the availability of explicit task knowledge, and the ease with which it can 
be acquired. If participants were informed about the cue directions, the mapping model was 
clearly the best model to predict participants’ estimations. Furthermore, also if participants 
could easily abstract explicit knowledge about the cues during training, the mapping model 
outperformed the other models. Last, but not least, the mapping model did not only describe 
participants’ estimations in a highly constrained experimental task but the laboratory results 
shown in the first two chapters were supported by those in the third chapter, showing the 
success of the mapping model in a real-world example. 
Regression Model 
In the first chapter, I tested the mapping model against a multiple linear regression 
model, as the predominant model for quantitative judgment in the literature. Regression 
models have been widely and successfully used to capture judgment policies in many areas 
of social research (e.g., Hammond, 1996; Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). However, researchers 
have questioned if people possess the cognitive capacities to perform the rather complex 
calculation required by a regression analysis. In this vein, it has been contended that 
regression models do not capture the process underlying a decision, even if they accurately 
predict decisions’ outcomes (Hoffman, 1960; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; see also Doherty & 
Brehmer, 1997). However, many researchers have argued that this criticism does not 
necessarily affect the idea that judgments follow a linear additive estimation process. 
According to this argument participants assign each cue a subjective weight and then add the 
weighted cues (Einhorn et al., 1979; Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2003; Juslin et al., in 
press). Multiple linear regression analysis is employed to estimate the subjective weights that 
participants assigned to the cues, but without the claim that it reflects the process of how 
participants determined the weights.1 
Consistent with this literature supporting the success of linear additive models to 
describe human judgment (Juslin et al., in press; Juslin et al., 2003; Brehmer, 1994; Einhorn 
                                                 
 
1 However, it should be noted that the assumption that the estimation process in fact follows a linear 
additive combination of the cue information makes it reasonable to impose restrictions on the regression model, 
for example, see the constraints assumed by the cue abstraction module of the Sigma model (Juslin et al., in 
press). 
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et al., 1979; Kalish, Lewandowsky, & Kruschke, 2004; Anderson, 1981; Hammond, 1996), 
the results in Chapter 1 (Study 3) showed that a linear regression model described 
participants’ estimations well, if the criterion was a linear additive function of the cues. 
Interestingly, in this task, the correct cue weights could be abstracted easily, which 
could have enhanced the reliance on a linear additive strategy. Due to the deterministic 
nature of the task, the correct cue weights could be estimated from any two training objects, 
differing only on this cue during the training phase (Juslin, et al., in press). This was not 
possible in the tasks with skewed criteria or a nonlinear relation between the cues and the 
criteria, which could be one of the cues indicating to the participants that a linear additive 
strategy can not be successfully applied in these tasks.  
Exemplar Model 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I tested the mapping model against an exemplar-based model 
(Juslin et al., 2003). Exemplar models have been quite successful in describing behavior in 
categorization (Nosofsky, 1986; Kruschke, 1992), and were recently successfully put 
forward as a model for quantitative estimation (Juslin et al., in press). One advantage of 
exemplar models is that they can offer an accurate solution to tasks that can not be 
successfully solved by rule-based processes (Juslin et al. in press; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 
2006). In this vein, Juslin and colleagues argued for a shift to exemplar-based processing if 
the criterion is a nonlinear function of the cues, and thus a linear additive model, such as 
multiple linear regression, could not successfully predict the criterion. However, the results 
in my studies suggested that these claims need to be further specified. The exemplar model 
was the best model to describe participants’ estimations if participants had no prior 
knowledge about the cues and could not easily acquire knowledge during the training phase. 
Nevertheless, if these requirements were met, I found, consistent with Juslin and colleagues 
(in press), support for a spontaneous shift to exemplar-based processing. This is notable, as 
Olsson et al. (2006) recently had only found a shift to exemplar-based strategy if participants 
were explicitly instructed to use this strategy. Olsson and colleagues argued that a shift only 
occurs spontaneously if the reliance on exemplar knowledge promised accurate performance 
at the beginning of the training phase. As in Study 2 (Chapter 2), the exemplar model led to 
an accurate performance during training, which could have increased the accessibility of 
exemplar-based strategies.  
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Overall, the results suggested that exemplar models in fact offer a valid description of 
human estimation processes, but that the situations in which they are applied are rather 
specific. More precisely, people seem to only fall back on exemplar-based strategies if other 
rule-based models are not suited to solve the task. 
A second point worth noting concerns the parameterization of the exemplar model. 
Throughout my dissertation, I considered two versions of the exemplar model: a complex 
version with a free parameter for every cue and a simplified version assuming that all cues 
are weighted equally. In the majority of the tasks, the simplified exemplar model was better 
in predicting participants’ estimations than the more complex standard version, indicating 
that the original version of the exemplar model is prone to overfitting, and that the attention 
parameters need to be interpreted with caution. However, in the reanalysis of Experiment 1 
by Juslin et al. (in press) and the second study in Chapter 2, there was a stable minority of 
participants best described by the complex exemplar model. This suggests that sometimes 
the additional parameters can prove to be necessary and informative, especially if not all 
cues are predictive and thus not used for the estimation. Likewise, Rehder and Hoffman 
(2005a, 2005b) showed that the parameter of exemplar models (see also Kruschke, 1992; 
Nosofsky, 1986) match the actual attention that participants allocate to the cues. However, it 
leaves the question of, how many parameters should be assumed a priori, and under which 
conditions the parameters can be reliably interpreted as reflecting the attention given to the 
cue (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Juslin et al., 2003)? Results by Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) 
indicated that this could also be dependent on the duration of training, as they found a 
learning pattern where initially all cues were considered, but attention gradually concentrated 
on the relevant features. 
QuickEst 
In the first chapter, I also considered the heuristic QuickEst as a competitor for the 
mapping model and a possible alternative model for quantitative estimation (Hertwig et al., 
1999). In particular, in the J-shaped condition, a good performance of QuickEst would have 
been expected. However, the overall support for QuickEst was rather weak. Though in the 
very first study about 20% of the participants were best described by QuickEst, it did not 
perform well in the second study. Likewise, an empirical study by Hausmann et al. (2007) 
did not find any support for QuickEst as a model of human behavior. However, in the studies 
presented here, one reason for the lack of support for QuickEst could lie in the design of the 
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task. Participants were presented with all relevant information simultaneously and free of 
charge. Research on inferential decision making in pair comparisons, however, indicated that 
noncompensatory strategies, like QuickEst, could be favored under time pressure or if 
information search is costly (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, in press; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1988; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Like “tally,” the mapping model is an information intensive 
strategy including all cues that are considered relevant. QuickEst, on the other hand, ignores 
a large part of the information, and thus QuickEst might be more readily employed if 
information has to be retrieved from memory or involves others’ costs (Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003). 
Implications for the Process of Estimation 
Assumptions of the Mapping Model  
The mapping model makes explicit assumptions about the processes underlying 
estimation. Thus, the mapping model’s success in describing the estimation process has 
specific implications regarding human estimation processes. According to the mapping 
model, people group objects together into a few categories based on the amount of evidence 
provided by the cues, and then select a typical estimate for each category, reflecting the 
central tendency of the objects falling into this category. More specifically, it implies that all 
cues are weighted equally, and that similar estimates follow from grouping objects together 
at an abstract level and not by similar configurations of cues. In these assumptions, the 
mapping model differs from the other models of estimation. 
With the assumptions that all relevant cues are weighted equally, the mapping model 
differs from the regression model and the standard version of the exemplar model, which 
both propose that cues are weighted according to their importance. Overall, the results of my 
dissertation provided evidence for the equal weight approach assumed by the mapping model 
in nonlinear environments, but not for linear environments. In nonlinear estimation tasks, the 
mapping model accurately predicted participants’ estimations in the laboratory. Likewise, 
the mapping model outperformed the regression model in a naturalistic estimation task. 
Furthermore, the exemplar model with a single attention parameter for all cues performed 
better than an exemplar model that potentially ignored cues, resonating with research 
highlighting the good performance of unit weight models in prediction tasks (Dawes, 1979).  
Although the unit weight approach of the mapping model was successful even if the cues 
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differed clearly in their predictiveness (Chapter 1), the results in Chapter 2 indicated that this 
might be limited to situations where knowledge about the cues is available. When the cues 
differed substantially in their predictiveness and participants had no prior knowledge, at least 
some participants were better captured by an exemplar model, allowing for differential 
weighting of the cues. This is also consistent with results by Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) 
who reported a shift of attention measured by eye movements to relevant cues during 
training. 
A second related assumption of the mapping model is that object category membership 
is computed on the level of the summed evidence ignoring which specific cue contributed to 
the cue sum. Here, the mapping model differs from the exemplar model. While the exemplar 
model determines the similarity of two objects by the number of matches on the cues, and 
thus puts emphasis on specific configurations of cues, the mapping model assumes that 
objects are grouped together based on the total evidence provided by the cues, regardless of 
how many cues actually match. The clear qualitative pattern in the studies in Chapter 2 
provided evidence that, at least if knowledge about the cue directions is available, 
participants’ behavior corresponded to the assumptions of the mapping model, estimating 
similar values for objects with the same number of positive cues regardless of the dimension 
the cues were in. This also relates to Brunswik’s idea of vicarious functioning (1952), that is, 
cues can be replaced by each other to reach the same judgment.  
Adaptive Behavior in Quantitative Estimation 
A further clear result from the experimental studies was that no single model could 
explain participants’ behavior in all situations. Instead, the results indicated that whatever 
model was most successful in describing participants’ estimations was a function of the 
environment. Similar to pair comparison tasks, participants adaptively shifted their 
estimation strategies to match the structure of the task (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Laine, 2003; Payne et al. 1993; Juslin et al., in 
press). Consistent with the simulation study in Chapter 1, the mapping model performed 
better than or as good as the other models if the criterion followed a skewed or linear 
distribution. Likewise, the mapping model or the exemplar model was best if the criterion 
was a nonlinear function of the cues and thus a linear regression model was not suited to 
solve the task. However, if the criterion was a linear function of the cues, and thus linear 
regression was the optimal model to solve the task, participants’ estimations were 
General Discussion                                                                                         Page |   147 
consistently best described by a regression model. Moreover, the last paper indicated that the 
adaptive match between models and task structures was not just a result of the artificial 
nature of the task environment. In a real-world estimation task with a skewed criterion, when 
predicting sentence magnitude for low-level crimes, the mapping model also outperformed 
the regression model. 
 Likewise, the shift from the mapping model to exemplar-based processing, as reported 
in Chapter 2, can be regarded as adaptive. As knowledge about the correct cue directions is 
indispensable for the accurate performance of the mapping model, the ease with which the 
mapping model can be applied is closely tied to prior knowledge about the cues. If the cue 
directions are clear, the mapping model only demands minimal computation and can be 
correctly executed with little training. Thus, relying on the mapping model leads to a 
computational advantage if it can be applied to master the estimation task from the 
beginning. However, if the mapping model was not easily applicable because detecting the 
correct cue directions was difficult and a linear additive model could not successfully be 
applied, shifting to an exemplar-based estimation process can be considered an adaptive 
response to the task. 
Though my results indicate an adaptive shift in processing dependent on the task 
structure, it remains unclear if the shift is due to an automatic error-driven learning process 
(e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, 
& Waldron, 1998) or to deliberate and voluntary processing (Haider, Frensch, & Joram, 
2005). Although I did not model the learning process, it seems reasonable to assume that 
participants did not commit, at the onset of the task, for one type of processing, but learnt 
during the task which type of processing was most successful (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005b). 
However, it seems probable that also deliberative and controlled processes are involved. 
Recently, Haider and colleagues (2005) suggested that explicit knowledge stems from 
voluntary inferential processes. This suggests that learning the cue directions and thus the 
application of the mapping model, if no prior knowledge is available, could depend on a 
voluntary inferential effort of the participants to acquire this information. 
Model Selection Methods 
The goal of my dissertation was to determine which model was best suited to describe 
the participants’ estimations. However, this raises methodological concerns, especially if 
models of differing complexity are compared, as just selecting the best-fitting model often 
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leads to the wrong choice (Robert & Pashler, 2000; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). Although 
flexible models, that is, models with more free parameters, are better able to fit a specific 
dataset, they run the risk of overfitting the data. That is, they not only capture the systematic 
variance due to the underlying process but also fit random variance in the data. Thus, the 
best-fitting models are not necessarily best to accurately predict new data, making it 
indispensable to take model complexity into account for model selection. In my research, I 
addressed the problem of model selection with different methodologies. 
Generalization Method: Out of Sample Prediction  
In Chapters 1 and 2, I implemented a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). 
In a first step, I set the models’ free parameters to equate the models’ flexibilities by fitting 
them to a training set. Next, I predicted participants’ estimates for a test set by computing the 
test objects’ criterion values based on the obtained parameter values. The test set consisted 
of “old” exemplars, that is, test objects with the same cue values as the training objects, and 
of “new” objects, that is, test objects that they did not encounter during training, forcing the 
models to make sample predictions. Generalization tests go beyond pure cross validation: 
They not only ensure that only a model capturing the process underlying the estimation 
process is able to make accurate predictions, they also warrant that good model performance 
is not restricted to the objects encountered during training, but can be generalized out of the 
tested sample. However, they make the underlying assumption that the same processes 
govern the generation of data in both samples.  
Qualitative Tests 
Although quantitative measures of model performance are informative and allow a first 
test, if a model can capture human behavior, they do not offer any insights if the model 
assumptions actually correspond to the cognitive process generating the data. Furthermore, 
models often make very similar predictions, making it difficult to differentiate between them 
on a pure quantitative level. In the first chapter, I addressed this problem by selecting test 
objects on which the models differed in their predictions to increase the possibility to 
differentiate between the models. In the second chapter, I went one step further and tested 
qualitative predictions to underpin the quantitative model test. Qualitative tests are highly 
desirable because they can be constructed to be widely independent of model parameters, 
and they allow a better test of the models’ assumptions (Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung, 
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2006). My goal was to provide some evidence that the participants’ behavior actually 
corresponds to the model assumptions about the estimation process. For this I focused on 
differences in the core assumptions the models make about the estimation process. For one 
the mapping model assumes that objects with a same cue sum are grouped together and 
receive the same criterion value as estimate. However, objects with differing cue sums are 
assigned to different categories and thus receive differing estimates. In contrast, the 
exemplar model relies on the similarity relations of the test objects to the training objects, 
which can be similar for two objects with differing cue sums. However, if two objects are 
maximally different, that is they do not match on a single cue, it is probable that they will 
also differ in their similarity relations to the training objects and thus in the estimates for the 
criterion. Based on these model assumptions, I constructed test conditions in which the 
models differed in their ordinal predictions, largely independent from the model parameters. 
Thus, when the participants’ estimations matched the model predictions, this gave a strong 
indication that the model in fact captured the cognitive process underlying the estimations. 
Bayesian Model Averaging 
In the third paper, I relied on a different methodology for model selection. Similar to 
Chapters 1 and 2, one methodological problem was that I was comparing models of differing 
complexity, and thus different abilities to fit a data set. However, this study offered a further 
methodological problem as the relevant cues for the estimation task were not clear, but one 
goal of the analysis was to identify which predictors reliably influenced sentencing. In 
regression analysis, often methods based on significance testing, such as stepwise regression 
procedures, are used to find the best model to describe the data and to quantify the impact 
that the cues have on the estimation. However, these methods are often unreliable, 
potentially leading to different results if cues are stepwise included or excluded. 
Furthermore, focusing on a single model ignores the uncertainty involved in model selection 
and the conclusions that can be drawn from a single model. To address these problems, I 
chose a Bayesian Model Averaging method (BMA) by Raftery (1995). Based on the BIC 
approximation for the Bayes’ factor (Schwartz, 1978; Raftery, 1995), the BMA method can 
be used to more reliably identify which models most probably underlie the data, and takes 
model complexity into account by penalizing a model for its number of free parameters. 
Moreover, it takes model uncertainty fully into account to determine which predictors have a 
significant impact on the estimation. Thus, it seemed to be a more reliable methodology to 
analyze the data. 
General Discussion                                                                                         Page |   150 
Limitations and Extension of the Mapping Model 
Though the mapping model was quite successful in describing participants’ 
estimations, there are limits to its applicability. In the following, I will sketch some of the 
boundary conditions for the mapping model and how it could possibly be extended in the 
future. 
Cue Selection  
The mapping model does not have a mechanism incorporated to decide which cues 
should be included or to stop search for further information, but works on the assumption 
that all relevant cues are included in the estimation. This makes the assumption that prior 
knowledge about which cues are important is available and can be incorporated into the 
analysis, or the cues are preselected for their relevance (Brehmer, 1994). Thus, in real-world 
estimation tasks, the applicability of the mapping model could be limited because often an 
enormous amount of possible relevant cues can be identified, and knowledge about the cues’ 
quality is not easily available (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988). One way to solve this problem is 
to employ statistical methods, such as the BMA (Raftery, 1995), to identify which cues 
influenced the estimation processes.  
However, a second possibility would be to implement a search and a stopping rule to 
model how the decision to include or exclude a cue is made (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).  
Cue Weighting 
The mapping model assumes that all cues are weighted equally; an assumption which 
was largely supported by the data in my dissertation. In a similar vein, unit weight linear 
models have been found to be as good or better as proper regression models, providing 
evidence for the robustness of a unit weight approach (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1975). In this vein Dawes and Corrigan (1974) wrote: 
“The whole trick is to decide what variables to look at and then know how to add.” (p. 105). 
However, the assumption of equal weights is a simplification which will not hold for 
all situations. It has been repeatedly shown that, in tasks with few cues, participants are able 
to differentially weight cues and can learn to ignore irrelevant cues (e.g., Castellan, 1973; 
Brehmer, 1973; Klayman, 1988; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999). Furthermore, Rehder and 
Hoffman (2005b) showed that spatial attention measured by eye movements was eventually 
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restricted to relevant cues. If several predictive cues are available, it seems unrealistic that 
the correct weights for all cues are correctly learnt, making a unit weight approach more 
probable. However, if only two or three cues are available and furthermore strongly differ in 
their validity, it seems probable that humans would learn not to rely on all cues, but 
concentrate their attention on the cues offering predictive information. Thus, in this situation, 
the simplification by the mapping model might lead to worse performance and not reflect the 
behavior of the participants, restricting it to situations with several predictive cues.  
Extrapolation 
Similar to the exemplar model, the mapping model does not extrapolate over the range 
of criterion values encountered during training. This seems to be a reasonable assumption if 
multiple cues are available and the environment is nonlinear (Juslin et al, 2003; Juslin et al., 
in press). Likewise, the results of Study 3 (Chapter 1) only provided evidence for 
extrapolation if the criterion was a linear additive function of the cues. However, research 
has shown that people are able to extrapolate in a one-dimensional function learning task 
(e.g., DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997; Kalish et al., 2004). Moreover, in the second 
study (Chapter 2), participants extrapolated over the experienced range in a condition in 
which the participants’ estimations were otherwise well-described by the mapping model. 
This suggests that it could be plausible to consider an extrapolation mechanism for the 
mapping model. For instance, if the maximum is known and an object falling outside of the 
existing categories is encountered, a new category could be formed, and a typical criterion 
value falling between the criterion for the closest category and the maximum value 
estimated.  
Continuous Cue Information 
In the first two papers, I presented a version of the mapping model relying on binary 
cues. However, cues often provide more finely-graded information which can be used for the 
estimation. It seems to be sensible to assume that the continuous information is used and not 
just reduced to binary information. Thus, in the third chapter, I extended the mapping model 
to apply it to continuous cues. This extension differed in some respect from the binary 
version in Chapters 1 and 2, even though the model predictions are equivalent. More 
specifically, the continuous version of the mapping model assumes that, consistent with 
range frequency theory (Parducci, 1974), the perception of the magnitude of cues’ values is 
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normalized, a mechanism which was not necessary in the binary version. Second, in the 
continuous version of the mapping models, the cues are integrated by averaging the cue 
values instead of adding positive cue information. Furthermore, in the first two papers, the 
number of categories and category membership is determined by the number of positive 
cues, but in the continuous version, the number of categories is set to seven (Miller, 1956), 
which are found by dividing the range of averaged cue values into equally sized categories.  
As the continuous version of the mapping model made identical predictions in the 
tasks reported in Chapters 1 and 2, it was impossible to evaluate the two versions against 
each other in this work. However, from a theoretical perspective, relying on an averaging 
approach seems plausible, resonating with research on information integration (Anderson, 
1965, 1967; Juslin et al., in press). Similarly, the range frequency theory provides a 
psychological plausible theory of how continuous cues are perceived (Parducci, 1974).  
Moreover, the results from Chapter 3 can be seen as a first support that the mapping model 
can be successfully extended to continuous cues. However, a more rigorous examination 
with an experimental approach of a continuous version is certainly necessary. 
Generalizability and Applications of the Mapping Model 
The success of the mapping model in predicting sentencing recommendations 
indicated that it can serve as a model of quantitative estimation in real-world tasks; in 
particular if similar conditions, as identified in the first two chapters, are encountered. This 
could be more frequent than appears at first glance: In many estimation tasks, we encounter 
in our daily lives that we possess explicit knowledge about the task, in particular about the 
cues. Knowledge about the task can not only be acquired through personal experience but 
can also be socially transmitted. For example, legal or medical education consists, to a large 
part, of transmitting knowledge about which cues are predictive in a specific task, such as 
diagnosing a specific disease or deciding if a defendant violated the law. Furthermore, 
skewed distributions are frequent. Because general growth processes commonly generate 
power law distributions (Gabaix, 1999), diverse phenomena ranging from city sizes to record 
sales or the size of computer files follow J-shaped distributions (for a review, see Schroeder, 
1991). Thus, the conditions for the successful application of the mapping model could 
frequently be at hand. In a similar vein, consistent with the general idea of the mapping 
model, research in diverse areas of psychology has shown that unit weight summary indices 
of risk and protective factors are often the most reliable predictor to assess the risk of 
General Discussion                                                                                         Page |   153 
juvenile delinquency or childrens’ intelligence scores (e.g., Sameroff, Seifer, Baldwin, & 
Baldwin, 1993). In sum, the applicability of the mapping model is not restricted to laboratory 
or legal decision-making tasks, but can easily be employed to model quantitative estimations 
in a variety of areas. 
Conclusion 
Past research on quantitative estimation has almost exclusively relied on linear 
regression models to model the human estimation processes. In spite of the success of 
regression models in predicting the outcome of estimation, these models have been criticized 
for not capturing the cognitive process underlying estimations (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; 
Hoffman, 1960). Recently, alternative computational models were proposed for the area of 
quantitative judgment and estimation (e.g., Juslin et al., 2003; in press). My dissertation 
presents an important contribution to this literature, proposing a new cognitively inspired 
theory for quantitative estimation that outperformed current models of estimation in 
capturing peoples’ behavior. In particular, in situations in which linear regression did not 
capture human behavior, the mapping model offered a plausible alternative solution. 
Furthermore, the mapping model explained peoples’ estimations not only in several 
laboratory studies but also in a real-world environment. This suggests that its applicability is 
not restricted to laboratory tasks, but can be potentially employed in a diverse set of tasks. 
Thus, the mapping model offers an interesting extension for the adaptive toolbox 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), providing a further tool for quantitative estimations.   
A second contribution of my research concerns the link between environmental 
structures and cognitive processing, extending existing research on the adaptive nature of 
human decision making to quantitative estimation (Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd, & 
the ABC Research Group, 1999). More specifically, my work showed that specific task 
structures differentially affected cognitive components that were essential for the models’ 
assumptions about the estimation task. Consequently, model performance was, to a high 
degree, a function of the environment. In sum, my research not only highlights the impact of 
the environment on cognitive processing but also the importance of precise assumption about 
cognitive processes for psychological research. 
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